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A b s t r a c t
The ability to infer the invisible displacement of objects has long been thought to 
elude most species with the exception of humans and great apes. However, in recent 
years, a number of researchers have proposed that this elusive capacity, rather than 
reflecting profound differences in the conceptual abilities of monkeys and other 
nonprimates, may instead reflect differences in processing capacities (such as 
inhibition and working memory). This thesis investigated knowledge of occluded 
object movements involving gravity, in rhesus and stumptail macaques {Macaca 
mulatta and arctoides), and two- and tliree-year-old children {Homo sapiens). In the 
first part of the thesis, using manual search tasks, a behavioural analysis revealed a 
number of biases that influence search on invisible displacement tasks, but also 
showed that contrary to the contentions of some authors, these biases do not mask the 
existence of correct representations. One study did reveal how seemingly mundane 
differences between tasks might lead to markedly different patterns of search and 
emergence of biases. In the second part of the thesis, in the first direct test of the 
prediction-postdiction hypothesis, an analysis of anticipatory eye gaze suggested that 
an inability to predict the location of an object does not account for the looking- 
searching dissociation that has become so prevalent in both the developmental and 
comparative literature. In attempting to bring together the findings firom all the 
chapters, a framework is suggested in which representations are viewed as differing in 
strength such that the strength of a representation may determine whether or not a pre­
existing bias surfaces in behaviour.
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OVERVIEW OF THESIS
“It was the White Rabbit, trotting slowly back again, and looking 
anxiously about as it went, as if it had lost something; and she heard it 
muttering to itself 'The Duchess! The Duchess! Oh my dear paws! Oh 
my fur and whiskers! She'll get me executed, as sure as ferrets are 
ferrets! Where CAN I have dropped them, I wonder?'”
{Chapter IV, Alice in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll)
Alice in Wonderland is a story about a little girl who magically shrinks, goes down a 
rabbit-hole and enters a mysterious world of talking animals. Of course, it is fantasy 
children’s fiction and we know that animals don’t really talk, have tea parties or play 
croquet. However, while we can be fairly sure that animals do not engage in any of 
these cultural, probably uniquely human activities, whether or not the white rabbit can 
really ponder where he lost the fan and the white kid gloves is not so clear. For 
example, does he know that the things he has lost can only be somewhere he has been? 
Can he retrace his steps to find them? While rabbits are phylogenetically quite distant 
from humans in the evolutionary chain, there is considerable debate concerning to what 
extent even animals much more closely related to us are capable of finding hidden 
objects and thinking about where they could be.
This thesis investigates what three species, the rhesus and stumptail macaque and 
the human child, know about objects they can no longer see. Many years of research 
have, to date, provided conflicting reports on the extent to which monkeys are able to 
reason about objects that have disappeared from their sight. In numerous studies, 
monkeys are reported to resort to using strategies in their attempts to find objects, and 
in doing so, expose their apparent lack of appreciation that, for example, an object can 
only be found somewhere that its bearer has been.
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But, do such behaviours really reflect a lack of appreciation for such a basic 
physical principle? A recent debate within the field of developmental psychology has 
suggested that a child’s behaviour might be a misleading guide to what they really 
know, and this debate has fuelled a similar debate among comparative psychologists. 
Many claim that behaviour may imply a lack of understanding of physical principles 
without this really being the case.
The experiments to be presented in this thesis are motivated by this debate. In 
the chapter that follows (Chapter 1), I will explore what we know about object 
understanding in young children and animals (mainly non-human primates) and 
introduce the debate over what behaviour really reflects. In Chapter 2, I review the 
various studies that have been carried out with non-human animals to investigate their 
abilities to find hidden objects in invisible displacement tasks, and examine various 
interpretations that may account for performance. Chapter 3 talces a broader look at 
physical cognition in human children and non-human primates, focusing on what these 
subjects know about the physical world and how it constrains the behaviour of objects. 
Chapter 4 describes the general methodology employed in the empirical chapters and 
provides information about the subjects who took part in the experiments that follow. 
Chapters 5 - 9  report the results of a number of invisible displacement studies that 
were designed to investigate which elements of a task contribute to errors in both 
human children and non-human primates. Chapter 10 provides an introduction to the 
looking method, that has been so instrumental in fuelling the debate described above, 
and chapter 11 reports the results from a study that aimed to test one specific 
hypothesis that has stemmed from this debate. Finally, in Chapter 12,1 bring together 
the results from the empirical chapters and attempt to provide a framework for thinking 
about these results and propose some directions for future research.
U n d e r s t a n d i n g  o b j e c t s
1.1 O b je c t  k n o w l e d g e
On a daily basis, as humans, we are confronted with a multitude of objects and in 
order to make sense of our environment we need to have developed a multitude of 
skills. At the most basic level, the ability to be able to recognize that two adjacently 
situated objects are still two distinct objects, allows us to see our world in terms of 
distinct entities rather than a jumbled mess. Similarly, we need to know that an object 
continues to exist even when we can no longer see it, and that when that object 
reappears, it is that same object Üiat was hidden. In order to predict the behaviour of 
objects, we need to understand the fundamental properties that objects possess. Such 
an understanding of these properties is so fundamental and so seemingly 
indispensable to everyday functioning, that it difficult to imagine how any organism 
could exist without them. Refening to the notion of object permanence -  the 
principle that objects continue to exist even when they are no longer directly 
perceptible -  Flavell writes, “the concept itself is so utterly basic and fundamental. If 
any concept could be regarded as indispensable to a coherent and rational mental life, 
this one certainly would be. Imagine what your life would be like if you did not 
believe that objects continued to exist when they left your field of vision.” (Flavell, 
1977) (p. 42).
As difficult as this may be to imagine, this is exactly the kind of world that a 
young Piagetian infant is confronted with. According to Piaget, before the age of 
about seven months, young human infants do not understand objects as being
independent or permanent entities (Piaget, 1955). If an object that they are playing 
with is hidden from view, for example if a cloth is placed over the object, a young 
infant will not attempt to search for the object. This inability is so striking that even if 
the infant was in the middle of executing a reach towards a visible object, if a cloth is 
then placed over the object, they will interrupt this reach and behave as if the object is 
no longer attainable (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2001). Although Piaget dealt with 
many aspects of object understanding, his work on the child’s developing notion of 
object permanence is arguably his most influential contribution to developmental 
psychology.
1.2 O b je c t  P e r m a n e n c e
Although Piaget will be most celebrated for his investigations into object pennanence, 
that young infants do not appear to have an adult-like conception of objects was noted 
many years earlier by philosopher William James when he wrote that:
“A baby’s rattle drops out of his hand but the baby looks not for it. It has ‘gone out’ 
for him as a candle-flame goes out; and it comes back when you replace it in his hand, 
as the flame comes back when relit. The idea of its being a ‘thing’ whose permanent 
existence by itself he might interpolate between its successive apparitions, has 
evidently not occurred to him.” (James, 1890)
However, in carrying out numerous experiments with his own children, Piaget 
identified other eiTors that he claimed were indicative of young children’s incomplete 
understanding of object properties. Even once an infant becomes able to search for a
hidden object, thus demonstrating basic object permanence, if this object is then 
visibly hidden in another location, the infant will very often search for the object in 
the location where it was previously hidden. According to Piaget, this en'or, which 
has become known as the A-not-B error, demonstrates that although the child may 
have attained a rudimentary notion of object permanence, this understanding is by no 
means complete. The error of searching for an object in the place where it was 
previously found reflects the young infant’s misconception that they can recreate the 
desired object wherever they want, simply through the process of engaging in search 
(Piaget, 1955).
It was Piaget’s contention that a complete understanding of objects and their 
properties comes about through the child’s experience with their environment and 
with objects in their physical world. As children manipulate objects in their actions, 
they abstract information from these interactions, and it is this assimilation and 
accommodation of information that eventually leads to a complete understanding of 
objects. Piaget’s position, that intelligence emerges through interactions with the 
physical enviromnent, led others to begin to ask the same questions regarding non­
human species. After all, humans are not the only species who are confronted with a 
multitude of objects on a daily basis. The finding that young humans appear not to 
come into the world with knowledge about these basic and fimdamental properties of 
objects led those in the comparative field to question the extent to which object 
understanding in non-human species might differ from our own, adult understanding. 
If such a fundamental capacity is not innate, then how can we be sure that animals see 
the physical world in a similar way?
However, research has now accumulated from many different species indicating 
that the capacity for object permanence appears to be widespread in the animal
kingdom. What is more interesting though, is that animals appear to acquire a 
concept of object permanence in much the same way as humans, suggesting that in 
animals too, it is learnt through a process of interacting with the environment. For 
example, testing Piaget’s object pennanence tasks with great apes has revealed that 
they pass through the same stages as human children, making the same errors (e.g. the 
A-not-B error) en route to showing a full understanding of objects, the only difference 
being that they reach each stage at a slightly earlier age than human children 
(Redshaw, 1978). Similarly, research with different species of monkey and other 
animals (mainly cats and dogs) have shown that they too pass through the same 
stages, but at a decidedly quicker pace than human children and great apes (Wise, 
Wise, & Zimmerman, 1974; Diamond, 1990; Dore & Goulet, 1998), For example, 
whereas human children do not show the ability to retrieve a hidden object until eight 
months of age, infant monkeys can do this by about one month of age and cats can do 
this after about two weeks (Gomez, 2004).
Although there is certainly much debate over whether non-human species 
achieve a full understanding of objects, or a rather more partial understanding, if we 
are to believe Piaget’s contentions, infants, be they of the human or animal kind, do 
not come into the world with pre-existing knowledge about objects and their 
behaviours. Rather this knowledge needs to be constructed through experience.
1.3 T h e  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e
However, Piaget’s interpretations of his results have not gone unchallenged. In the 
past thirty years, with the birth of new methodologies, researchers have claimed to 
have found a much earlier understanding of objects and their properties than Piaget 
claimed. Most problematic for Piaget’s constructivist theory, when tested in
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alternative ways, young infants appear to show an appreciation for object properties at 
an age where they have had little opportunity to interact with objects themselves. 
These studies and the methods that they employ will be described more thoroughly in 
Chapter 10, so only a brief discussion is included here.
Piaget’s theory of object permanence development was based primarily on tasks 
that required infants to manually retrieve hidden objects. However, it is not until 
infants are about four months of age that they will even reach for a visible object 
(Piaget, 1960), suggesting that even if they did have an earlier existing notion of the 
permanence of objects, they would not be able to demonstrate it. It was probably this 
quandary that motivated a new movement within developmental psychology, a 
movement away from a reliance on tasks that required manual responses to one that 
relied instead on an infant’s visual response. These new tasks revealed what appeared 
to be a very precocious understanding of object properties. For example, in the 
earliest studies exploiting an infant’s visual response, Bower and colleagues found 
that infants as young as two months were able to anticipate the reappearance of an 
object that had stopped behind a screen by “looking to that half of the movement path 
the object would have reached had it not stopped” (Bower, Broughton, & Moore, 
1971 p. 183). In order to anticipate the re-emergence of the object, infants must 
appreciate that despite disappearing behind the screen, the object continues to exist.
In a number of now well-renowned studies employing a method known as 
habituation, Baillargeon and colleagues have claimed to demonstrate an 
understanding of object permanence in infants as young as two-and-a-half-months, 
well before they are able to reach out and manipulate objects for themselves 
(Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Baillargeon, 1987, 2000). In these studies, 
infants look longer at events that violate object peimanence and such findings have
been taken to suggest that longer looking reflects a reaction of surprise. The infant is 
surprised because the event violates what they know to be true and so they look 
longer towards this event.
The findings of Baillargeon and her colleagues, along with those of other 
developmental researchers (e.g. Mehler & Bever, 1967; Bever, Mehler, & Epstein, 
1968), signalled a new movement within developmental psychology which was to 
divide the field into those who, like Piaget, believed that young children were 
conceptually or representationally impoverished relative to human adults, and those 
like Baillargeon, who argued that the representations of young children were not 
profoundly different from those of human adults, but, for a number of reasons, young 
children are unable to demonstrate what may be quite a sophisticated understanding of 
the physical world.
1.4 W h a t  d e v e l o p s  w it h  a g e ?
However, despite these demonstrations of precocious object knowledge, Piaget’s 
observations have been replicated numerous times and appear to be very robust 
(Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975; Harris, 1985). So, if the behaviours that Piaget obseiwed do 
not reflect an impoverished object concept and the advancement from one stage to the 
next does not reflect developing knowledge about objects, what does it reflect?
Opinions on what such Piagetian behaviours and errors reflect are wide and 
varied. A simple inability to reach for and uncover objects seems unlikely to be the 
whole story as by seven months -  before infants begin to search for hidden objects -  
they can already uncover an object under a transparent cup (Bower, 1974) or behind a 
transparent screen (Munakata, McClelland, Jolinson, & Siegler, 1997). As the motor 
demands on the child are the same irrespective of whether the object is hidden under
or behind a transparent or opaque occluder, it would appear that there must be another 
explanation.
One possible explanation for some of the childhood errors observed by Piaget is 
that they reflect an immature or underdeveloped “executive functioning system”. 
Executive function has been defined as “the ability to maintain an appropriate 
problem-solving set for attainment of a future goal” (Welsh & Pennington, 1988 p. 
201) and is thought to encompass a number of abilities such as planning, set-shifting, 
inhibition and working memory (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999). 
One of the indications that young infants have an immature concept of objects, 
according to Piaget, is his observation that if  one object is placed in contact with 
another object, infants will fail to reach for and retrieve the object, even though they 
could competently retrieve the object if it was placed alone. According to Piaget, this 
reflects the infant’s lack of understanding that, even though the object now shares a 
boundary with another object, it is still the same independent object that it was before 
it was placed in contact with the other object. In their investigations into why 
children are unable to retrieve an object when it is contiguous with another object, 
Diamond & Gilbert (1989) used a transparent box with a desired object inside. 
Seven-month-olds had no problem retiieving an object when it was in the middle of 
the Plexiglas box such that it did not share a boundary with any of the box walls. 
However, as soon as the object became contiguous with the box (e.g. when it was 
placed inside the box against the front wall), infants of this age were unable to retrieve 
it. Diamond & Gilbert noticed that when children were unsuccessful at retrieving the 
object, they tended to end up grasping the edge of the box instead of the object. On 
the basis of these observations, the authors contended that it was not that infants had 
difficulty representing the object as a separate entity, as Piaget had argued, but that
infants this young were simply incapable of making an accurate reach for the object. 
When there is another object nearby, if they touch this object first (which they often 
do), their grasp reflex leads them to grab hold of that object instead (e.g. the edge of 
the box). So, although it appears that the infant is not appreciating that the desired 
object is a separate entity that they can still obtain, this inability to retrieve the object 
rather reflects imprecise motor control and an inability to inhibit a reflexive grasp \
1.5 In h ib it io n  a n d  c o g n it io n
According to Diamond (1991), “Cognitive development can be conceived of, not only 
as the progressive acquisition of knowledge, but also as the enhanced inhibition of 
reactions that get in the way of demonstrating knowledge that is already present” (p. 
67). When the child attempts to reach for the object that is contiguous with another 
object, the child cannot inhibit a reflex that causes her to grab hold of the first object 
her hand comes into contact with. Because of this, it appears as if the child is unable 
to appreciate the object’s individuality when in actual fact they may simply have an 
inability to inhibit a reflex that in other situations is extremely useful.
Inhibition is the capacity to suppress behaviours that are inappropriate to the 
situation and although probably not evolved for this purpose, an increased capacity 
for inhibition has the added advantage of allowing for greater attentional abilities and 
better concentration (Bjorklund & Kipp Hamishfeger, 1995). The greater an 
individual’s ability to inhibit unwanted behaviours, the more flexible their behaviour 
can be. For example, although the grasp reflex is probably vestigial in human infants, 
it is essential for the young monkey who needs to ride on its mothers back. However,
 ^However, the grasp reflex disappears in human infants at around four months of age, and so Diamond 
& Gilbert’s conclusions should be treated with caution.
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while useful to the neonate, this reflex is useless to the older monkey and would 
probably be quite a hindrance if it could not be suppressed.
As noted above, the grasp reflex disappears in human infants at around 4 
months of age and its disappearance is associated with frontal lobe maturity, such that 
persistence of the grasp reflex is taken to indicate the presence of a frontal lobe lesion 
in human children (Schott & Rossor, 2003). The neocortex, specifically the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, is thought to be critically involved in the ability to 
inhibit unwanted or inappropriate behaviours (Fuster, 1980; Goldman-Rakic, 1987), 
the majority of evidence for which comes from studies of monkeys and brain­
damaged human adults (Milner, 1963; Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). 
Following lesions to this area of the brain, rhesus monkeys perform badly on a 
delayed response task (a task similar to the A-not-B task) in which, after the monkey 
has retrieved an object from one hiding location, it is hidden at another hiding 
location, and after a short interval the monkey is allowed to search for the object. 
Typically, monkeys with frontal lesions search in the old location suggesting that the 
lesioned area of the brain is important in allowing the monkey to inhibit inappropriate 
or prepotent response tendencies. A prepotent response tendency can be either innate 
or conditioned (Diamond, 1991).
1.5.1 Innate prepotent responses
Innate tendencies are those that, during the course of evolution, have been adaptive in 
some way to that species (Hauser, 2000). The grasp reflex is an obvious example of 
an innate response tendency. Another example of failures to inhibit innate prepotent 
responses may be seen in the inability of young children and non-human primates to 
delay gratification. Boysen carried out a study in which she attempted to teach
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chimpanzees a rule whereby if they picked the smaller of two arrays of food, they 
would be rewarded with the larger array. If the chimpanzee picked the larger array, 
another chimpanzee would receive the larger array, and they would get the smaller 
one. Chimpanzees could not leam this rule, instead each time they would pick the 
larger array and end up themselves receiving the smaller an'ay. These results were 
interpreted as suggesting that cliimpanzees were unable to inhibit picking the larger 
amount of food and delaying gratification (Boysen, 1996). Young children appear to 
have a similar difficulty. In a task known as the ‘windows task’, children see two 
boxes with windows, and tlirough the windows the child can see that one box is empty 
and one box contains a treat. In order to obtain the treat, the child has to infer a rule 
that indicating the empty box to an opponent will yield the treat for them. Tliree-year- 
olds are unable to infer this rule, pointing instead to the box that contains the reward, 
ensuring that their opponent receives the treat (Russell, Mautlmer, Sharpe, & 
Tidswell, 1991). Similarly, in a study by Peskin (1992), three-year-old cliildren were 
very poor at deceiving a competitor about which sticker they wanted to keep for 
themselves. Even though they were aware that the competitor would take for them 
self whichever sticker the child indicated as their favorite, they persistently pointed to 
the sticker that they wanted, rather than to the one they did not want.
1.5.2 conditioned prepotent responses
A conditioned prepotent response, on the other hand, is a response that becomes 
dominant through experience and repeated elicitations. Diamond argues that the 
Piagetian A-not-B error that young children make or the error that monkeys make on 
the delayed response task is a conditioned prepotent response (Diamond, 1991). 
When the object is hidden at ‘A’ over a number of trials and having made a number of
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reaches to that location, reaching to ‘A ’ becomes the prepotent response and when the 
object is switched to ‘B’, because of insufficient inhibitory capacities, infants are 
unable to stop themselves from making the prepotent response again -  and reach 
erroneously to ‘A’. Support for this claim, that the A-not-B en'or reflects a prepotent 
response, comes from findings by Marcovitch et al. (2002) showing that infants who 
receive more ‘A’ trials prior to a ‘B’ trials are more likely to make the A-not-B error 
than infants who have received less ‘A’ trials, suggesting that the more conditioned 
the response becomes, the stronger is the likelihood of failing to inhibit it.
1.6 INHIBITION AND EVOLUTION
We have seen from the literature reviewed so far that it is not only young children 
who appear to have difficulty inhibiting prepotent responses. Non-human primates 
also appear to have difficulties with tasks that require inhibition. Although all 
mammals have a prefrontal cortex, there are probably subtle yet crucial differences in 
the underlying connectivity that play a fundamental role in the animal’s inhibitory 
capabilities (Hauser, 1999). Although it seems doubtful that there is any difference in 
the relative size of the frontal cortex (Semendeferi, Lu, Schenker, & Damasio, 2002), 
or the prefrontal cortex when allometrically scaled (Deacon, 1997) between humans 
and great apes and as such, it is unlikely that size alone can account for differences in 
inhibitory capacities between species, both humans and great apes do have relatively 
larger frontal cortices compared to those of the lesser apes and monkeys. 
Furtheimore, the structure of the prefrontal cortex in primates is subtly different from 
those of other mammalian species because one of the six layers is gianular in primates 
and agranular in nonprimates (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Any of these differences in 
size, connectivity and structure could have major consequences for the functioning of
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the prefrontal cortex and lead to large differences in inhibitory capacities -  the 
proposed central function of this brain region (Diamond, 1991).
Rumbaugh (1997) looked at the relationship between brain evolution and 
transfer of learning. Transfer learning involves having the subject leam to select a 
particular object in exchange for a reward and then, once the subject has learnt this 
mle, the object which produces the reward is switched such that the previously 
incorrect object is now the correct object that yields the reward. Animals with 
relatively smaller brains, monkeys and lesser apes, show negative transfer such that 
the more trials they had prior to ti'ansfer, the worse they do on transfer trials whereas 
those animals with relatively larger brains (specifically the four great ape species) 
show positive transfer such that the more trials they had prior to transfer, the better 
they do on transfer trials. This is thought to be because the great apes are able to learn 
something about the mle, such that the more they learn, the better they can do in the 
future (on transfer trials), whereas those animals with smaller brains are restricted to 
stimulus-response learning and only leam that a particular object is associated with 
the reward. The type of learning afforded by the larger and more complex brained 
animals allows for greater behavioural flexibility compared with smaller and less 
complex brained species.
Rumbaugh’s findings suggest that there should be differences between species 
in how they perform on tasks requiring inhibitory capacities. Those species with 
more developed prefrontal cortices should do better on these tasks than those species 
with less developed prefrontal cortices. This prediction already has some support. In 
a task called the object retrieval task, a desired object is placed inside a transparent 
box that has an opening either on the top or at the side. Either way, in order to obtain 
the object, the subject has to make an indirect reach -  reaching directly for the object
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will result in the subject hitting the box and not retrieving the object. Before about 7 
months, human infants are unable to make a detour reach, instead reaching directly 
towards the object (Diamond, 1981). Diamond argues that performance on the object 
retrieval task is crucially dependent on an ability to inhibit a prepotent tendency to 
reach directly for a desired object (Diamond, 1981) and her contention is supported by 
evidence showing that adult rhesus monkeys who have lesions in the prefrontal cortex 
make the error of reaching directly for the reward, whereas adult rhesus monkeys with 
intact frontal cortices do not make this erroneous response. However, the smaller 
brained (with a smaller prefrontal cortex) cotton-top tamarin does not need to have a 
frontal lesion in order to make this error on the object retrieval task -  adult cotton-top 
tamarins make the error anyway (Santos, Ericson, & Hauser, 1999). This finding 
suggests that the smaller brained cotton-top tamarin has inferior inhibitory skills to the 
larger brained rhesus macaque (Hauser, 1999).
1.7 E v id e n c e  f o r  e x is t in g  k n o w l e d g e
The claim that some organisms have difficulty inhibiting prepotent responses, be they 
innate or conditioned, is only a part of Diamond’s argument. She also claims that 
prepotent responses mask knowledge that is already present, and if it were not for 
these prepotent responses, this knowledge would be able to be reflected in the solving 
of a task.
The idea that prepotent responses might mask existing knowledge comes from a 
number of sources. For example, one of the hallmarks of prefrontal damage in adults 
is their failure on the Wisconsin card sort test. In this test, subjects are required to 
sort cards, first according to one rule, and then according to another. While failure is 
marked by continuing to sort cards according to a now obsolete rule, these same
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patients can verbally report that they know they are doing the wrong thing (Milner, 
1963). Similarly, Zelazo et al. (1996) reported similar findings for school-age 
children, who despite making the same mistake of sorting according to an old rule, are 
able to articulate what the new rule is whilst sorting according to the old one.
Furthermore, although nonverbal subjects like infants and animals cannot tell us 
that they really do have the correct knowledge, there may be telling signs in their 
behaviour. For example. Diamond reports that often, infants who err and erroneously 
reach to ‘A’ on the A-not-B task, do not even look in to ‘A’ to see if the toy is there 
but go straight to ‘B’, and even on occasion, infants can be seen reaching to ‘A’ but 
simultaneously looking towards ‘B’ (Diamond, 1991). These behavioural signs may 
suggest that infants have knowledge of where the toy is despite not being able to 
demonstrate this knowledge in their explicit responses.
Finally, as discussed previously, the most persuasive indication that young 
children really may have knowledge despite not being able to demonstrate it, comes 
from the mass of data collected via the looking task measure. As mentioned, a more 
thorough discussion of looking time studies will follow in Chapter 10, and so the 
discussion here will be limited to one study which seems to indicate an accurate 
appreciation of contiguity in infants younger than those whom Diamond reported 
were unable to reach for an object when it shared a boundary with another object 
(Diamond & Gilbert, 1989). Needham & Baillargeon (1998) demonstrated that 4.5- 
month-old infants who were given a five second exposure to a particular object, then 
looked longer at an event in which that object appeared to move together with another 
object as if they were joined together, than at an event in which the object they had 
been exposed to, moved separately. These results indicate that young infants do still
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appreciate the individuality of an object despite it subsequently being contiguous with 
another object.
1.8 D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  INHIBITORY c o n t r o l  in  c h il d r e n
Although perfomiance on Piaget’s A-not-B task has been the focus of much of the 
speculation regarding inhibition, other researchers studying other tasks on older 
children have echoed Diamond’s contention that inhibition failures may mask existing 
conceptual knowledge. For example, Carlson et al. (1998) have argued that young 
children’s failure to pass false-belief tasks may reflect an inability to suppress a 
conditioned prepotent response. Before about 4 years of age, children are unable to 
pass this task, and when asked where the experimenter will look for an object, 
children tend to point to the box where the object actually is, despite the fact that the 
child, but not the experimenter witnessed the object being moved from its original 
location to a new location. However, in a modified version of this task, rather than 
requiring the child to point, the child had to place a pictorial cue on the box that they 
think the experimenter will look in, children were able to pass the false-belief task at 3 
years. Carlson et al. (1998) propose that “children may well possess these concepts 
but nevertheless have difficulty acting on them.” (p.686) possibly because the act of 
pointing is a well-practiced, often-used response for young children that they usually 
make “faithfully to tme locations and identities” and so it may be very difficult for 
children to make this same response in an alternative way (Carlson et al., 1998, p.
674X
Thus, although errors like the A-not-B error occur when infants are quite young, 
at about 8 months, problems with inhibition may also be seen in older children. In 
fact, problems inhibiting prepotent responses may occur throughout childhood and
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may even be present in normal adulthood under circumstances in which cognitive 
load is particularly high. Berger (in press) has argued that because cognitive capacity 
is finite, the more taxing a task is for a child, the more likely they are to make a 
perseverative response. In a locomotor version of the A-not-B task, Berger found that 
13-month-old infants could inhibit a prepotent response of walking to the ‘A’ location 
on ‘B’ trials when the locomotor demands were quite low (walking on flat gi'ound) 
but perseverated at ‘A’ on ‘B’ trials when the locomotor requirements were higher 
(such that the infant had to descend down a staircase). Berger interpreted this finding 
to indicate that infants perseverate when their attentional capacities are otherwise 
taken up so that their capacities are not then available to inhibit the prepotent 
response. As Berger suggests “as cognitive capacity improves, children need 
increasingly complex task demands to elicit perseverative behaviours” (p. 27).
Berger also proposes that the cognitive load explanation can account for why, 
on occasion, even human adults make responses inappropriate to the situation -  for 
example, rather than going straight home after work, you may decide to visit a friend 
but because you are having an argument with someone in your car you may not be 
concentrating on your route and you may find yourself mistakenly driving the normal 
route home instead. The prepotent response of driving the normal route home, which 
through experience, has become conditioned, wins out because the attentional 
capacities that would normally be used to inhibit this response and implement an 
alternative response (driving to a friend’s house) are being taken up by attending to 
the argument you are having.
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It seems then that problems inhibiting prepotent responses are not limited to infancy 
and may present themselves even in adulthood in situations where attentional 
resoui'ces are stretched. Furthermore, problems inhibiting prepotent responses may be 
especially prevalent in non-human species throughout their lives if  their inhibitory 
capacities remain inferior to those of humans. The literature reviewed above raises 
the intriguing possibility that some task failures are not due to a deficit in conceptual 
understanding but rather may be due to limits in executive functioning. The number 
of instances of potential inhibitory failures described above furthermore suggests that 
such difficulties may manifest themselves in a wide variety of situations, and at many 
different ages. The following chapter will review the literature on a task that has 
generated a substantial amount of investigation not only in human children, but also in 
a multitude of non-human species: the invisible displacement task. Passing this task 
was thouglit to signal a new stage in representational reasoning in human children 
(Piaget, 1955) but as research continues to turn up new examples of errors due to 
inhibitory failures in other tasks, it is necessary to consider whether failure on 
invisible displacements might also be attributable to limitations in executive 
functioning.
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U n d e r s t a n d i n g  i n v i s i b l e  d is p l a c e m e n t s
2.1 In v is ib l e  D is p l a c e m e n t
As explanations for task failures in childhood have shifted from the conceptual to the 
executive, more and more questions have been raised about other tasks that are 
commonly thought to assess representational understanding in young childien. 
Piaget’s position, that the A-not-B task error reflects conceptual difficulties, has 
largely been discounted, and although there is wide disagreement on what the A-not- 
B error does reflect, it is generally accepted that it probably does not reflect an 
immature object concept (Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001). If the A-not-B 
error can be explained in other ways unrelated to whether or not the child has a 
mature or complete object concept, then it raises doubts about whether other errors 
which are thought to be characteristic of various stages of object concept development 
really do reflect profound developments on the road to complete object concept 
understanding, or whether they too can be explained in other, possibly non- 
conceptual, ways.
As noted in the previous chapter, the extent of object understanding in non­
human species has received considerable interest, on the one hand because the 
revelation that young children can come into the world without a notion of object 
permanence raises intriguing questions regarding whether such a seemingly 
fimdamental concept might also be lacking in other species, and on the other hand 
because Piaget’s methodologies presented themselves as so easily transferable to 
other species (Pepperberg, 2002). These studies have revealed considerable similarity 
in the development of object knowledge among a wide range of species (Tomasello &
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Call, 1997). However, despite this similarity, very few animal species have shown 
convincing evidence of being able to achieve what Piaget believed to be the crowning 
stage of object permanence: the ability to solve an invisible displacement problem 
(stage 6).
An invisible displacement problem is one in which an object is invisibly hidden 
from the subject, so that they do not see the final hiding place, and have to infer this in 
some way. A typical invisible displacement involves placing a desired object into a 
container and then moving that container behind a screen. Without the subject seeing, 
the experimenter then removes the object from the container and leaves it behind the 
screen. The container that had previously carried the object is then brought out from 
behind the screen and the subject sees that the container is now empty. The subject 
then has to infer that the object must be behind the screen, despite the fact that they 
never actually saw it being deposited there. One of the reasons why Piaget’s tasks 
were seen as easily applicable to the study of animal cognition was because they 
appeared to mirror situations that animals might encounter in their natural habitats. 
For example, when a hunted prey animal disappears behind a rock, may be of huge 
adaptive advantage for the hunter to search for that animal behind the rock (Vauclair, 
1996). If the animal is not behind the rock however, it would be useful for the hunter 
to then look behind other nearby rocks (Wynne, 2001). Likewise, deBlois et al.
(1999) point out that male monkeys often track the movements of female monkeys in 
oestrus and may need to infer the monkeys movements if they temporarily get 
distracted and find that the female is no longer visible.
The immense interest in the ability of non-human species to be able to solve 
invisible displacements stems, in part, from what Piaget believed this ability reflects. 
Rather than simply reflecting a quantitative difference in processing capacity, Piaget
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argued that the transition from being able to solve visible displacements to solving 
invisible displacement problems represents a much larger transition in cognition from 
sensorimotor to symbolic representational thought (Piaget, 1955). In order to solve an 
invisible displacement task, not only do children need to be able to mentally represent 
the continued existence of a hidden object, they also need to possess the capacity for 
logical deduction; the ability to be able to deduce, based on the newly-acquired object 
principles, where the object physically can be (Piaget, 1954; Watson et al, 2001). 
Another way to think about invisible displacements is as a means of distinguishing 
between learning and reasoning. Solving an invisible displacement problem 
representationally involves the subject inferring or reasoning where the object is, 
based on incomplete information. To solve an invisible displacement, the subject has 
to infer the location of the object even though they did not see the object being hidden 
at that location. The debate about whether animals are capable of reasoning or are 
just proficient rule learners continues to divide many comparative researchers (Call, 
2004). In addition, a further reason that may have provoked such interest in this 
crowning stage of object permanence capacities in non-human species is the 
contention by some authors that the representational skills required to reach this stage 
are critical to the subsequent onset of symbol use (i.e. language) in human infants 
(Piaget, 1955; Bates, 1976).
The various tasks used to assess object permanence with visible displacements, 
which most animals seem able to do, can all be solved through fairly primitive 
representations or simple leamt heuristics. For example, although the young child 
needs to appreciate that an object continues to exist even when they cannot see it, in 
order to solve a visible displacement, even one in which an object is hidden in several 
successive locations, they simply need to search for the object where they last saw it.
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However, in an invisible displacement task, the child needs to mentally recreate the 
pathway that the object must have taken, even though they themselves never 
witnessed that pathway. Such a task may ostensibly something qualitatively different 
from the subject.
However, with the growing debate over whether or not other of Piaget’s tasks 
(like the A-not-B task) really do reflect conceptual difficulties, there have been 
similar doubts concerning what various successes and failures on invisible 
displacement tasks can really tell us (Cummings & Bjork, 1981). It is possible that, 
rather than lacking the type of conceptual knowledge purported to be required to 
succeed on an invisible displacement task, it may be that those subjects that perform 
poorly simply lack the requisite executive capabilities. The following section will 
look at some arguments for why young children and monkeys might fail invisible 
displacement tasks for reasons other than not having the representational competence.
2.2 C o n s id e r in g  r e a s o n s  f o r  in v is ib l e  d is p l a c e m e n t  s u c c e s s e s  a n d
FAILURES
It is indicative of what was the general consensus, that in Parker & Gibson’s model of 
evolution, in which phylogeny is recapitulated in ontogeny, they label one of their 
stages in child development ‘the Old-World monkey stage’ (Parker & Gibson, 1979). 
At this stage, they see children as having incomplete object permanence because they 
are unable to solve an invisible displacement problem. Although there are some 
studies in which authors claim various species of monkey are able to solve an 
invisible displacement problem, others have argued that the monkeys in these studies 
may have solved the tasks without mentally representing the pathway the object took 
(Dore & Dumas, 1987). Of those studies that have adequately controlled for
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strategies that allow the task to be solved non-representationally, the only species, 
other than humans, that appear capable of succeeding are gi*eat apes and surprisingly, 
psittacine birds (Redshaw, 1978; Mathieu & Bergero, 1981; Natale, Antinucci, 
Spinozzi, & Poti, 1986; Pepperberg & Kozak, 1986; Pepperberg & Funk, 1990; De 
Blois, Novak, & Bond, 1998; Call, 2001).
However, the problem with interpreting the search behaviour of particular 
species as indicative of an inability to solve invisible displacement tasks 
representationally, is that there may be other reasons why animals fail these tasks, 
which does not preclude them from having representational abilities. The task then 
lies in determining what other factors might influence search behaviour. The 
remainder of this chapter will review the literature on invisible displacement 
performance in both children and non-human species, looking at whether task failures 
could be explained in ways other than by attributing representational or conceptual 
deficits.
2.2.1 Stimulus Enhancement
Spence (1937) coined the term ‘stimulus enhancement’ to refer to behaviour that 
results from increased attention towards something that another being has attended to. 
One problem with many invisible displacement studies, including those of Piaget, is 
that only the location(s) where the object could have been deposited are manipulated 
by the experimenter. Part of solving an invisible displacement task is the ability to 
infer that the object can only be in a location that has been touched by the 
experimenter and so only searching in these manipulated locations. However, one 
objection to claims that some species can pass invisible displacement problems is that
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these particular studies have not controlled for this possibility. Monkeys or other 
species (including human children) might pass the task by only looking in places that 
were manipulated by the experimenter, not because they understand that this is the 
only place where the object could be, but because these locations have a privileged 
status by virtue of being manipulated. Without controls that include trials in which 
the experimenter also manipulates a container but does not insert the displacer into the 
container, it is not possible to differentiate between these two possible ways of 
solving the task.
A related problem with some studies of invisible displacement is the problem of 
recency. In Piaget’s invisible displacement task, the object tends to be left in the last 
location visited, and there are two simple ways of solving this problem. Firstly, 
subjects could learn the simple strategy of always searching in the last place visited. 
Secondly, the last location manipulated may be privileged because of recency effects: 
subjects choose this location because it is the location to which they have most 
recently attended. Several of the early studies of invisible displacement purporting to 
show success with animals have used one of these two methods. For example. Wise 
et al. (1974) claim that object concept development in the infant rhesus monkey 
{Macaca mulatto) follows a similar trajectory to that described by Piaget for human 
infants, cuhninating in stage six object permanence, and the solving of invisible 
displacements. However, since the object is always left under the last screen visited, 
the task can be solved using the rule ‘search under last screen touched’, without the 
need for mental representation. Without appropriate controls, it is impossible to know 
whether anything more sophisticated can be attributed to these animals than proficient 
rule learning capacities. In a recent investigation into stage 6 object permanence in 
cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus Oedipus), Neiworth et al. (2003) claim that these
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monkeys can solve a typical invisible displacement task. However, the same criticism 
might be made of this study as the Wise et al. (1974) study: namely that in all 
conditions except control trials, the object is hidden in the last location visited. When 
‘catch’ trials are included so that the item is hidden in the first location visited rather 
than the second, perfonnance did not differ from chance.
However, although stimulus enhancement has generally been thought of as 
unfairly helping the subject to pass the task, it is also possible that it has a hindering 
effect on performance. For example, in the Neiworth et al. (2003) study, the 
experimenter does attempt to control for recency effects by including trials in which 
the last cup manipulated is simply touched by the experimenter but the displacer is 
never inserted and so the object in the displacer could not be in the last cup touched. 
However, it is feasible that this act of touching and drawing attention to this location 
is sufficiently distracting to the subject, leading them to attend to this location and 
subsequently search there. As Goldman-Rakic (1987) has pointed out, the behaviour 
of subjects with insufficient prefrontal function may be “excessively controlled by 
external stimulation”. The act of searching in this location may be unrelated to the 
subject’s belief about where the food reward is, it may simply be the result of the 
subject being unable to inhibit searching at a location that has most recently received 
attention.
2.2.2 Memory requirements
It has been proposed that conflicting reports of successes and failures on invisible 
displacement tasks might be understood by looking at the differing memory 
requirements of the different invisible displacement procedures (De Blois, Novak, &
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Bond, 1999). According to Dumas & Brunet (1994), invisible displacement tasks can 
be generally divided into two kinds; those that use a logical procedure and those that 
use a comprehensive procedure. In the logical procedure, the experimenter shows the 
subject whether or not the displacer still contains the target object or not, in between 
each displacement, whereas in the comprehensive procedure, it is only at the end of 
all the displacements that the subject is shown the empty displacer. The difference 
between these two types of tasks is important because it has serious implications for 
what one can infer from successfril search behaviour. In the comprehensive 
procedure, akin to the procedure Piaget described, any one of the visited locations is a 
possible place where the object could be found, and so subjects must maintain each of 
the visited locations in memory. However, in the logical procedure, because the 
subject is shown whether or not the displacer still contains the object or not after each 
visit, there is only one possible location that the object could be hidden. As such, if, 
after the first visit, the displacer is withdrawn and shown to still contain the object, the 
subject can disregard any displacements prior to this. If, on the other hand, the 
displacer is withdrawn and shown to be empty, the subject can disregard any future 
displacements. In terms of memory load then, the comprehensive procedure is more 
taxing than the logical procedure.
De Blois et al (1999) asked whether differing memory requirements could 
account for the differences seen between performance on visible and invisible 
displacements. For example, orangutans (pongo pygmaeus) in their study may have 
failed some trials because they could not remember the second location visited by the 
experimenter. However, in a subsequent study, they tested monkeys and apes on a 
visible and an invisible displacement task tliat they claim entail equal memory 
demands on their subjects. As such, if memory requirements can account for
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problems on invisible displacement tasks, then subjects should perform equally on 
both. The task involved placing a reward in one box and moving this box next to 
another box, where the reward is h'ansferred from the first to the second box. The 
only difference between the tasks is that on the invisible displacement version, the 
boxes are touching and the reward is transferred invisibly, whereas in the visible 
displacement tasks, a small gap is left between the two boxes so the subject sees the 
reward being transfen*ed. There was also a third version whereby the box containing 
the reward was moved next to the second box but the reward was not transferred and 
remained in the first box. Results showed that performance was significantly lower 
on invisible displacements than on visible displacements or no displacement problems 
for both species, but that apes outperformed monkeys on invisible displacement 
problems.
However, it could be argued that these problems are not at all comparable in 
terms of the memory demands they place on the subject. Regardless of the number of 
preceding steps, in the visible displacement task, the subject sees where the object is 
hidden. There is no need for them to remember the number of steps prior to the final 
hiding. De Blois et al. argue that if memory requirements really were an issue, then 
subjects should also perform equivalently on the invisible displacements and the no­
displacement problems because subjects “could not determine the location of the 
object before all the manipulations were completed”. However, given that we know 
from several studies that monkeys or other animals are adept at using a strategy 
whereby they search in the location closest to where they last saw an object disappear 
(Goulet, Dore, & Rousseau, 1994; Santos, 2004), this kind of strategy may also serve 
them well on the no-displacement problem. If monkeys approached these three 
different problems (visible, invisible and no displacements) with this kind of strategy.
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the following predictions could be made. For the visible displacements, we might 
expect the subject to succeed because the correct location is also the location where 
they last see the object; for the invisible displacements, we might also predict that the 
subject should search first in the original baited box (where they last saw the reward 
disappear), except that in this design, the subject is shown that the baited box is empty 
before they begin searching, so this strategy would not work for invisible 
displacements. For the no-displacement problems, subjects would be expected to 
search in the box where they saw the object last, which again, would be the correct 
box, as no transfer took place.
Whilst the results hom the animal studies are inconclusive regarding the role of 
differing memory demands, there is some fairly persuasive evidence that memory 
may indeed play an important role when young children are presented with invisible 
displacement tasks. One study suggesting that memory deficits may contribute to 
failure on the standard invisible displacement task, was carried out by Cummings & 
Bjork (1981). Instead of the standard two or three search locations, infants were 
presented with a choice of five search locations in a row, where an object was hidden 
either in the far right or far left container. Having invisibly deposited an object from a 
smaller container into a search well, the child was allowed to search. Cummings & 
Bjork found that twelve- to fourteen-month-old infants searched mostly at a location 
around the correct location, if  they did not search at the correct location itself. They 
suggest that young infants may have difficulty maintaining an exact memory of the 
location and that by providing them with a number of options, experimenters may find 
that infants know ‘roughly’ where the object is. Furthermore, Bremner (1978) found 
that nine-month-old infants did better on a visible-displacement task when the two 
locations were distinctly coloured, possibly as this reduced confusion between the two
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locations at the time of search, another indication that memory plays an important 
role.
Arguably memoiy load is gi'eater for most invisible displacement problems than 
for visible displacements by virtue of the fact that the object is out of sight for a 
longer time and must therefore be held in memory for a longer time. As a result, 
subjects who have limited working memory capacities may fail a task not because 
they have an inability to represent invisible changes in location or invisible object 
pathways but because they are simply unable to keep active a memory for long 
enough to solve the problem.
2.2.3 Inhibition
Call (2001) has pointed out that failure to solve the most difficult kinds of invisible 
displacements may not necessarily be due to a lack of mental representation or 
memory problems. Although great apes do well on certain invisible displacement 
problems, they too have problems when presented with double non-adjacent invisible 
displacements. In these tasks, the displacing container visits two non-adjacent boxes 
such that there is typically one box in between these two boxes that is never visited by 
the displacer. When subjects are allowed to search, both great apes and young 
children have difficulty bypassing the centre box, even though the displacer never 
visited this box. They had no difficulty solving double adjacent invisible 
displacements where the two boxes visited included the centre box (Call, 2001). 
From this. Call concluded that inhibition does indeed play a role in these failures 
because subjects could pass all other conditions. However, it is difficult to know 
whether apes and children search in the middle location because they find it difficult
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to inhibit this tendency despite possibly knowing that the object is not there, or 
whether they search in the middle location because by the time they have searched in 
the first location and not found the object, they have simply forgotten which other box 
the experimenter visited with the displacer.
Similarly, in a study by Natale et al. (1986) a Japanese macaque {Macaca 
fuscata) failed to solve a double non-adjacent invisible displacement and the authors 
concluded that this was because the macaque could not solve invisible displacement 
tasks in a representational way. However, it is possible that, like the Great Apes in 
Call’s study, the macaque was unable to resist the lure of the next sequential 
container, but that this inability may not reflect the monkey’s true belief about where 
the object is.
So, as is the case for Piaget’s A-not-B task, it may be that monkeys and young 
children have problems with invisible displacements, not because they are unable to 
mentally represent the invisible change of location of the object but because they have 
limited memory and inhibition capacities. One factor that the Piagetian invisible 
displacements discussed above have in common is that they involve displacements 
that are unlikely to be seen in an animal’s natural environment (Dumas, 1992) and 
although they may approximate problems animals encounter in the wild, they involve 
additional factors that animals are unlikely to ever witness. For example, to be 
successful, animals need to understand that an object can be carried by another object 
and that an inanimate object can be removed from the displacer without any obvious 
intervention (Wynne, 2001). As such, it could be argued that the conclusion that non­
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human species lack the capacity to solve invisible displacement tasks is simply a 
result of experimenters not designing ecologically relevant enough tasks.
In fact, the most recent claims for an understanding of invisible displacement 
have come from studies that have used tasks that may more closely approximate 
situations that animals are likely to encounter naturally. These studies, motivated by 
claims that both young childi*en and animals may have knowledge that they are unable 
to demonstrate, have pointed to a number of instances where failure to solve invisible 
displacements are primarily due to an inability to inhibit prepotent responses (Hood, 
Hauser, Anderson, & Santos, 1999; Hauser, 2001, 2003), rather than to an inability to 
correctly conceptualise the task.
In the kind of tasks that such claims originate from, to be described in more 
detail in subsequent chapters, subjects encounter natural object trajectories, dictated 
by such physical forces as gravity and inertia. In addition, these sorts of invisible 
displacement tasks involve additional physical constraints that the subject must 
understand in order to solve the invisible displacement task. For purposes of 
illustration, two of these kinds of tasks are pictured in figure 2.1.
The studies of authors like Hood (1995) and Hauser (2001) have gone beyond 
simply claiming that failure on certain tasks might be due to a failure to inhibit 
prepotent responses, to explore and propose reasons for the origins of certain 
prepotent responses. Specifically, the authors of these studies have evoked naïve 
physics as the culprit in some prepotent responses that mask an otherwise existing 
ability to solve invisible displacements. Again, the argument goes that, because of 
under-developed inhibitory capacities, some subjects cannot suppress responses, 
conditioned or innate, in certain situations. These responses though, are based on
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‘theories’ about how objects in the physical world behave. The following chapter will 
review this proposal in more depth.
Figure 2.1 Invisible displacement task o f  Hood (1995) in which a ball is dropped down an 
opaque tube (left) and invisible displacement task o f  Berthier et al. (2000) in which a ball is 
rolled down a ramp behind an opaque panel where the ball’s ongoing trajectory is prevented 
by a solid wall (right). Photos reproduced from authors’ websites.
However, in claiming that certain invisible displacement failures are due to an over­
reliance on naïve physical theories, these authors are proposing that subjects have the 
requisite physical knowledge that would be required to solve the task were it not for 
the interference of the prepotent response. For example, on one of these tasks 
(pictured on the left in figure 2.1), to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, 
subjects need to have an appreciation of how the solid nature of a tube acts to 
constrain the pathway of an object inside it (Hood, 1995). In another task, to be 
discussed more in Chapter 6, subjects need to appreciate that a solid wall stops the 
ongoing linear movement of an object (Hauser, 2001). Evidence that young children 
and monkeys do show an appreciation for such physical constraints would be essential 
for any explanation of invisible displacement failures which attributes failure to an
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inability to inhibit a prepotent response, rather than to conceptual limitations. It 
would be difficult to propose that these subjects fail tasks because of inhibitory 
weaknesses if it were not possible to demonstrate that, in the absence of the prepotent 
response, these subjects could demonstrate an accurate appreciation for such physical 
constraints.
The following chapter will look at the kind of knowledge young cliildren and 
animals have about the physical world, before addressing some of the claims put 
forward in accounts that implicate such theories in failures to solve invisible 
displacements.
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N a ïv e  p h y s i c s  in  h u m a n  a n d  n o n h u m a n  p r i m a t e s
3.1 N a ïv e  p h y sic s
The term naïve physics refers to the untrained perception of basic physical 
phenomena (Smith & Casati, 1994), knowledge that is acquired informally rather than 
explicitly taught. First coined by Kohler, the term naïve physics refers to the “physics 
of ordinaiy men” and although one can acquire physical knowledge through explicit 
scientific teaching, it is “the non-scientific form (that) constantly determines our 
whole behaviour” (Kohler, 1925 p. 129). Naïve physics or folk physics is the kind of 
common-sense view of the world that young children possess (Povinelli, 2000) and 
that probably permeates our view of the physical world long beyond childhood 
(Shanon, 1976). This kind of knowledge aids us in our everyday dealings with the 
world. If we do not balance something sufficiently, we know that it will probably fall 
and we don’t need any explicit teaching about Newton’s law to foresee this. 
Although if pushed, you might invoke an explanation about gravity, the concept of 
gravity is, to most of us untrained physicists, really just a label we have been taught to 
use to explain the reason why objects fall down if  they are not supported, but we do 
not need such a label to be able to predict and use physical events in practice.
However, by virtue of being naïve, these beliefs are not always correct. For 
example, McCloskey et al. (1980) found that when adults were asked to predict the 
trajectory that a ball would take upon leaving a c-shaped tube, many erroneously 
predicted that it would continue to take a circular trajectory. In another study by 
McCloskey et al. (1983), they found that when adults were asked to predict the
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pathway that an object dropped from a moving plane would take, many adults said 
that the object would fall straight down. Children, it seems, also share such naïve 
physical theories. Kim & Spelke (1999) asked two- to six-year-old children to predict 
the landing point of a ball after it rolled off the end of a ramp. Children under five 
years erroneously predicted that the ball would take a straight-down trajectory upon 
leaving the ramp, whereas children of six years and above predicted that the ball 
would follow a parabolic trajectory.
3.2 O r ig in s  o f  n a ïv e  p h y s ic a l  b e l ie f s  in  h u m a n s  
Spelke believes that there is a body of physical knowledge that the human infant is 
innately endowed with. This body of knowledge -  termed ‘core knowledge’ because 
it is believed to be “central to common-sense reasoning throughout development” 
(Spelke, 1994) p.439. -  consists of an appreciation of a number of constraints on 
object behaviour. These constraints have been identified as continuity and solidity 
(Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992) as well as cohesion and contact 
(Spelke, 1994). The first principle (continuity) means that infants know that objects 
only move on connected paths and that they do not jump from one place and time to 
another and the second principle (solidity) allows infants to reason that objects only 
move on unobstructed paths. Spelke’s conviction that such principles are innate in 
humans, stems from a number of studies done by her and her colleagues using the 
looking time method. These studies appear to show that infants as young as three 
months pay more attention to events in which objects appear to violate these two 
principles than to events in which objects behave in accord with these principles. 
Increased attention towards events depicting ‘impossible’ outcomes is interpreted as 
surprise on the part of the infants -  and the reason they display greater attention
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towards such events is because they are aware that these events are impossible and 
violate the principles they are innately endowed with. Further studies using variations 
of the looking-time method have shown that even infants as young as 2.5 months 
appear to recognize the impossibility of one solid object passing through another solid 
object (Spelke et al., 1992).
It is of course possible that these principles are not innate, since two-and-a-half- 
months may be a sufficient time frame for a principle to be leamt (Haith, 1998). 
However, as Spelke (1994) points out, it is difficult to imagine how a child could ever 
learn how other physical laws affect the behaviour of objects if they were not innately 
predisposed to reason that objects are continuous and that the object the infant saw 
over ‘there’ is the object they now see over ‘here’. As Spelke argues “learning 
systems require perceptual systems that parse the world appropriately” (p. 439).
The principles of cohesion and contact state that “a moving object maintains its 
connectedness and boundaries” and that “objects affect one another’s motion if and 
only if they touch” (Spelke, 1994; p. 435). For example, studies by Baillargeon and 
colleagues found that 2.5-month-old infants expected an object to be displaced when 
another object collided with it and appear to be surprised when an object begins to 
move without first having been hit by another object (Baillargeon, 1995). Similarly, 
studies by Leslie and colleagues show that infants appear surprised when an object 
does not immediately move upon being impacted by another object (Leslie & Keeble, 
1987; Leslie, 1994).
However, although Spelke argues that these principles are innate, and that they 
form the core of adult physical reasoning, she argues that other physical principles are 
not innate, but rather leamt. Two principles, those of gravity and inertia, both appear 
to develop with time and as such, may be more peripheral to adult physical reasoning.
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The physical principle of gravity tells us that objects will fall downwards if they do 
not have sufficient support and the principle of inertia tells us that objects do not 
change their motion spontaneously (Spelke et al., 1992). In a number of experiments, 
Spelke and colleagues demonstrated that four-month-old infants do not pay more 
attention to an event in which a falling ball appears to stop in mid-air (thus violating 
the principle of gravity) and five-month-olds do not pay more attention to an event in 
which an object rolls down a slope with inappropriate acceleration or at an event in 
which a ball appears to roll up a slope (Kim & Spelke, 1992; Spelke et al., 1992). 
However, by seven months, infants do look longer at an event with inappropriate 
acceleration and one in which a ball rolls up a slope, indicating that they are 
beginning to reason in accord with the principle of gravity, hi another study, also 
employing the looking-time method, Spelke et al. (1994) showed that 8-month-olds, 
but not 6-month-olds looked longer at an event in which a linearly moving object 
disappears behind an opaque screen and is revealed at a non-linear location, contrary 
to the law of inertia.
On the basis of these studies, Spelke argues that infants are not bom with 
knowledge of the principles of gravity and inertia, but that these principles develop 
with experience over the course of infancy. Further evidence for a lack of 
appreciation for the effect of gravity come from observations by Piaget (1955), who 
noted that it is when infants begin to sit unaided, at around six-months of age, that 
they begin to predictively look down when an object is dropped. Rochat (1992) has 
suggested that prior to being able to sit unsupported, human infants do not observe 
enough events that allow them to form a theory about necessary conditions for 
support and Dan & Takahide (2002) have shown that only self-sitting infants know 
that objects should fall straight down. In a looking time study, these authors showed
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children a possible event where an object was released and fell straight down and an 
impossible event in which the object was released but fell diagonally down to one 
side. Only children whose parents reported they could competently sit by themselves 
looked longer at the impossible event, suggesting that prior to this age infants do not 
have expectations about the effects of gravity.
All of the findings reported above are based on variations of the looking-time 
method, which do not require the infant to make a manual response. When we look 
for an appreciation of physical principles in the infant’s own interaction with objects, 
the picture is less clear. On the one hand, young infants do show an appreciation for 
some physical constraints in their own actions, whereas in other cases they do not.
For example, utilizing Piaget’s (1952) support problem in which a desired toy is 
placed out-of-reach of an infant, either on or off a cloth, Willatts looked at whether or 
not young infants show evidence for understanding the support principle. In one 
condition, the object is placed on a cloth and the infant can pull the cloth towards 
them to obtain the toy and in the other condition, the toy is not on the cloth such that 
pulling the cloth will not bring the toy within reach of the infant. Willatts found that 
9- but not 6-month-old infants did show an appreciation of support, only pulling the 
cloth when the toy was on it (Willatts, 1984). In another study however, Willatts 
found suggestive evidence that even 7-month-olds may show evidence of appreciating 
the support principle in their actions as they made more attempts to pull the cloth 
towards them when the toy was on the cloth as opposed to when the toy was not on 
the cloth (Willats, 1999).
However, when we look at childrens’ actions, the evidence for an appreciation 
of the need for support to prevent objects from falling, is less convincing. Karmiloff- 
Smith & Inhelder (1975) canied out a study in which young children were required to
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balance blocks on other blocks. They found that even four-year-old children made 
errors that indicated they did not appreciate how much contact is needed for an object 
to balance, a conclusion also reached years earlier by Kohler when he observed that 
“very young children, in attempting to pile one thing on another, tiy, by holding, and 
sometimes pressing, one against the other, to fix them in different and often curious 
positions. It is quite obvious that they too lack that kind of statics.” (Kohler, 1925; p. 
130). In a task originally used to assess causal understanding in non-human primates, 
Limongelli found that young children fail to show an understanding of what will 
happen to an object if it loses its support, and do not adjust their behaviour to prevent 
the object from being lost due to a lack of support (Limongelli, 1995 cited in 
(Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998).
3.3 N a ïv e  p h y sic s  in  n o n -h u m a n  sp e c ie s
As Santos (2004) points out, “if human infants come to this world equipped with an 
evolved capacity to reason about physical objects, as the CK (core knowledge) theoiy 
contends, then one would predict that this knowledge should be shared with closely 
related primate species” (p. 167). The extent to which animals may share the same 
kind of common-sense understanding of the physical world as humans was first 
investigated by Kohler (1925) in his studies of chimpanzees and more recently re­
examined by Povinelli (2000). In his investigation into what he terms ‘naïve statics’ 
(p. 130), Kohler looked at the behaviour of chimpanzees on a number of tasks 
requiring them to understand how objects behave and the effects of physical forces 
such as gravity on objects. For example, in one task, Kohler hung a banana from the 
ceiling and watched how the chimpanzees tried to retrieve the banana. Despite 
eventually managing to stack various boxes on top of one another in order to reach the
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banana, Kohler noted that they made numerous errors on the way to attaining a 
solution. For example, they would place boxes halfway up a wall with no support, or 
they would place one box diagonally against another box or even remove a box from 
a tower beneath them so that the tower (and the chimpanzee) would fall. In addition, 
Kohler reports that even after the chimpanzees succeeded at stacking boxes, their 
success was not easily repeated, despite modelling the correct solutions for them. As 
a result of these observations, Kohler concluded, “there is practically no statics to be 
noted in the chimpanzee” (Kohler, 1925; p. 130).
In addition to Kohler’s reports of box stacking in chimpanzees, Visalberghi and 
colleagues have carried out a number of experiments in which they exploited the 
natural tool using behaviours of capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees to see if they 
could use a stick to retrieve a food reward from inside a narrow tube. The tube 
contained a trap in the middle, which meant that if the animals pushed the reward 
towards the trap, the reward would fall and be lost. If the chimpanzees pushed the 
reward away from the trap, they could obtain it. They wanted to know whether these 
animals could reason about the effect of the lack of support afforded by the trap. 
However, neither capuchins nor chimpanzees appeared to appreciate the function of 
the tiap, and at least in the case of the capuchins, they initially just inserted the stick 
into the end that the reward was closest to (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994; 
Limongelli, Boysen, & Visalberghi, 1995; Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage- 
Rumbaugh, 1995; Povinelli, 2000). Even when the animals finally managed to solve 
the task by pushing the food away from the trap, when the tube was inverted such that 
the trap was on the top of the tube and so would have no effect on the object, they 
continued to ti*y to move the food away fi*om the trap, suggesting that they did not
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really understand the causal nature of the trap (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994; 
Povinelli, 2000).'
In studies similar to those carried out with children, Hauser and colleagues have 
explored how much monkeys understand about contact and support. When cotton-top 
tamarins were presented with Piaget’s cloth-pulling experiment, they appeared to 
show an understanding of the causal nature of the problem, choosing more often than 
would be expected by chance the cloth that would yield the reward, rather than the 
one that would not (Hauser, Kralik, & Botto-Mahan, 1999). They appeared to 
understand that the cloth would only bring them the reward if the reward were 
actually on the cloth. However, in a later study with chimpanzees, Povinelli et al.
(2000) included an additional condition in which the degree of contact was varied 
such that in both cases the reward was in contact with the cloth, but in only one case 
was there sufficient contact that pulling the cloth would yield the reward. Although 
chimpanzees could eventually learn which set-up would bring the reward if they 
pulled the cloth, their behaviour at the beginning of the experiment did not show that 
they understood the difference between the two different degrees of contact.
However, despite Kohler’s conclusion, there is evidence to suggest that some 
animals do reason about the physical world in accord with the principles that Spelke 
contended are innate in humans, and as was the case for human infants, most of these 
findings come from experiments which have employed the looking-time paradigm. 
For example, Santos & Hauser (2002) found that monkeys, like four-month-old 
human infants, pay more attention to an event in which an object appeared to have
However, a more recent study with another natural tool user, the woodpecker finch, appeared to show 
behaviour that surpassed even the chimpanzee (Tebbich & Bshary, 2004) When the woodpecker was 
presented with the inverted trap tube, it started to insert the stick from just one side, apparently 
appreciating that the trap was no longer relevant. It appears that the woodpecker finch learnt 
something causal about the effect o f the trap, rather than simply to avoid it.
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passed through another solid object than one in which the movement of an object 
appeared halted by another object -  appearing to appreciate the principle of solidity 
and how it acts to constrain object movement. In other studies, rhesus monkeys 
appeared to find it surprising that an inanimate object could start moving on its own, 
without first being contacted by another object -  demonstrating that they can 
apparently reason about objects in accord with the principle of contact (Hauser, 1998; 
Santos, Flombaum, & Hauser, 2002).
Furthermore, a recent study by Cacchione & Kiist (2004) suggests that 
chimpanzees do appreciate the need for support to prevent an object falling. The 
authors presented chimpanzees with video footage of events in which an object had 
adequate or inadequate support and found that their subjects looked longer at a 
display in which an object remained stable but was inadequately supported, than one 
in which the object was adequately supported. Interestingly however, in a subsequent 
experiment they found that although chimpanzees were able to discriminate between 
adequate and inadequate support, they did not show the same appreciation for the 
orientation of this support. Chimpanzees looked equally long at a display in which an 
apple appeared stuck to the side of another object as they did to a display in which the 
apple was supported from below. They did not seem to appreciate that only the 
display in which the apple was supported from beneath was actually possible.
Thus, it appears that the same principles that Spelke and colleagues contend guide 
human adult commonsense reasoning about the physical world, might, to some extent, 
also guide the reasoning of non-human primates. For example, non-human primates
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appear to appreciate that one object cannot pass tlirough another and that an inanimate 
object requires contact from another object in order to move. Non-human primates 
may even go beyond these core principles and develop some understanding of 
physical principles that are thought to develop later in human infants, like gravity and 
inertia. Non-human primates, it appears, do have naïve physical intuitions. With 
regard to such naïve physical intuitions, two questions ai'e important with respect to 
the work to be presented in this thesis. Firstly, to what extent might such naïve 
physical intuitions impinge on a subject’s ability to solve an invisible displacement 
task, by manifesting as a prepotent response? Secondly, the evidence for core 
knowledge in non-human primates and young children comes primarily from looking­
time studies with sometimes contradictory findings emerging from studies in which 
subjects are required to make manual responses. It is unclear what kind of knowledge 
is tapped by this paradigm and it is possible that this kind of knowledge is not 
available for explicit reasoning and so is not available for solving the kind of manual 
search tasks that Piaget’s theory was based on. What sort of form could knowledge in 
young children and animals take?
3.4 P r o c e d u r a l  R e s p o n s e s  a n d  M o d u l a r  M a c r o s
As Povinelli writes, “chimpanzees’ efforts with tools ultimately force them to cope 
with gravity, space, force, shape, and so on -  but this may have no bearing on whether 
such concepts are explicitly present in their minds” (Povinelli, 2000; p. 77). 
Considering the multitude of sophisticated biological adaptations that various species 
appear to have been endowed with as a result of selective pressures (Hauser, 2000), it 
is not unthinkable that some species have evolved adaptations for making sense of 
their physical environments. Shepard (1984) has proposed that peiwasive dynamic
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constraints in the physical world, such as the effect of gravity, are inherent in human 
motion processing mechanisms. Recently, Hauser (2003) has proposed that the same 
may be true for a non-human species, the cotton-top tamarin, proposing that “the 
mind of a tamarin has been designed with .. .knowledge” about gravity (p. 8).
Presumably, if some naïve physics is inherent in the design of the human or 
animal brain, it serves an adaptive function. For example, we know from the visual 
cliff paradigm that as soon as animals are able to move about on their own, that they 
are able to perceive and avoid drops. Even chicks of one day old will avoid a drop 
(Gibson & Walk, 1960). However, we would not want to argue that a one-day-old 
chick has a concept of gravity. Does the evidence from non-human primates 
discussed in the previous section allow us to attribute to them a more sophisticated 
understanding of the physical world than the kind of ‘knowledge’ that is revealed in a 
chick’s reaction to depth cues?
Physical laws produce regular, leamable effects or statistical regularities and for 
every causal concept, there is a perceptual invariant that guai*antees the same 
behavioural outcome (Hauser, 2002; Povinelli, 2002). For example, in the vast 
majority of cases, a dropped or unsupported object will fall downwards and in order 
to predict this we need not necessarily evoke any explicit causal concept of gravity. 
All we need do is evoke the end result that is most commonly associated with the 
beginning point; a simple association. Rummer (1995) argues that the causal 
knowledge of some animals may result only from repetitive obseiwations and 
associations and does not reflect ti*ue understanding of physical principles. An animal 
may know that an object that loses support will tend to fall downwards, but they may 
not know why. Karmiloff-Smith (1991) describes this kind of knowledge as 
‘procedural knowledge’ and proposes that it is “run as procedures within specific
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input systems, given appropriate external stimuli” (p. 177). According to Karmiloff- 
Smith, the knowledge is implicit, and it is not available for conscious reasoning. 
Understanding that something happens may simply be a case of evoking leamt 
statistical regularities and it is now well established that even the simplest of animals 
are competent associationists (Shettleworth, 1998). Understanding why something 
happens is entirely different and it is not even clear that the majority of non-physics 
trained humans possess explicit knowledge about why something happens. If you 
were asked why an object falls down, you are more likely to say ‘because it is 
unsupported’ than to respond with a physical description of Newton’s law. This 
distinction between knowing what happens and why something happens has been 
explicitly stated by Povinelli who has proposed two systems responsible for extracting 
statistical regularities. On the one had, there is the ‘what?’ system that is solely 
responsible for the extraction of statistical regularities and is present in humans as 
well as non-human species. On the other hand, there is the ‘why?’ system that is 
concerned with extracting causal structures and this system is solely present in 
humans (Povinelli, 2002). According to these authors then, the kind of naïve 
physical knowledge possessed by non-human primates may be nothing more than 
rather sophisticated associations.
hi a slightly more extreme hypothesis, Hauser (2003) has proposed that where 
there are statistical regularities in the world, natural selection favours innate 
mechanisms that respond adaptively to such regularities. From an evolutionary point 
of view, it would seem that the effects of gravity would be a useful constraint to have 
evolved a sensitivity to. For example, when foraging for food, it would be useful to 
know the likely landing place of falling fruits. Hauser has called these adaptive 
mechanisms ‘modular macros’ and proposed that they may be rather like the kind of
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habitual responses described by Graybiel (1998), which are subserved by the basal 
ganglia (Hauser, 2002, 2003).
Irrespective of whether the physical knowledge that animals have is hard-wired 
as Hauser has proposed may be the case for loiowledge about gravity (Hauser, 2003), 
or comes about through repetitive observations as Rummer has suggested, the 
resulting appreciation of such principles may be very useful to the animal that 
possesses it. However, the efficiency of procedural knowledge may come at the 
expense of cognitive flexibility. Hardwiring particular behaviours in response to 
particular external stimuli is a double-edged sword because although these behaviours 
may allow for efficient problem solving, they may also result in responses that are not 
always appropriate to the situation. For reasons that will be made clear in the next 
section, in a recent review of the literature. Call & Tomasello (in press) conclude that 
procedural knowledge of physical principles may actually impair an animal’s search 
for hidden objects, and interfere with the solving of various invisible displacement 
problems.
3.5 P r e p o t e n t  r e s p o n s e s , p e r s e v e r a t io n  a n d  in h ib it io n
Our review of the literature has now taken us full-circle to our starting point where 
our discussion began with the proposal that human infants may have more knowledge 
about physical principles than their performance on some tasks leads us to believe, 
and that limits in executive functioning may mask this knowledge.
Why would naïve or folk physical expectations impair a subject’s search for 
hidden objects? If knowledge about some physical phenomena does take the form of 
procedural responses, then according to Hauser, young children and animals may be 
unable to override the responses that the activation of such mechanisms dictate
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(Hauser, 2003). Modular macros, according to Hauser, are fast, automatic and 
unconscious action sequences that are immune to counter evidence. Because of this, 
the responses that they dictate will occur whenever the stimuli that evoke them are 
present. In behavioural terms, this will manifest as perseveration -  repetition of the 
same behavioural response -  despite the fact that this response may not be 
appropriate.
With this view, Hauser adopts Diamond’s position that some subjects, namely 
animals and young children, because of weak inhibitory control, may be unable to 
suppress responses that the firing of such macros dictate, despite the fact that they 
may well comprehend the task at hand, and have the appropriate conceptual 
knowledge required to solve the task. Specifically, both Hood (1995) and Hauser 
(2003) have argued that on some invisible displacement tasks, to be discussed in more 
detail in the following chapters, it is not a failure to understand the task, or an inability 
to represent the hidden movement of an object that results in failure, but a failure to 
inliibit prepotent responses of the “modular macro” type, that are inappropriate 
considering the task at hand. According to Hauser, these responses stem from naïve 
physical theories, that in most cases suffice to allow the individual to function on a 
daily basis and interpret events in the physical environment appropriately, but in some 
cases will be inappropriate (Hauser, 2000).
If this proposal is true, failure on some tasks does not result from a deficiency in 
the subjects’ understanding of the physical world. On the contrary, it is almost as if 
they have too much knowledge to know what to do with. For example, in one task 
(the tubes task), to be discussed more extensively in Chapter 5, an object is dropped 
down an s-shaped opaque tube and subjects have the option of searching for the object 
either directly beneath the top of the tube (an impossible location) or at the end of the
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tube (a possible location). Two-year-old children and monkeys fail this task and show 
a bias towards searching in the location directly beneath the top of the tube (Hood, 
1995; Hood, Hauser, Anderson, & Santos, 1999). According to Hood (1995) and 
Hauser (2003), it is not a lack of understanding of how tubes function to constrain 
object motion or an inability to represent the invisible movement of an object, that 
causes failure on this task. It is a pervasive theory about the consequences of a lack of 
support on an object’s pathway that leads subjects to search in the straight-down 
location. So, although subjects may have knowledge both about the physical 
constraints of the tube (the principle of solidity) and about the effects of gravity on 
object trajectories, it is this knowledge about the effect of gravity that wins out in this 
task.
That such naïve physical beliefs may impair the search for hidden objects 
implies that non-human subjects may have the capacity to solve an invisible 
displacement task. The empirical chapters that follow explore how monlceys and 
young children understand the world of invisible displacement of objects and examine 
the claims made by authors like Hood (1995) and Hauser (2003) that young children 
and monkeys do understand some invisible displacement tasks and would be able to 
pass the task were it not for naïve physical responses, that they are unable to inhibit.
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S u b j e c t s  a n d  g e n e r a l  m e t h o d o l o g y
4.1 M o n k e y s
Two groups of macaques served as subjects for the experiments described in this 
thesis. The genus of Macaques are Old World monkey species and are, with the 
exception of humans, the most widely distributed of any primate species on the planet 
(Fa & Lindburg, 1996). They are also, according to Matsuzawa (2001), probably the 
most dexterous of all the non-human primates, which makes them particularly suitable 
for object manipulation tasks.
4.1.1 Subjects: Monkeys
The first group of macaques were rhesus macaques (macaca mulatto). The group 
comprised 8 adult monkeys who were all born and raised in captivity. They live in a 
breeding colony in the School of Psychology at the University of St Andrews. They 
live in small social groups of 2 or more monkeys and are provisioned daily with 
monkey chow and fruit and have ad libitum access to water.
The second group of macaques were stumptail macaques {macaco artoides). 
The test group comprised 6 adult monkeys who were chosen opportunistically from a 
large group of animals, all of which were bom and raised in captivity. The stumpails 
live in a breeding colony at the Medical Research Council (MRC) facility at the 
University of Edinburgh.
Neither group of monkeys have had much experimental testing prior to the 
participating in the current set of studies, and certainly none of the testing involved
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finding hidden objects. Table 4.1 provides details about the sex and age of each 
subject and the tasks in which they participated.
4.1.2 General methodology: Monkeys
All experiments carried out with monkeys were done on a one-to-one basis in the 
monkey’s home-cage. Monkeys were isolated for testing by inserting wooden 
dividers between them and the rest of the colony. Monkeys were tested at floor level 
and a wooden stage was constructed (measuring 50 cm in length x 40 cm in width x
16.5 cm in height) to place the apparatus on to bring the apparatus level with the 
bottom of the monkeys cage. Some monkeys developed a tendency to sit to one side 
of the cage once they had been isolated. Such behaviour could potentially influence 
the monkey’s choice of search location as they may simply choose the location that is 
nearest to them. To ensure that these monkeys were centred for testing, objects were 
placed on both sides of the cage to force the monkey to sit in the middle of the cage 
(see figure 4.1 below for testing set-up).
The experimenter sat opposite the monkey on a small stool so that they were at 
roughly the same height as the monkey. A videocamera was set up above and behind 
the experimenter so that all trials could be recorded. Food rewards were used as the 
object to be hidden. These consisted of various high rewards foods such as chocolate 
raisins, smarties, m&m’s, grapes and marshmallows and were varied throughout 
testing to maintain the monkeys interest in the task at hand. Table 4.1 displays all the 
monkeys who took part in the experiments described in this thesis, their ages and the 
order in which they took part in each task.
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Figure 4.1 Photo of testing environment for studies with monkeys. Here, a monkey who has 
a tendency to sit to one side of the cage is prevented from doing so by two large plastic 
obstacles that are placed on either side of the cage. In this way, the monkey is forced to sit in 
the centre of the testing cage. The photo also shows the small wooden stage that was used 
throughout the experiments presented in this thesis in order to present the apparatus to the 
monkey.
4.2 C h il d r e n
The experiments with children were carried out in two locations. The majority of 
child testing was carried out at the University of Lincoln Babylab. Some additional 
testing was carried out at the Baby & Child Lab at the University of St Andrews. In 
each case, children were recruited through local advertisements and were brought into 
the lab by their parents. Parents were required to sign a consent form prior to testing.
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For the search studies, the child was seated at a small table and the experimenter sat 
opposite the child. The parent or caregiver always sat next to the child. A 
videocamera was set up behind the child and recorded all responses the child made. 
Children either received a gift for taking part in the study or their parents were offered 
travel expenses.
The participants for the studies described in this thesis were children aged 
between two years and three yeai's of age. In order to maximise data collection, each 
child participated in a number of studies. However, due to the limited attention span 
of the young child, each child was asked to come into the laboratory on two visits and 
so data collection was spread over two sessions. Four different search tasks (reported 
in chapters 5 , 6 , 7  and 9) and six different looking events (described in chapter 11) 
were designed and each child received a pseudo-random ordering of these tasks over 
their two visits. As some tasks resembled each other more closely than others, the 
most similar tasks were separated by visit, primarily to prevent the child jftom getting 
bored. Again, as children participated in a number of different studies, tables 4.2 and 
4.3 describe which study each child participated in.
Ethical approval for the studies to be carried out with children was obtained 
from the School of Psychology Ethics Committee.
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E x p l o r i n g  t h e  g r a v i t y  e r r o r : P a r t  I
5.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The gravity error is joining the ranks of classic developmental errors that may be the 
consequence of failing to inhibit a prepotent response. First identified by Hood 
(1995) in two- to four-year-old children, and subsequently also shown to be present in 
cotton-top tamarins (Hood, Hauser, Anderson, & Santos, 1999), the error appears 
when an object or food reward is dropped into an opaque tube and participants are 
allowed to search in one of three opaque containers, one of which is attached to the 
end of the tube. Subjects tend to search in the container directly below the top of the 
tube, rather than in the one attached to the end of the tube. Findings that participants 
do not have this alignment bias when the same apparatus is presented horizontally and 
an object rolled into the tube, have been taken to suggest that expectations about 
falling objects may be so strong that some subjects are unable to overcome their urge 
to search directly below where the object was dropped. This response has been 
interpreted by some authors as a perseverative error, because children and tamarins 
continue to make the error despite receiving no positive feedback, and never obtaining 
the reward (Hood, 1995; Hauser, 2003). Recently, Hauser (2003) has suggested that 
knowledge about the effects of gravity may have evolved as a sensitivity to statistical 
regularities in the physical world. If we see unsupported objects fall enough times, we 
become sensitive to the regularity with which they fall straight down. Such a 
sensitivity may become manifested as a prepotent response or bias, and activated 
when participants are faced with falling objects. Expectancy violation studies with
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human infants suggest this bias could be in place by 5.5 months (Dan, Omori, & 
Tomiyasu, 2000). According to Hauser (2003), such a response bias has to be 
inhibited when it is inappropriate. This is what human adults would do, but young 
children and some non-human primates, may lack the necessary inhibitory capacities 
to suppress this prepotent response.
The current study aims to test the inhibitory failure explanation for the gravity 
error. According to Hood, this error constitutes a procedural response of searching in 
the straight-down location upon seeing an object fall (Hood, 1995). According to 
authors like Hauser (2003), as a result of many years of life on earth, the brains of 
species, such as the cotton-top tamarin, have become hard-wired to respond to 
instances of falling objects with this straight-down result. He considers that such 
stimulus-response action sequences are largely automatic and unconscious. However, 
inliibition makes possible the withholding of these prepotent responses in situations in 
which they are not appropriate, for example when other physical constraints apply, 
deflecting the object’s trajectory.
Both Hood (1995) and Hauser (2003) have proposed that the gravity error 
reflects an instance where, despite understanding the task and being able to track an 
invisible displacement, both young children and monkeys fail the tubes task because 
they are unable to inhibit this procedural response. The aim of the current study is to 
explore further the inhibitory failure explanation for the gravity error. Firstly, if 
inhibiting a prepotent response is crucial to passing the tubes task, as it is believed to 
be for passing the A-not-B task, we might expect a species that shows better 
inhibitory capacities than the cotton-top tamarin, to do rather better on the tubes task.
The first aim then, was to extend the realm of species tested on this task. To 
date, human children, the New World cotton-top tamarin, and dogs have been tested
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on the tubes task (Hood, 1995; Hood et al., 1999; Osthaus, Slater, & Lea, 2003) and 
all exhibit the gravity error to a greater or lesser degree. However, it has been 
suggested that Old World monkeys may have superior inhibitory capacities compared 
with those of New World species like the cotton-top tamarin (Rumbaugh, 1997; 
Hauser, 1999). In a study by Santos et al. (Santos, Ericson, & Hauser, 1999), it was 
found that like young human infants, adult cotton-top tamarins were unable to pass 
the object retrieval task, in which a desired object is placed inside a transparent box 
and can only be accessed via an opening on the side of the box. When presented with 
this task, cotton-top tamarins are unable to stop themselves from reaching straight 
ahead towards the object rather than reaching around the side and in through the 
opening. However, when adult rhesus macaques are given this task, they are able to 
retrieve the reward in the correct way, reaching around through the side (Diamond & 
Goldman-Rakic, 1989). This difference in task performance suggests that Old World 
monkeys, like rhesus macaques, may be better able to inhibit inappropriate prepotent 
responses than New World monkeys like the cotton-top tamarin (Hauser, 1999).
If inhibition is key to successful perfoimance on the tubes task, as both Hood 
(Hood, 1995; Hood et al., 1999) and Hauser (2003) suggest, perhaps an Old World 
monkey might not make the same error. The presence of the gravity error was 
therefore investigated in two species of Old World monkey: the rhesus macaque 
(Macaca mulatto) and the stumptail macaque {Macaco artoides). Despite suggestive 
evidence that rhesus macaques may be exhibiting something akin to a gravity bias on 
a different task (Hauser, 2001b; see following chapter), the gravity error has not been 
investigated in any Old World monkey species.
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The second aim of the current study was to test the prediction, made by Hood 
(1995), that “participants should be capable of performing the correct response when 
the prepotent response is removed” (p. 595), if indeed the gravity error is the 
manifestation of an inhibitory failure. Hood’s own operationalization of this problem 
was to analyse children’s second search choice, where there are three possible 
choices, reasoning that if they made the gravity error on their first choice, by their 
second choice, the prepotent response option would have been removed, and therefore 
they should now choose the correct location.
L e v e l I L e v e l II L e v e l III
Figure 5.1 Taken from Hood (1995), the diagrams illustrate the different levels of the 
original tubes task, with one, two and three tubes. Those children who become able to pass 
level 1 move on to level 2 and those who become able to solve level 2, move on to level 3. 
When Hood analyzed children’s second searches he found chance level responding on levels 
1 and 3, but above chance responding on level 2. However, as acknowledged by Hood, this is 
likely to be because children have leamt that the ball is never found in a box unconnected by a 
tube. If this is the case, having initially searched in the straight-down location on their first 
search attempt on level 2, they then search in the only other location connected by a tube. 
The fact that second searches are not above chance on the other two levels suggests that 
correct second searching on level 2 does not reflect true knowledge about the location of the 
ball, contrary to the prediction of the inhibitory failure hypothesis.
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However, the results of this analysis were inconclusive. Children who had shown an 
ability to pass the one-tube version of the test but who then failed the two-tube version 
on their first search, were often then correct on their second search attempt. This 
would appear to support the inhibitory failure hypothesis. However, as Hood 
acknowledges, the reason for this correct second searching may only be because 
children have leamt that the ball is always found in locations connected by a tube, but 
never in the third, tubeless location. Thus, with only two tubes, if they make the 
gravity error on the first search, then their second search will necessarily be correct. 
However, it is unclear whether this is because the prepotent response has been 
removed, or because they are choosing the only other location with a tube attached. 
Successful second searches therefore may not be due to any real understanding of the 
task.
To clarify this issue, I reasoned that if no search location was available beneath 
the point of release, participants who had previously failed the standard one-tube task 
should be able to solve this version, if  indeed their problem had been an inability to 
inhibit a prepotent response. Specifically, I investigate whether, when the search 
locations are arranged such that both are misaligned in relation to the point of release 
of the object, the subject will search in the correct location, attached to the end of the 
tube, or in the incorrect location, on the opposite side, where both locations are an 
equal distance from the point of release. The inhibitory failure hypothesis would 
predict that, since search under the release point is not possible, no prepotent response 
needs to be inhibited and therefore the correct knowledge would be free to control 
participants’ search behaviour.
Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to explore alternative explanations for the 
type of errors that have been described as gravity errors. In support of an inhibitory
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failure explanation, it has been claimed that it is not a lack of understanding of the 
constraining nature of the tubes that cause subjects to have difficulty with this task 
(Hauser, Kralik, Williams, & Moskovitz, 2001; Hauser, 2003) and that subjects do not 
have a problem understanding the function of the tubes. In their investigation into 
tamarins’ abilities to pass the tubes task, Hauser et al. (2001) replaced the tube with an 
occluded ramp, reasoning that if there is something especially difficult about 
understanding the tubes, then animals should improve when presented with a ramp 
instead. However, tamarins continued to fail the task, and as a result, Hauser and 
colleagues concluded that it is not a failure to understand how tubes function that 
causes tamarins to fail the task.
Further evidence that is used to support the claim that tubes are not 
problematic is the fact that children and monkeys do not show similar biases when the 
task is presented in other ways, hi one version of the task, the same apparatus is 
presented, but rather than standing vertically, it is placed horizontally in firont of the 
subject and a desired object is dropped into one of the tubes. The beginning portion 
of the tube is slightly inclined to allow the object enough momentum to pass all the 
way through the horizontal tube and then the subject is allowed to search for the 
object as in the vertical version of the task (Hauser et al., 2001). Hauser (2003) argues 
that a misunderstanding of tubes per se cannot explain the problem because tamarins 
show a “marked improvement in their search patterns” (p. 7) when the tubes task is 
presented in this way. However, what this ‘marked improvement’ actually amounts to 
in tamarins is that three out of a sample of ten monkeys showed a convincing 
understanding of the task, managing to pass a generalization condition in which the 
tube was configured differently. Only two monkeys passed the generalization 
condition with the vertical task. Although seven out of ten monkeys did eventually
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reach criterion on the horizontal test, a comparison of the two reports suggests that by 
the time tamarins reached criterion, they had participated in many more trials than 
their counterparts on the vertical test. Moreover, although seven out of ten monkeys 
is slightly greater than the proportion who eventually reached criterion on the vertical 
task (five out of nine monkeys), this difference might be explained by an elimination 
of the alignment bias leading to a greater degree of random responding rather than a 
concentrated response pattern at one location. Similarly, when this test was carried out 
with two-year-old human children, again, although their performance improved 
relative to performance on the vertical condition, performance was not significantly 
above chance (Hood, Santos, & Fieselman, 2000). In sum, the horizontal tubes test 
does not provide convincing evidence that monkeys understand the function of the 
tubes.
Finally, Hood (1998) reports better performance by children in a version of the 
task in which children watch on a television screen as a ball appears magically sucked 
up the tube, suggesting that they do understand how tubes fimction to constrain object 
trajectories, hi this version of the task, on half the trials children saw the ball being 
sucked up the tube and on the other half they saw the ball being dropped down the 
tube. Children performed significantly better on the trials in which the ball appeared 
to travel up the tube than on trials in which the ball was dropped down the tube. 
However, these same two-year-old children failed to commit the gravity error in the 
ball-dropped-down condition when tested with the same television screen, suggesting 
that the televised version, whilst still leading to erroneous searching, does not evoke 
the straight-down bias in the same way as the ‘live’ version. Because of this, it seems 
difficult to argue that it is the gravitational element that leads to erroneous searching
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rather than problems with the tubes, because children are not making the gravity error 
on this task anyway.
Experiments 3 and 4 of this chapter aim to clarify children’s and monkey’s 
understanding of the tubes. Experiment 3 was designed to examine Hood’s claim that 
children are able to pass the tubes task when the motion is reversed and the object is 
pulled up the tube (Hood, 1998). In the experiment reported here, the apparatus is 
presented ‘live’ to two-year-old children, in a set up in which we already know that 
they exhibit a straight-down biased response. If children really do understand how the 
tube functions, then they should search conectly when the gravity element is removed 
and the ball disappears up the tube. Experiment 4 aims to investigate whether the 
same children are able to solve the tubes task if they are given some information about 
the initial trajectory of the object.
5.2 G e n e r a l  m e t h o d s
5.2.1 Apparatus
The apparatus used in the studies described in the current chapter were designed to 
closely resemble those of Hood (1995). Figure 5.2 shows the apparatus used with 
both monkeys and children, configured for the two conditions presented in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Two types of search location were used: blue plastic rings for 
the monkeys (12 cm diameter, 6 cm height) and coloured boxes with doors for 
children (11 cm^).
The rings used with monkeys were familiar to them as toys and contained wood 
shavings that they were familiar with foraging in. Research by Byrne & Suomi 
(1991) found that, in rhesus macaques, provision of wood shavings for foraging
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increases feeding, exploration, and motivation to search for food. The macaques in 
the current study regularly forage for food in wood shavings in their home cages, and 
so the provision of the same material during testing was hoped to increase motivation 
to search by exploiting ‘natural’ behaviours.
The tubes were made of flexible corrugated black plastic and were 50 cm long 
for the standard task and 37 cm long for the task in which the prepotent response was 
removed. For the monkeys, cotton-wool was placed a short way down each tube to 
stop the movement of the food reward as pilot testing had highlighted problems 
disguising the sound the food made as it travelled down the tube and landed in the 
wood shavings. Consequently, instead of allowing the food to pass down the tube, the 
correct location was pre-baited with the same reward. For children, small balls made 
of a soft material were used which made no noise within the tube or upon impact and 
so were allowed to travel down the tube. The tubes were held in place by a 
polycarbonate frame measuring 43cm x 50cm and three openings at the top with a 
distance between each of 12 cm that allowed the tube to be attached from the top to 
either the bottom left or right search location. For the monkeys, the polycarbonate 
frame was pulled back after the food reward had been released, to allow subjects 
access to the search locations. This design was adopted in light of a suggestion by 
Hood and colleagues, that tamarins in their study may have been avoiding the location 
with the tube attached (Hood et al., 1999). The current design removed any 
differences between the two locations at the time of search. This manipulation was 
not included in the design for children because the doors on each of the boxes meant 
that both locations were accessible without moving the frame away.
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(A ) (B)
Figure 5. 2 (A) Apparatus for use with children, presented in standard condition and (B) 
Apparatus for use with monkeys, presented in prepotent-removed condition.
5.3 Ex p e r im e n t  1 : Do O ld  W o r l d  m o n k e y s  e x h ib it  a  g r a v it y  b ia s?
5.3.1 Subjects
Five adult rhesus macaques (macaca mulatto) and six adult stumptail macaques 
{macaco arctoides) participated in this experiment. On session 2, one of the rhesus 
macaques was unable to be tested and so was replaced with an additional stumptail 
macaque such that 4 rhesus macaques and 6 stumptails participated in session 2. 
None of these subjects had participated in any behavioural experiments prior to 
testing. Table 4.1 in Chapter 4 lists the age and sex of each monkey that participated 
in this experiment.
5.3.2 Procedure
Participants were tested on two familiarization phases to ensure they were able to 
search in the locations and that they understood that the tubes were hollow. A food 
reward was dropped into the tube on five trials in which a tube was held up at roughly 
a 45" angle above one container filled with wood shavings. The end of the tube was
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placed into the wood shavings, such that monkeys could not see the reward emerging 
from the tube. The tube was then placed next to the hiding well and the monkeys 
were free to search either in the tube or in the well. All monkeys searched in the well 
on every trial, their behaviour indicating that they understood the tube to be hollow, 
and that the food reward would not remain inside the tube. In addition, the apparatus 
was presented to the monkeys a further five times, without the addition of the tube, to 
ensure they could search in the correct well when they saw the food dropped into it. 
All monkeys always searched in the correct well. Each subject was presented with the 
experimental task over two sessions, carried out a few days apart. On session 1, the 
monkeys received the standard tubes task with the tube either attached from the top 
right to the bottom left, or from the top left to the bottom right. The position of the 
tube was alternated from trial to trial so that if the tubes were presented to the monkey 
in the left to right configuration on trial 1, they would be presented in the opposite, 
right to left configuration on trial 2. In addition, to prevent the monkey learning a 
left-right pattern, two control trials were inserted in between each pair of experimental 
trials. In control trials, the tube was still changed to the opposite configuration from 
the preceding trial, but the reward was dropped in front of the tube rather than into the 
tube, ha this way, the reward on control trials fell straight down and was found in the 
container on the same side as it was dropped. Each monkey received up to 12 
experimental trials.
On session 2, the monkeys received the modified tubes task with the prepotent 
response removed. Here, the tube was attached from a middle top location to either 
the bottom left or bottom right (see Figure 5.2b) so that no search location was 
available directly beneath the top of the tube. Again, the configuration of the tube 
was changed on each trial and each monkey received up to 12 trials.
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5.3.3 Results and Discussion
As each macaque completed at least 10 trials on session 1, performance on the first 10 
trials was analysed. On session 2, 1 subject was uncooperative and only completed 4 
trials so was dropped from the analysis. Out of the remaining 9 subjects, 7 completed 
at least 10 trials and 2 completed 6 and 9 trials respectively. A mean percentage 
correct score was obtained for each subject for both standard and ‘prepotent removed’ 
trials. Figure 5.3 presents the mean percentage of correct responses for both the 
standard condition and the prepotent-removed condition. A repeated measures 
ANOVA with condition type (standard vs. prepotent-removed) and species (rhesus vs. 
stumptails) revealed no effect of species but did reveal a significant effect of condition 
[F (1,7) = 15.38, p <0.01] indicating that subjects are performing significantly better 
on the prepotent-removed condition than on the standard tubes task. Since there was 
no effect of species, the data was then collapsed across species. A one-sample t-test 
revealed that monkeys were performing below chance on the standard tubes condition 
[t (9) = 5.71, p <0.001] indicating that they searched predominantly in the incorrect, 
straight-down location. However, although the ANOVA showed that performance 
was significantly better on the prepotent-removed condition, a one-sample t-test 
revealed that this improvement was not above chance [t (8) = 0.778, n.s.]
Results from the first session of Experiment 1 indicate that, like cotton-top 
tamarins and two-year-old children, adult rhesus and stumptail macaques also commit 
the gravity error when presented with the tubes task. Results from the second session 
suggest that removing the prepotent response so that participants are not given the 
option to search in a straight down location does not improve performance above
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chance level. That is, although this manipulation leads to the disappearance of the 
gravity bias, this is not replaced by correct performance, but by chance performance.
Two species of Old World monkeys, therefore, do show a gravity bias despite 
their hypothesized superior inhibitory abilities (Hauser, 1999). However, it does not 
appear that this bias is masking a potentially correct performance despite Hood’s 
prediction that removing the prepotent response should lead to correct performance if 
indeed the gravity bias does reflect an inhibitory failure.
In order to investigate whether this task manipulation could improve the 
performance of human children, Experiment 2 presented two-year-old children with a 
tubes task in which the prepotent response had been removed.
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Figure 5.3 Mean (± SE) percentage of correct responses on each condition for monkeys.
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5.4 E x p e r im e n t  2 : R e m o v in g  t h e  p r e p o t e n t  r e s p o n s e  f o r  c h il d r e n
5.4.1 Subjects
20 24-month-old infants (M= 24.8 months, SD = 1.6 months) participated in the 
study. The sample consisted of 6 girls and 14 boys. Participants were recruited 
tlirough a database of parents who had expressed an interest in their children 
participating in studies conducted at the infant lab. One child was excluded from 
analysis due to inattention and fussiness throughout testing. Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 
lists the other studies that each of the children in the current study also took part in.
5.4.2 Procedure
The removal of the prepotent response for children was the same as for monkeys in 
that the tube was attached from the top middle to either the bottom left or right. The 
tube was again switched from left to right for each trial, and every two trials with the 
prepotent response removed were followed by two standard trials where the tube was 
attached from the top right to bottom left, or top left to bottom right. This was 
important to ensure that all two-year-olds who took part did indeed commit the 
gravity error on standard trials. Furtheimore, it provided a baseline against which to 
compare performance on the ‘prepotent removed’ trials. Each child received up to 12 
trials: 6 standard and 6 prepotent removed trials.
5.4.3 Results and Discussion
Of the remaining 19 children, 14 completed twelve trials and 6 completed between 
seven and eleven trials. A mean percentage correct score was obtained for each child 
for both standard and ‘prepotent removed’ trials. A paired-samples t-test revealed that
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performance on the prepotent-removed trials is significantly better than on standard 
tubes trials [t (18) = 2.66, p <0.05]. However, one-sample t-tests showed that, as is 
the case for monkeys, this improvement only brings performance from below chance 
on standard trials (t (18) = 3.64, p <0.005) to chance level on prepotent-removed 
trials (t (18) = 0.54, n.s). Results from Experiment 2 suggest that removing the 
possibility of committing the hypothesized prepotent response does not lead to 
successful searching in two-year-old children. The prepotent gravity bias therefore 
does not mask accurate knowledge about where the ball is. Figure 5.4 shows the 
mean percentage of correct responses on the standard tubes trials and the prepotent- 
removed trials.
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Figure 5.4 Mean (± SE) percentage of correct responses on each trial type for children.
5.4.4 Error Analysis
It has been suggested that first-trial performance may be the most important measure 
of true understanding in many search tasks because of the susceptibility that young
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children and non-human subjects may have to perseveration on subsequent trials 
(Suddendorf, 2003). That is, it may be difficult for these subjects to inhibit making a 
previously rewarded response even if the location towards which they are making this 
response is no longer appropriate. As such, performance on only the first and second 
trials was analyzed in order to explore whether there was evidence for perseveration 
of this type. Firstly, from this analysis, it appears that the gravity error was not 
predominant on the very first trial for 24-month-old children. 10 out of the 19 
children made the incorrect ‘gravity’ response on the first trial, a proportion that is not 
greater than would be expected by chance {p= 1.0, 2-choice binomial).
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Figure 5.5 Percentage of 24-month-olds who searched in the same location on both first and 
second trials, as a function of whether or not they were correct on the first trial.
As figure 5.5 shows, the location of search on the second trial appears to be heavily 
dependent on whether or not the child successfully found the ball on the first trial. 
Seven out of the nine children who successfully found the ball on the first trial (i.e.
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who did not commit the gravity error) searched for the ball in the same location on the 
second trial (and were therefore unsuccessful on the second trial because the location 
of the tube was switched from trial to trial). On the other hand, only two out of the 
ten children who failed to find the ball on the first trial continued to search at that 
location on the second trial. On the second trial, eight of these children switched their 
searching to the location that actually did contain the ball on the first trial (and were 
therefore also unsuccessful because by the second trial, this was no longer the correct 
location). Thus, it seems that children may be adopting a win-stay, lose-shift strategy 
whereby, on the second trial, location of search depends on where the object was 
found on the first trial.
Examining the initial search patterns of the monkeys reveals a different pattern.
Only two of the monkeys searched correctly on the first trial, with eight monkeys 
exhibiting the gravity bias from the very first trial. Out of those eight monkeys who 
searched incorrectly on the first trial, six of these monkeys again searched incorrectly 
on the second trial. The two monkeys who did search correctly on the first trial also 
searched correctly on the second trial. However, it is difficult to compare these i
results with those of the children because the fact that 6 monkeys switched their 
search to the location that was shown to contain the reward on the first trial also fits 
with the contention that search reflects a gravity bias.
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Figure 5.6 Two-year-old child (left) and rhesus macaque (right) searching incorrectly on the 
prepotent-removed condition.
5.5 E x p e r im e n t  3: Ex p l o r in g  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  t u b e s  in  y o u n g
CHILDREN.
In Experiment 3, two-year-old children were presented with a version of the tubes 
task in which a ball travelled up the opaque tube. The aim of this experiment was to 
replicate findings by Hood (1998) that when gravity is removed, children are able to 
infer where the ball has gone based on a correct understanding of how tubes function. 
However, in that experiment (conducted via a television monitor), children did not 
actually commit the gravity error on downward motion trials and so it could be argued 
that the design was not comparable to the original tubes task and so inferences 
concerning children’s understanding of tubes cannot be generalized to the actual tubes 
task. Experiment 3 presented trials in which the real tubes task was presented and a 
ball was drawn up the tube.
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5.5.1 Subjects
10 two-year-old children took part in Experiment 3 (M = 24 months, range = 23-27  
months). There were 4 girls and 6 boys. For this study, children were tested at the 
Baby & Child Laboratory at the University of St Andrews. Again, table 4.2 details 
which children took part in this study.
5.5.2 Apparatus
The same apparatus that was used in Experiment 2 was also used in Experiment 3. 
However, 2 additional boxes were used for the ‘upward motion’ trials such that there 
were two boxes on the top of the apparatus and two boxes at the bottom of the 
apparatus (see figure 5.8). The two additional boxes used in this condition served as 
launching boxes that contained the ball before it was drawn up the tube on ‘up’ trials. 
These additional boxes did not have a front, and were open so that the child could see 
the ball at the beginning of each trial. The two boxes with doors were placed at the 
top of the apparatus and held in place by velcro so that they could be easily removed 
in ‘downward motion’ trials. For trials in which the ball had to travel up the tube, 
invisible thread was attached to a number of small balls for use on the ‘up’ trials in 
order to draw the ball up the tube.
5.5.3 Design and Procedure
In order to be sure that these participants did commit the gi'avity error on the tubes 
task, standard trials where the ball is dropped down the tube were also included in the 
design. Children received 6 ‘up’ trials and 6 ‘down’ trials in blocks of three, i.e. they 
would first receive 3 up trials, followed by 3 down trials followed by another 3 up 
trials etc. The experimenter was seated opposite the child at a small table. The
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apparatus was placed on the table and the experimenter showed the child the ball, and 
then, out of view of the child, the experimenter hid the ball in one hand. The 
experimenter then placed one hand in each of the boxes and released the ball down the 
tube so that it appeared in one of the lower boxes. Because both hands were inserted 
into the two upper boxes simultaneously, children could not see which box the hand 
that contained the ball was inserted into. Once the ball had appeared in the lower box, 
the experimenter drew the attention of the child towards the ball. The child was 
permitted to touch the ball and take it out of the box. The experimenter then asked the 
child to put the ball back into the box, and to watch carefully what would happen to 
the ball. The ball was then drawn up the tube by the string. Children saw the ball for 
a small portion (about 8 cm) of its upward trajectory until it disappeared into the tube. 
The experimenter’s hands were always kept at the bottom of the apparatus, in the 
centre, so as to avoid giving the child any cues as to where the ball was going. Once 
the ball had disappeared, the child was then encouraged to find the ball. During 
‘down’ trials, the apparatus was configured as in Experiment 2 with the two boxes 
containing doors positioned at the bottom of the apparatus. As with Experiment 2, the 
direction of the tube was changed on each trial for both ‘up’ and ‘down’ trials.
5.5.4 Results and Discussion
Nine children completed at least 6 trials of each type but one child only completed 
two trials and was excluded from analysis because of inattention. The mean 
percentage of correct responses over the first 6 trials for each child was calculated for 
the ‘up’ trials and the ‘down’ trials. The mean percentage of correct responses for all 
children on ‘up’ trials was 30 % and the mean percentage of correct responses on 
‘down’ trials was 24 %. A paired-samples t-test comparing performance on ‘up’ trials
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with performance on ‘down’ trials did not reveal a significant difference. One-sample 
t-tests comparing performance on both trial types with chance revealed that 
performance on both was significantly below chance [UP: t (9) = 3.50, p <0.01; 
DOWN: t (9) = 3.40, p <0.01].
The results from Experiment 3 show that removing the effect of gravity does not 
improve the performance of two-year-olds on an invisible displacement task involving 
tubes. Contrary to the findings of Hood (1998), the children in this study showed a 
bias both with the upward motion trials and with the downward motion trials. The 
bias was to search in the location immediately above or below the launching point.
100
t  60
ball down ball up
condition
Figure 5.7 Mean (± SE) percentage of correct searches on both the downward and the 
upward motion trials.
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Figure 5.8 Two-year-old child searching in the incorrect aligned location on upward motion 
trials in Experiment 3.
5.6 Ex p e r im e n t  4: Ex p l o r in g  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  v ie w in g  p a r t  o f  th e
OBJECT’S TRAJECTORY.
Considering that two-year-old children appear to show no understanding of the 
function of the tubes irrespective of the type of motion involved (i.e. upward or 
downward), it seems likely that it is not a naïve theory of gravity per se that results in 
failure on this task but a lack of understanding of how objects move invisibly through 
a tube, that might be related to the more general problem of tracking invisible 
displacements of objects. It is unclear what kind of strategy or basis children are 
using when they search in the aligned location on both upward and downward motion 
trials. This kind of searching could result from a proximity strategy i.e. children could 
be using a ‘search in location closest to where the object disappeared’ rule. When 
both locations are equally close, as when the prepotent response was removed, 
random searching would be expected if children were indeed using such a strategy.
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However, an alternative explanation is that subjects are extrapolating the invisible 
portion of the objects trajectory from the visible portion. So, when they see the object 
dropping, the only part of the motion they see is linear (before the object disappears 
into the tube) and likewise when they see the object being diawn up the tube. The 
aim of Experiment 4 was to present a situation in which the portion of the object’s 
motion that the child saw was not straight-down, but maintain a situation in which the 
point of disappearance of the object was equally close to the two possible search 
locations. If children are indeed utilizing a proximity or alignment strategy of search, 
then allowing them to view the object trajectory within the tube to a point that is 
midway between the two-search locations should again yield random searching 
between the two locations. On the other hand, if children are extrapolating the 
continued trajectory of the object from a portion of movement that they are allowed to 
witness, then viewing the diagonal trajectory of the object until the point of 
disappearance should lead them to search preferentially in the coirect location.
To this end, a partially transparent tube replaced the previously opaque tube so 
that the initial trajectory of the object was visible. The child therefore saw that the 
object did not fall straight down but followed a pathway imposed by the tube. The 
tube became opaque midway between the two search locations (see figure 5.9). If 
children are simply using a proximity strategy, one might expect random searching 
when the object disappears midway between the two locations. On the other hand, if 
children are extrapolating the pathway that the object takes based on the portion of 
object motion that they are permitted to witness, one might expect improved 
performance on this task.
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5.6.1 Subjects
16 two-year-old children participated in Experiment 4. The same 10 children that 
participated in Experiment 3, plus another 6 who had previously participated in 
Experiment 2 were subjects for this experiment (see table 4.2 for list of which subjects 
participated in which studies). There were 11 boys and 5 girls and the mean age of 
children was 24.4 months (s.d. = 1.1 months).
5.6.2 Apparatus
The same apparatus that was used in Experiment 2 was used in the current 
experiment. The only difference was that the previously opaque tube was replaced 
with a semi-transparent tube. This bottom half of the tube was covered with red tape 
that was wrapped around the tube to render it opaque.
Figure 5.9 Two-year-old child searching correctly on the semi-transparent version of the 
tubes task.
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5.6.3 Procedure
The procedure for the current experiment was exactly the same as for Experiment 2, 
with the configuration of the tube being switched on each trial. Children were given a 
maximum of 12 trials but no subjects completed this many trials.
5.6.4 Results and Discussion
14 subjects completed 6 trials, 1 subject completed 5 trials and 1 subject completed 4 
trials. The mean percentage of correct responses for each subject was calculated. A 
one-sample t-test revealed that subjects were performing significantly above chance [t 
(15) = 2.55, p <0.05]. Thus it appears that showing two-year-olds part of the object’s 
trajectory down the tube does facilitate search, despite a portion of that trajectory still 
being invisible.
This result suggests that children are not using the simple strategy of searching 
in the location closest to the point of disappearance. If they were using such a 
strategy, we would expect to see random searching as the point of disappearance was 
at an equal distance from both search locations. An alternative possibility is that 
subjects extrapolate the remaining imseen portion of an objects trajectory from the 
information they could gather from the initial visible portion. Research has shown 
that children as young as nine-months are able to extrapolate unseen segments of 
object motion based on viewing the initial pathway (Berthier et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, extrapolating object pathways may in itself constitute a bias or prepotent 
response and the resulting behaviour on this task of correct search may have no 
bearing on whether the subject understands why the object must be in the box at the 
end of the tube. As has been shown by recent studies in the field of eye gaze 
perception, even newborn infants are sensitive to dynamic eye movements and orient
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correctly towards the direction that an adult attends (Farroni, Massaccesi, Pividori, & 
Johnson, 2004), but this is most likely because infants are cued by the direction of 
motion rather than by eye gaze per se (Farroni, Johnson, Brockbank, & Simion, 
2000). Even though infants are sensitive to direction of motion and so can follow 
dynamic eye movements, this does not indicate that they understand the relationship 
between eye gaze and attending to objects (Woodward, 2003). Infants and young 
children may therefore be extremely sensitive to movement events and react 
appropriately (by extrapolating object trajectories or orienting in the direction of eye 
movements) without inferring that the object must be at the end of the tube as a 
consequence of the solid nature of the tube, or that the person whose eyes are moving 
is attending to a particular object. The observed response (of orienting or searching in 
the correct location) might be a reaction upon which the infant or child may have little 
control.
5.7 G e n e r a l  d is c u s s io n
Results from the experiments described in this chapter clearly establish that, like 
human children and cotton-top tamarins, rhesus and stumptail macaques also commit 
the gravity error on the standard tubes task. In the standard task, where a search 
container is available directly below the top of the tube, as well as at the end of the 
tube, these two macaque species show a bias towards searching in the container 
directly below. In order to investigate the response-inhibition failure hypothesis for 
the gravity error, subjects were given a version of the task in which the prepotent 
response was removed. Both children and monkeys stopped committing a biased 
eiTor. However, rather than making the correct response, they chose randomly
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between the two locations. These results suggest that, contrary to the contentions of 
Hood (1995) and Hauser (2003), the prepotent, but erroneous gravity response does 
not mask a correct understanding of the object’s location at the end of the tube. 
Participants do not demonstrate any correct knowledge of the location of the object in 
their manual responses once the prepotent response has been removed.
How should we think about these results, if not as a problem of response 
inhibition? Over the past decade, a number of authors have drawn a distinction 
between two types of inhibition. Hamishfeger (1995) has made a distinction between 
cognitive inhibition and behavioural inhibition and Zelazo and colleagues between 
inhibition at the response level and inhibition at the level of representations (Zelazo, 
Reznick, & Pinon, 1995; Zelazo, Reznick, & Spinazzola, 1998; Jacques, Zelazo, 
Kirkham, & Semcesen, 1999). According to Zelazo et al. (1995) “Executive errors 
due to a representational inflexibility or to forgetting can be contrasted with failures of 
response control, which occur when one camiot inhibit an mcorrect response despite 
establishing and remembering a correct alternative” (p. 509). Thus, one possibility is 
that children and monkeys fail to suppress the inappropriate gravity-biased 
representation of the objects being underneath the release point. If participants were 
failing to inhibit dominant representations, the removal of the prepotent response 
would not necessarily improve performance. For example, in the current study with 
the prepotent response removed, if monkeys fail to inhibit the representation of the 
target falling straight down, they should look at the place mider the release point and 
see that the object is not there. As a result, they refrain from actually searching in the 
gravity location. However, not having an alternative representation of the 
whereabouts of the target, they engage in random search among the available 
locations. Similar conclusions were drawn by O’Sullivan et al. (2001) in their
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investigation into DeLoache’s model-room task (DeLoache, 1987). Believing 
perseveration to be the cause of failure in 2.5-year-olds, they removed the possibility 
of perseverative responding yet found no improvement in performance. They 
concluded that inhibition at the representational level, not response level, was crucial 
in this task. In the case of the tubes task, a strong representation concerning falling 
object trajectories might override participants’ ability to appropriately consider 
mediating factors like the presence of the tube, but participants may nonetheless have 
the ability to represent objects moving through tubes correctly.
Another possibility is that inhibitory failures —whether at the response or 
representational level— do not contribute to the so-called gravity error. If this is the 
case, a number of strategies could lead subjects to an error that is ostensibly the same 
as the gravity error. Firstly, subjects may simply be relying on a default gravity- 
biased expectation because they lack an effective understanding of the object’s 
behaviour in this task. If they do not understand how a tube constrains the trajectory 
of an object, they may guide their search with a default expectation that objects fall 
straight down. The difference between this explanation and one based on inhibitory 
control is that here participants are not failing to employ the correct understanding or 
response because they cannot inhibit an incorrect understanding or response. They are 
unable to form the correct representation of the task, and as a consequence they 
actively employ the gravitational strategy as a means to find an object (rather than 
being governed by a bias over which they have no control). The gravity bias is not 
masking a correct representation, but rather filling in the gap of a lack of 
understanding of tubes and their relation to moving objects. The proposal that the 
gravity error might reflect an active recruitment of a strategy when subjects do not
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understand the task would accurately predict that when the straight-down response 
option is removed, a randomised response pattern is seen.
Not understanding how tubes work would obviously lead to a misrepresentation 
of the task. However, as described earlier, some authors contend that both monkeys 
and children do not have problems understanding the function of the tube (Hood, 
1998; Hauser, 2003). Results from Experiment 3 suggest that, contrary to Hood’s 
(1998) finding, removing the gravitational element from the task does not enable 
children to solve the task. Results from this experiment, like those fr'om the standard 
tubes task, are significantly below chance, indicating not only that children still fail 
the task but also that they continue to show a straight-line bias. Children search in the 
box on the same side of the apparatus as the ball disappeared, showing complete 
disregard for the tube. If the bias exhibited on the standard tubes task was the result 
of a naïve theory of gravity, this linear bias should not be present when gravity is 
removed -  as it is when the motion is reversed. Furthermore, throughout testing there 
were many occasions where both children and monkeys appeared flummoxed by the 
disappearance of the object into the tube. In some cases, both groups of subjects 
would either attempt to reach their fingers into the top of the tube as if trying to 
retrieve the object and in other cases they would stand up to try to look into the top of 
the tube (see figure 5.10). Such behaviour suggests that participants do not fully 
comprehend that gravity will cause objects to fall all the way down the tube.
The results from Experiment 3 point to two things. Firstly, children do not take 
into account how tubes constrain object movement. This contention is supported not 
only by findings from this experiment but also by findings that both children and 
monkeys do not pass the tubes task when it is presented horizontally either (Hood et 
al., 2000; Hauser et al., 2001). Secondly, children show what is better described as an
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alignment bias rather than a gravity bias. An alignment bias better explains behaviour 
because it exists in the absence of gravity as well as in its presence. An alignment 
bias may be prepotent, which, having discounted response inhibition as an 
explanation, may suggest that failure on the task stems from an inability to inhibit an 
inappropriate ‘aligned’ representation of the task. On the other hand, an alignment 
bias may reflect the active recruitment of an alignment strategy, as described above. 
The current study is cannot distinguish between these two possibilities.
Figure 5.10 Two-year-old child reaching into the top of the tube after the ball has been 
dropped.
The trial-by-trial analysis of behaviour revealed that half of the children did not make 
the gravity error on the very first trial. In addition, although by the second trial, most 
children were making the error, this behaviour appears to be determined by the true 
location of the reward on the first trial. The emergence of the bias over the course of 
trials fits with Hood’s finding that the percentage of incorrect responses increased 
with the number of completed trials (Hood, 1998). One possibility is that alignment
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biased search patterns reflect the active recruitment of a strategy once children have 
realised they do not understand the task.
Overall, the results from this chapter suggest that, contrary to the contentions of 
authors like Hood (1995) and Hauser (2003), an inhibitory failure at the response 
level does not explain the error on the tubes task. A number of alternative 
explanations may account for the observed responses in monkeys and two-year-old 
children. Taken together with the results from Experiment 3, it seems most likely that 
both groups of subjects have difficulty representing how the tubes constrain the 
pathway of an object, either because they do not have this knowledge or because they 
cannot recruit such knowledge. When given some information about how the tube 
functions, as in Experiment 4, children’s performance improves, but this may not 
reflect any real understanding of the task. Finally, although the conclusions from this 
group of experiments have played down the role of gravity in favour of a more 
general alignment or proximity bias, there is another set of experiments by Hauser 
(2001b) which claim to have found a giavity bias in monkeys. In Chapters 6 and 7 ,1 
explore these experiments further and address some unanswered questions that have 
arisen.
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G r a v i t y  e r r o r  e x p l o r e d : P a r t  II
6.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The previous chapter proposed that the so-called ‘gravity error’ (Hood, 1995) of 
searching in the location directly beneath where an object was dropped was not 
dependent on gravity, and was also present when an object moved on an upwards 
trajectory, against gravity. In addition, it was proposed that the behaviour exhibited 
on the tubes task might reflect the extrapolation of the visible portion of an object’s 
trajectory. This chapter addresses a related proposal by Hauser (2001b) that a gravity 
bias is also evident on a different task that both 2-year-old children and monkeys fail. 
This task, originally designed by Spelke et al. (1992), involves presenting participants 
with two seai'ch containers, one above and one beneath a solid shelf. A screen is 
erected in front of the apparatus and an object is dropped from above. Originally 
presented as a looking task, Spelke and colleagues (1992) found that 4-month-old 
infants looked longer at a result in which the ball would have had to pass through the 
solid shelf -  i.e. an impossible outcome. However, in a study by Hood et al. (2003), it 
was found that even two-and-a-half-year-old children did not search in the correct 
location on top of the shelf when presented with a similar event but where a manual 
search response was required instead of a looking reaction. Instead, seai'ch appeared 
dependent on the location of the object during familiarization. If the object were 
presented in a lower window during familiarization, children would search in that 
window during a test phase even though there was now a shelf in between that would 
obstruct the pathway of the ball. The authors interpreted the results as evidence that
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even children as old as two-and-a-half years are not able to take into account the 
constraint of solidity on object motion in a search task.
In a more recent study with semi-free-ranging rhesus macaques, Hauser (2001b) 
has found that monkeys search predominantly in the lower search location on the 
same task. This bias towards tbe lower search container has led Hauser to propose 
that this preference reflects another dimension of the gravity bias. Not only is there 
an expectation that all falling objects will fall in a straight line, but there is also an 
expectation that falling objects will fall to the lowest possible point. According to 
Hauser, this prepotent expectation can ovemde knowledge about physical constraints 
(in this case solidity) that the monkeys do possess. In a control condition, two boxes 
were placed horizontally side-by-side and a screen was placed in front of the boxes 
such that the monkeys could no longer see them. A reward was then rolled from one 
side behind the screen. Hauser found that monkeys searched predominantly in the 
first box, and he concludes that this provides evidence that monkeys do have the 
ability to take into account physical constraints. They reason correctly that the reward 
could not have passed through the first box and into the second, and so they direct 
their search towards the first box. It is the additional element of gravity that is 
introduced when the task is presented vertically that leads to the monkeys’ failure on 
the vertical task.
The experiments reported in this chapter sought to elucidate the reasons why 
monkeys might choose to search under the shelf. I ask whether it is likely that this is 
a search bias based on a naïve theory of gravity that all falling objects fall to the 
lowest point (Hauser, 2001b) or whether monkeys might have a more general bias to 
search under a shelf irrespective of what kind of movement they encounter. Based on 
a proposal by Karin D’Arcy & Povinelli (2002) that evolutionary pressures have led
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monkeys to prefer to forage for food in sheltered places in order to avoid competition 
from conspecifics and predation, I raise the possibility that monkeys may approach a 
task like this with a pre-existing bias to search below the shelf for a food reward. If 
this were the case, the preference that monkeys exhibit for choosing the cup beneath 
the shelf does not reflect a naïve theory about gravity, but rather a long history of 
competition and predation that has led animals to develop a bias towards feeding in 
‘safer’ locations.
Although Hauser’s group of experiments does employ a number of controls to 
try to ensure that monkeys do not simply have a preference for a location underneath 
a shelf, I argue that none of these controls is sufficient. In the first control, an object 
is dropped from above but no screen is present so the monkey can see where the 
object goes (see figure 6.1a). It is possible that when the monkey sees the ultimate 
location of an object, any bias towards the beneath-shelf location is suppressed or that 
a beneath-shelf bias only arises when the monkey does not see the final destination of 
the food reward and where the monkey does not have an alternative representation of 
the food’s location. This control is an instance of visible displacement and it may be 
that biases such as gravity or sheltered location preferences would emerge only in 
conditions of invisible displacement, when participants need to infer the movement of 
the object. Second, a control was included in which no bottom location was presented 
at all (see figure 6.1b), and monkeys searched entirely in the upper location. Hauser 
argues that if they did have a beneath-shelf bias, they should search beneath the shelf 
regardless of whether or not a box is present. However, this prediction seems tenuous 
because presumably as monkeys approach the apparatus, they can see that there is 
nothing beneath the shelf and by this point have probably learnt that on this task, food 
will be found in boxes. Third, a control was included in which two boxes were
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placed, one above and one below a shelf, but no reward was dropped at all (see figure 
6.1c). Hauser argues that if they had a bottom box bias, they should search in the 
bottom box even when nothing has been dropped. However, as no food reward is 
dropped, monkeys have no reason to expect to find a food reward in one of the boxes 
and so search in this case may reflect curiosity rather than a genuine attempt to 
retrieve a food reward. If it is competition that leads monkeys to search preferentially 
beneath the shelf, the element of competition might be removed in this condition and 
so a bias may not emerge. The aim of Experiment 1 of this chapter was simply to 
explore whether, all things being equal, monkeys would exhibit a preference for the 
beneath-shelf location.
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Figure 6.1 Controls employed by Hauser (2001b) to rule out intrinsic preference for lower 
box. (A) Ball is dropped into top box in full view of monkey (visible displacement); (B) 
Only one box available on top of shelf, no bottom box at all (invisible displacement); (C) 
Both boxes available but no object dropped.
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From Hauser’s work, it is clear that if a beneath-shelf bias exists, is not present when 
monkeys have exploitable information about where an object is hidden. In 
Experiments 3 and 4, Hauser demonstrated that, given sufficient spatial cues to an 
object’s location, monkeys could find an object that was dropped behind an opaque 
screen.
(a)
Î
(c) (d)
1
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Figure 6.2 Controls employed by Hauser (2001b) in Experiments 3 and 4: (a) and (d) 
respectively: conditions in which two boxes are spatially distinct both with and without the 
shelf, (b) and (c) respectively: conditions in which boxes are spatially indistinct both with and 
without shelf.
In two conditions in which an object was dropped behind an opaque screen into one 
of two spatially distinct boxes (see figure 6.2a and 6.2d), monkeys searched correctly 
for the food reward, searching in the box on top of the shelf on one condition (6.2a) 
and in the left hand box on the other (6.2d). However, when the two boxes are not
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spatially distinct (as in figures 6.2b and 6.2c), monkeys’ performance worsens and 
they search predominantly in the bottom box on one condition (6.2b) and randomly 
between the two boxes on the other (6.2c). It appears therefore that if there is a 
spatial distinction between two search locations, monkeys can use this as a cue to find 
a reward and if one location is beneath a solid shelf, then monkeys do not show a 
preference for this location if  there are spatial cues available for them to use. It 
suggests that any beneath-shelf bias may only come into effect when monkeys do not 
have additional information as to the reward’s location. Experiment 2 was designed 
to address the question of whether monkeys might have a bias towards a beneath-shelf 
location in an invisible displacement task in which gravity does not dictate one 
location to be more likely to contain the reward than the other, and in which the 
distance between the two locations was systematically varied. If monkeys continue to 
demonstrate a beneath-shelf bias when there is no difference in the gravitational 
plausibility of the two locations, then it would provide evidence that, given the choice, 
monkeys simply prefer to search beneath a shelf.
Given that Hood and colleagues have claimed an identical gravity bias in 
monkeys and young human children when they are presented with the tubes task 
(Hood, 1995; Hood et al., 1999), if performance of monkeys on the shelf task were 
due to a gravity bias, one would predict similar performance in children at the ages in 
which they manifest a gravity bias in the tubes task. However, findings by Hood et al. 
(2000) do not suggest a beneath-shelf bias in two-year-old human children. In that 
study, children did not display a preference for the bottom location, instead location 
preference appeared to be determined by the location where children had seen the ball 
appear during familiarization trials. One possible reason for the discrepancy between 
monkey and child performance on the shelf task is that the monkey’s search pattern
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does not reflect a gravity bias but an intrinsic preference for the lower location. 
Experiment 3 investigated whether two-year-old children would display a beneath- 
shelf bias on a different shelf task, in which both locations are presented on the same 
laterality.
6.2 E x p e r im e n t  1: p r e f e r e n c e  t e s t  w it h  m o n k e y s
Experiment 1 consisted of a simple preference test in which monkeys were presented 
with two identical food rewards, one placed on the shelf and one placed directly 
below. The preference test was designed to establish wheüier or not monkeys had any 
bias in the order in which they took the food rewards.
6.2.1 Subjects
The same five rhesus monkeys that took part in the experiment described in the 
previous chapter took part in the preference test. Additionally another three rhesus 
macaques also participated (Jenny, Alex and Bruno).
6.2.2 Apparatus
A wooden shelf measuring 27 cm in heiglit by 40 cm in width was used as well as an 
opaque black screen that could occlude the apparatus (measuring 47 cm by 25 cm). 
The same small wooden stage used in the previous chapter’s experiments was used in 
the current test in order to present the apparatus to the monkeys.
6.2.3 Procedure
The experimenter placed the wooden shelf on the stage and placed the opaque screen 
in front of the apparatus so that the edges of the shelf were still visible to the subject 
(see figure 6.3)
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Figure 6.3 Diagram showing apparatus used in preference test.
The experimenter, sitting opposite the monkey and behind the apparatus then placed 
two identical food rewards behind the screen, one above the shelf and one below (see 
figure 6.3 above). The screen was then removed and the monkey was able to take the 
fully visible food rewards. Each monkey participated in up to 12 trials.
6.2.4 Results and Discussion
The food reward that the monkey took first was the variable of interest. The 
percentage of ‘above-shelf first’ versus ‘beneath-shelf first’ responses per monkey 
was calculated. Seven out of eight monkeys took the food reward beneath the shelf 
first more often than taking the food reward above the shelf. One monkey showed the 
reverse pattern of search. A one-sampled t-test shows that monkeys prefer to take the 
food reward beneath the shelf before taking the reward above the shelf, more often 
than would be expected by chance [t (7) = 2.69, p <0.05].
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Figure 6.4 Mean percentage o f  first choices (± SE) directed at the above-shelf and beneath- 
sh elf location.
No monkey avoided taking the food reward located on top of the shelf (after the 
food under the shelf had been taken), indicating that there was nothing aversive about 
this location. The results suggest that, all things being equal, rhesus monkeys have a 
bias towards taking a food reward from beneath a solid shelf. Two things can create a 
situation in which neither location is perceived as intrinsically more likely to contain 
the reward than the other. First, as is the case in this preference test, the fact that the 
two rewards are identical meant that only the monkey’s location preference would 
determine their first search. Secondly, if the reward is not visible, as is the case in an 
invisible displacement, an inability to represent the invisible displacement of the 
reward may create a situation in which neither location is perceived as more likely 
than the other to contain the food reward. Experiment 2 presents the same subjects 
with an invisible displacement test in which one of the two search locations could not 
contain the object because it is located underneath the solid shelf.
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6.3 E x p e r im e n t  2: I s  b e n e a t h - s h e l f  s e a r c h i n g  g r a v i t y
INFLUENCED?
If the monkey understands that a solid shelf constrains the falling object’s pathway, 
then this would render the top cup a more likely location to contain the reward and 
therefore create an inequality between the two search locations. On the other hand, if 
the monkey is unable to correctly reason about the effect of a solid shelf on the 
object’s trajectory, both locations may be perceived as equally likely to contain the 
reward. However, the presence of discernable spatial cues may provide the monkey 
with an alternative cue to the reward’s location and, even if unable to reason about 
physical constraints, the information provided by spatial cues may create an inequality 
between the two locations such that the monkey now perceives one location as more 
likely to contain the food reward than the other.
Considering monkey performance on Hauser’s conti'ols, it is likely that the 
beneath-shelf bias revealed in Experiment 1 is only exhibited when monkeys cannot 
decipher where the food reward has gone or where there is nothing that makes one 
location more likely to contain the reward than the other. Experiment 2 of the current 
study was designed to investigate whether a beneath-shelf bias is exhibited in an 
invisible displacement task in which there is no difference between the two search 
locations in terms of gravitational plausibility. In other words, if monkeys do have a 
naïve theory of gravity in which they expect all falling objects to fall to the lowest 
point, then, if both search locations are on the same level, both are equally plausible. 
If monkeys continue to display a preference for a search location beneath a solid shelf 
even when both locations fit equally with an expectation that falling objects fall to the 
lowest point, then, it is unlikely that a beneath-shelf bias is attributable to a naïve 
theory of gravity.
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An experiment was designed in which two cups were placed either side of a 
solid shelf, so that one cup was underneath the shelf and the other cup was on the 
outside of the shelf (see figure 6.5). The distance between the outside cup and the 
inside cup was varied systematically. Based on Hauser’s findings and the findings in 
Experiment 1 of the current chapter, it was predicted that monkeys would show a 
beneath-shelf bias in the absence of sufficient spatial cues to delineate the two search 
locations (i.e. when the two search locations are very close together) but that this bias 
would disappear when spatial cues became useful (i.e. when the cups are further 
apart). A control condition involved the shelf being removed so that there were no 
differences in the appeal of either cup. The control condition was included to ensure 
that there was no intrinsic preference for the outside, as opposed to, the inside cup. In 
the absence of the shelf, when the two search locations are close together and there 
are therefore no spatial cues available as to the location of the object, search should be 
random.
6.3.1 Subjects
The same eight rhesus macaques that took part in Experiment 1 also took part in 
Experiment 2.
6.3.2 Apparatus
The same shelf and opaque screen used in Experiment 1 were also used in Experiment 
2. hi addition, two plastic coloured cups were used as hiding containers. These cups 
measured 15.5 cm in height and cotton-wool was placed inside each cup to eliminate 
any auditory cues as the food reward fell into the cup.
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6.3.3 Design and Procedure
With the experimenter sitting opposite, subjects were again presented with the same 
wooden shelf on top of a low wooden stage. The factor differentiating the two search 
locations in Experiment 2 was horizontal position and so the monkey’s position in the 
cage was important. Experiment 2 comprised four possible paired-container 
configurations (see figure 6.5). In the first configuration (1), the two cups were 
placed directly adjacent to each other, separated only by one of the walls of the shelf 
and thus spatially undifferentiated. In the second (2), third (3) and fourth (4) 
configurations, the cup placed under the shelf was increasingly further away fi"om the 
cup on the outside of the shelf. The distances between cups, measured from the 
centre of one cup to the centre of the other cup were 11 cm, 18 cm, 27 cm, and 35 cm 
for configurations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. These spatial positions were marked on 
the table so the experimenter knew where to place the cups. Monkeys were presented 
with each of these four configurations once from the right (i.e. the outside cup was 
placed on the right side of the shelf and each of the inside cups moved further to the 
left depending on the configuration chosen) and once from the left (i.e. the outside 
cup was placed on the left side of the shelf and each of the inside cups moved further 
to the right depending on the configuration chosen). Subjects might choose a 
particular location because it is ipsilateral to their dominant hand and so presenting 
the task from both sides removes this potentially confounding variable.
There were two conditions: shelf-present and shelf-absent. In the shelf- 
present condition, monkeys were presented with the wooden shelf and any of the four 
configurations of cups described above. A black screen was placed in front of the 
shelf and a food reward dropped from above into the outside cup. The screen was 
then removed and monkeys were allowed to search in one cup. If they failed to find
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the reward on their first attempt, the second cup was removed. This aspect of the 
design was chosen to increase the monkey’s motivation to search correctly rather than 
just relying on a ‘search all containers’ strategy. In the shelf-absent condition, the 
paired-cups configurations were as above but no shelf was present (see figure 6.5B). 
Each monkey received a total of 16 trials: 4 shelf-present trials (with 1 trial for each 
paired-configuration) from the right; 4 shelf-present trials from the left; 4 shelf-absent 
trials from the right; and 4 shelf-absent trials from the left. The order of presentation 
of the trials was randomised.
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Figure 6.5 Apparatus and conditions for Experiment 2. The upper row indicates shelf- 
present condition (a), configurations 1 - 4  and the lower row indicates shelf-absent condition 
(b), configurations 1 -  4.
6.3.4 Results and Discussion
Each monkey completed 32 trials. A mean percentage correct score for each monkey 
was obtained for each of the 8 trial types (4 shelf-absent, 1 of each configuration and 
4 shelf-present, 1 of each configuration).
A 2 X 4 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with shelf (shelf present vs. shelf 
absent), configuration (positions 1, 2, 3 and 4) and side of presentation (left vs. right)
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all as within-subjects factors, revealed a significant effect of configuration [F (3, 21) = 
8.45, p <0.001] and an effect of ‘shelf that approached significance [F (1,7) = 4.57, 
p = 0.07]. hi addition, the interaction between ‘shelf and ‘configuration’ also 
approached significance [F (3, 21) = 2.58, p = 0.08]. Performance did not differ 
significantly with side of presentation [F (1, 7) = 0.21, «5 ]. Due to the fact that both 
the interaction and the factor ‘shelf were almost significant, comparisons were made 
between the different levels of the shelf and configuration factor, collapsing the data 
over side of presentation because there was no effect of this factor^. With an adjusted 
alpha of 0.99, two of the possible ten pair-wise comparisons were significant. There 
was a significant difference in performance between shelf-present configuration 1 
trials and shelf-absent configuration 1 trials [t (7) = 3.27, p <0.01), with monkeys 
performing significantly better on shelf-absent configuration 1 trials. There was also 
a significant difference between performance on shelf-present configuration 3 trials 
and shelf-present configuration 2 trials (t (7) = 3.74, p <  0.01), with monkeys 
performing better on configuration 3 trials.
Using one-sample t-tests, performance on shelf-absent config.l trials was not 
better than would be expected by chance [t (7) = 0.7, n.s.] but performance on shelf- 
present configuration 1 trials was significantly worse than would be expected by 
chance [t (7) = 2.37, p <0.05] indicating that monkeys chose the cup beneath the shelf 
more than would be expected by chance. These results suggest that when containers 
are in close proximity such that monitoring the position from which the reward is 
dropped is unhelpful in providing a cue to the correct container, monkeys choose 
randomly between the two containers. However, with the addition of a solid shelf, so 
that one container is now underneath the shelf but still in close proximity to the other
 ^A Sidak test procedure was carried out in order to adjust the conqiarison alpha to take into account 8 
possible paired comparisons. With 10 comparisons, this means that the null hypothesis is only rejected 
if  a  = 0.99 orp <0.01.
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container, performance drops below chance because monkeys prefer to take the 
container underneath the shelf. Although the sidak test stipulated an alpha level of 
0.99, it should be noted that one other paired-comparison nevertheless revealed an 
effect at the 0.05 level: monkeys performed better on shelf-present configuration 2 
trials than shelf-present configuration 1 trials [t (7) = 2.76, p = 0.03].
These results indicate that as distance between containers increases, monkeys 
performance improves, but only in the shelf-present condition. However, when 
spatial cues are unambiguous (i.e. in configurations 3 and 4), it appears that the 
temptation to choose the container beneath the shelf can easily be overridden. This 
ability to override the temptation to choose the container beneath the shelf is also 
evident in Hauser’s third experiment showing that when the top and bottom containers 
are significantly misaligned relative to one another, monkeys do not show a bottom 
box bias (Hauser, 2001b).
The results from this experiment clearly demonstrate that rhesus monkeys have 
a preference for searching for food in a beneath-shelf location, and this does not seem 
to be related to a naïve theory of gravity. Rather, in the absence of useable 
information as to the reward’s location, monkeys will choose a cup based on their 
preference for location, and not on the possibility of that location containing the 
reward. Moreover, these results demonstrate another situation in which monkeys 
seem unable to take into account the constraint that the solid shelf has on the object’s 
pathway. They appear not to understand that a falling object cannot pass through a 
solid shelf and into a cup beneath. The results from the conti'ol condition suggest that 
it is the presence of the shelf that creates a bias for the inside cup, and that when there 
are spatial cues to delineate the object’s location, the presence of the shelf no longer 
exerts an influence on search.
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Figure 6.6 Mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) for monkeys on each condition.
6.4 E x p e r im e n t  3: Do c h i l d r e n  s h o w  a  b e n e a t h - s h e l f  b ia s?
Considering the preference that monkeys appear to have for searching beneath a solid 
shelf both when the cup pairs are configured vertically and horizontally, it was 
thought fruitful to explore whether two-year-old children might also show such a 
preference. If the preference shown by monkeys is indeed due to a foraging 
adaptation to cope with competition, it is possible that such an adaptation might also 
be present in humans. On the other hand, if a preference for ‘sheltered foraging’ is a 
behaviour which develops as a result of monkey’s foraging experiences, we might not
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expect children to show the same bias since human children do not have to cope with 
competition for food resources or predation to the same extent as monkeys. 
Experiment 3 aims to explore whether two-year-old children do exhibit the same bias 
on a task similar to that given to monkeys in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 was a 
modified version of Experiment 2 adapted to be more suitable for testing children. 
Based on pilot testing, the design employed in Experiment 2 for use with monkeys 
was deemed to be too lengthy and monotonous for use with young children and so a 
design incorporating the most important elements of Experiment 2 and Hauser’s main 
experiment was used. In the ‘shelf task employed by Hood et al. (2000), it was 
found that children’s choice of search location depended heavily on where they saw a 
toy during familiarization trials and when no familiarization trials were included, 
children showed no preference for searching above or beneath the shelf. These trials 
(hereafter called ‘vertical’ trials) in which a cup is presented above and beneath a 
solid shelf, were incorporated into the design of Experiment 3, along with trials based 
on Experiment 2 (hereafter called ‘horizontal trials), in order to have similar data for 
both monkeys and children and to have vertical data against which to compare the 
horizontal data obtained from children. See figure 6.7 below for diagram of 
horizontal and vertical trials.
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Figure 6.7 Trial types employed for use with children in Experiment 3. (a) vertical trials 
and (b) horizontal trials.
In addition, data was collected not only from two-year-olds but also from three-year- 
olds. As this is a new test, I was interested to see at what age children could solve this 
task and whether the ability to take into account the constraint of solidity in an 
invisible displacement test is something that develops generally at around three years, 
as was the case for both the tubes task (Hood, 1995) and the ramp task (Berthier, 
DeBlois, Poirier, Novak, & Clifton, 2000). It was predicted that, based on the failings 
of two-year-olds on these other invisible displacement tasks, they would also not be 
successful on this task. The aim of testing two- and three-year-olds was to explore 
whether they too exhibited a location bias.
6.4.1 Subjects
17 two-year-olds (11 boys, 6 girls, mean age = 25.4 months, s.d. = 1.3 months) and 18 
three-year-olds (8 boys, 10 girls, mean age = 37.5 months, s.d. = 1.7 months) 
participated in Experiment 2. Parents were recruited through advertising and were 
tested in the Lincoln Babylab and the Baby & Child Lab at the University of St 
Andrews.
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6.4.2 Apparatus
The same shelf, cups and screen used with the monkeys in Experiment 2 were used 
with children in Experiment 3.
6.4.3 Procedure
The child was seated at a small table opposite the experimenter. Children were tested 
on both horizontal trials, where the two cups were placed next to each other but 
separated by the shelf wall (as in configuration 1 of Experiment 2) either on the left or 
right of the shelf, and vertical trials where the two cups were placed one below the 
shelf and one directly above, on top of the shelf Children were given up to four 
blocks of three trials (horizontal left, horizontal right, vertical) depending on how 
willing they were to cooperate. Small soft balls were used as the hiding objects and 
once the child was seated and the screen placed in front of the apparatus, the ball was 
dropped from above. The screen was then removed and the child was allowed to 
search until they found the ball.
6.4.4 Results and Discussion
Both two- and three-year-olds completed an average of 8 trials in the horizontal 
condition and an average of 3 trials in the vertical condition. Perfonnance for each 
child was calculated as the proportion of correct first searches in each condition. A 2 
X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with condition (vertical vs. horizontal) as a within- 
subjects factor and age (2 years vs. 3 years) as a between-subj ects factor was carried 
out and revealed a significant effect of condition [F (1, 33) = 3.97, p <0.05], with 
children performing significantly better on horizontal than vertical trials and a 
significant effect of age [F (1, 33) = 12.6, p <0.01], with three year olds performing
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better than two-year-olds, but no significant interaction between condition x age [F (1, 
33) = 0.33, ns].
2 year olds 3 year olds
Horizontal trials 37.1 62.7
Vertical trials 21.5 54.2
Table 6.1 M ean percentage o f  correct responses on both horizontal and vertical tiials for 
each age group.
One-sample t-tests were used to individually assess whether performance of two- and 
three-year-olds was above chance on either the horizontal or vertical conditions. 
These t-tests indicate that whereas two-year-olds are performing significantly below 
chance on the horizontal condition (t (16) = 3.27, p <0.005], three-year-olds are 
performing significantly above chance (t (17) = 2.25, p <0.05]. For the vertical 
condition, t-tests indicate that whereas two-year-olds are performing significantly 
below chance (t (16) = 4.73, p <0.001), preferring to search beneath the shelf for the 
hidden object, three-year-olds performed at chance [t (17) = 0.39, ns].
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Figure 6.8 Graph showing mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) o f  two- and three- 
year-olds on both horizontal and vertical trials.
As with the monkeys, in the vertical condition the apparatus was presented to children 
from both the right and left in order to investigate whether there was any effect of 
handedness. Unlike with the monkeys however, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
with side (left vs. right) and age (two-years vs. three-years) as factors revealed a 
significant effect of side [F (1, 33) = 3.90, p <0.05]. Specifically, performance on 
this task was significantly better when the apparatus was presented from the right 
rather than the left. Although two-year-olds generally performed below chance and 
three-year-olds generally performed above chance, when the results are separated for 
side of presentation, it appears that children of both ages perform better when the 
apparatus is presented from the right and worse when it is presented from the left.
1 1 2
2-year-olds 3-year-olds
Left 24.0 57.9
Right 50.8 66.9
Table 6.2 M ean percentage o f  correct responses on horizontal trials presented from both the 
left and right, for each age group.
One-sample t-tests show that two-year-olds perform significantly below chance when 
the apparatus is presented fi*om the left [t (16) = 3.68, p <0.005] but perform at 
chance when it is presented Jfrom the right. Three-year-olds show a similar pattern but 
they perform at chance when the apparatus is presented from the left, but significantly 
above chance when it is presented firom the right [t (17) = 2.19, p <0.05]. This effect 
of side makes interpretation of the results difficult. On the one hand, two-year-old 
children demonstrate the same beneath-shelf bias as monkeys. However, this effect is 
only present when the apparatus is presented from the left, and when it is presented 
from the right, children perform at chance.
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Figure 6.9 Mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) as a function o f  side o f  
presentation.
However, a closer inspection of the results shows a differentiation within the three- 
year-old group on vertical trials, where 8 of the 18 children chose the correct 
container on every vertical trial. So, although overall the result of a one-sample t-test 
indicated that three-year-olds did not perform above chance on vertical trials, the data 
show that 8 of these children performed perfectly. An analysis of age within the 
three-year-old group showed that children who performed perfectly on the vertical 
condition (i.e. had 100% correct responses) had a higher mean age (38.1 months) than 
those who ‘failed’ (i.e. who had less than 100 % correct responses) (36.7 months). A 
t-test showed that this difference was significant [t (8) = 2.80, p <0.05]. If a 
comparison is made between these 3-year-olds who perform perfectly on the vertical 
task and these same children’s performance on the horizontal task, it seems that they 
make less errors on the horizontal task than do those children who failed the vertical 
task. The proportion of correct responses on horizontal trials for 3-year-olds who 
score 100% on vertical trials is 71.4 %, yet for those 3-year-olds who score less than
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100% on vertical trials, the proportion of correct responses on horizontal trials is only 
54 %. The correlation between subject’s performance on the vertical and horizontal 
condition does not reach significance, yet the trend reported above does point towards 
a more general differentiation between children who do well on the horizontal and 
vertical conditions and children who perform poorly on both the horizontal and 
vertical conditions.
The results from Experiment 3 show that two-year-old childi'en fail to take into 
account the solidity constraint imposed on object motion by the presence of a solid 
shelf, both in vertical and horizontal trials. However, the bias towards searching 
underneath the shelf on horizontal trials is only present when the apparatus is 
presented to them from the left. When the apparatus is presented from the right, 
search is at chance. The bias towards searching underneath the shelf on vertical trials 
is in contrast to the findings of Hood et al. (2000) in which it was shown that two- 
year-olds did not display a strong preference for either the top or bottom location in a 
similar design. By the time children reach three years however, this preference for 
choosing the cup underneath the shelf has disappeared and children seem able to 
correctly take into account the solidity constraint and choose the outside or top 
container. It is puzzling why some three-year-olds still display a bottom cup bias on 
the vertical task, but the fact that those three-year-olds who perform poorly on the 
vertical trials also perform poorly on horizontal trials (and those three-year-olds 
performing well on vertical trials also perform well on horizontal trials) suggests that 
failure comes out of a general inability to consider physical constraints on object 
motion and that this difficulty is not the result of a gravity bias.
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6.5 G e n e r a l  D is c u s s io n
The results from the experiments presented in this chapter suggest that monkeys have 
a bias towards searching underneath a solid shelf that is ostensibly also present in the 
search behaviour of two-year-old human children. The results from the monkeys 
point towards a bias that is easily overcome when, for example, the monkey has 
sufficient spatial cues as to the location of the reward.
There are a number of possible reasons why subjects show a preference for 
searching or taking a reward from underneath a solid shelf. Firstly, Karin D’Arcy & 
Povinelli (2002) have argued that subjects’ (in their case, chimpanzees) initial choices 
concerning where to look for food rewards are “driven by several factors to which 
they have become sensitised in their extensive experience in coping with competition 
over food resources. These include (a) avoiding food that is out in the open.. ..”(p.23 
of manuscript). In the shelf paradigm, the beneath-shelf location is the more 
sheltered, less out-in-the-open location and it may be this that biases subjects to prefer 
to take a reward from beneath the shelf. Recent work by Flombaum & Santos (2004) 
suggests that even rhesus macaques who are well habituated to the presence of, and 
provisioned by humans, do still view humans as ‘competitors’ in situations involving 
food and prefer to steal food from a human whose gaze is directed away from the 
desired food item than the human whose gaze is not. This suggests that the visibility 
of food to others might influence a primate’s disposition to search for it. It is possible 
that the food hidden in a cup underneath the shelf is perceived by the monkey as less 
visible to the human experimenter.
An alternative explanation concerns the relative perceptual salience of the two 
locations. The lower box is framed by the three walls of the shelf, which possibly 
make it perceptually more salient than the top box, which is not framed by any walls.
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If the subject perceives a location as more salient, this maybe enough to drive search 
to that location. Other authors have noted that young children display a centre- 
response bias (Benson, DeBlois, Bottani, & Hansen, 2000; Mash, Keen, & Berthier, 
2003) in some search tasks and the framing of the lower box in the shelf task may 
highlight its centrality more than the top box. If this is indeed the case, then it may 
account for differences in performance of the two-year-olds in our study on those 
vertical trials and those in the Hood et al. (2000) study. Hood et al. foimd that 
although children failed to search correctly in their version of the shelf task, there was 
no inherent preference for the lower location. However, in their task, the difference in 
the salience of the two locations is less obvious as the two side walls continue above 
the shelf so that they also frame the top cup.
However, it is puzzling why two-year-old children show the beneath-shelf bias 
on the horizontal task (Experiment 3 of current chapter) only when it is presented on 
the left. I believe the most likely explanation for this pattern of search is that the 
majority of our child sample, like the majority of the population, are right-hand 
dominant (Annett, 1985; Carlson & Harris, 1985). Handedness in children emerges 
by about eight months of age (Ramsay, 1980; Butterworth & Hopkins, 1993) and 
although it was not possible to know for sure whether the majority of the children in 
our sample were right handed (many parents reported that they did not know whether 
their children were right or left handed yet), it seems a fairly safe assumption. If this 
is indeed the case then in the absence of any understanding of the task (i.e. a lack of 
appreciation for the constraints of the solid shelf on object movement) one can see 
how the outside container on the left of the child might become less attractive as a 
search option by virtue of it being a more awkward reach.
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Figure 6.10 Diagram o f  child searching on the task presented in Experiment 3, (a) using  
right hand to reach ipsilaterally and (b) using right hand to reach contralaterally.
If the child is right-hand dominant and they do not alternate which hand they use 
depending on the side of presentation, reaching to the contralateral side when the 
apparatus is presented on the left might be awkward enough to create a bias towards 
choosing the nearer cup (which will be the cup underneath the shelf). In fact, not a 
single response to the correct, outside cup when the apparatus was presented to the 
left, was made with the right hand. However, the majority of reaches made by 24- 
month-old children were with the right hand (67 %). It seems likely then that this 
inflexible, preferred use of the dominant hand, may have lead to a bias towards the 
more accessible (beneath-shelf) cup when the apparatus is presented from the left. 
The absence of an effect of side of presentation in rhesus monkeys may be due to the 
fact that nonhuman primates in general show less pervasive handedness than humans 
(Annett, 1985; King, 1995). Specifically, in one observation of rhesus monkeys, 
Warren (1953) found that 45 % of subjects did not demonstrate handedness and so 
can be classed as ambidextrous. Whereas young human children may be resistant to 
using their less dominant hand, it is possible that this less pervasive hand preference
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in monkeys allows them to switch between hands and use the hand which is ipsilateral 
to the side of presentation more easily than if they had pervasive handedness.
It seems likely then that the ostensibly similar beneath-shelf bias that is shared 
by young human children and rhesus monkeys does not share a common aetiology. 
The most parsimonious explanation for the bias seen in children only when the 
apparatus is presented on the left is that is in an artefact of handedness, namely that 
children usually reach with their dominant hand and this gives rise to a preference for 
the less awkward-to-reach-to cup. Monkeys show this preference for searching 
underneath the shelf in*espective of which side the apparatus is presented on, and so it 
would seem that the beneath-shelf bias in monkeys reflects a real bias towards 
searching underneath a solid shelf. The existence of this bias in monkeys but not in 
human children could support the evolutionary ‘peripheral feeding hypothesis’ 
proposed by Karin D’Arcy & Povinelli (2002). When they are unsure of the location 
of a food reward, monkeys resort to a beneath-shelf bias that probably has its origins 
in a history of competing for food with other more dominant animals, something that 
is equally applicable to life in captivity as it is to life in the wild.
Most importantly however, the results from the cuirent chapter argue against 
Hauser’s contention that the bias that his monkeys exhibited on the shelf task reflects 
another example of naïve expectations about gravity (Hauser, 2001b). The results of 
this chapter suggest that there is no need to posit a gravity bias as an explanation for 
why monkeys prefer to search beneath a solid shelf for a falling object, since the bias 
exists regardless of whether there are any falling objects involved and regardless of 
whether there are any differences between locations in terms of gravitational 
plausibility. It seems more likely that neither monkeys nor children are able to take 
into account the presence of the shelf and the effect that this would have on the
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movement of a falling object. As a result, children search randomly except when it is 
awkward to do so (i.e. when the apparatus is presented to the left of the child) and 
monkeys are predisposed to prefer searching underneath a solid shelf when there is no 
information that would cause this bias to be ovenidden. However, Hauser (2001) 
claims that when the apparatus is presented in a horizontal orientation, such that two 
boxes lay side by side and a reward is rolled from the side, monkeys are able to take 
into account the presence of a solid wall, bolstering his claim that erroneous searching 
reflects an inability to inhibit a prepotent response rather than misconception of the 
problem. This claim will be examined in the following chapter.
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U n d e r s t a n d i n g  s o l id it y
7.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The experiments presented in Chapter 6 suggest that the bias monkeys have for 
searching in a box underneath a solid shelf need not be explained by a naïve theory of 
gravity in which they expect all falling objects to fall to the lowest point (Hauser, 
2001b). Rather, it appears that monkeys approach the task with a general preference 
for searching underneath a shelf. I proposed that the bias exhibited by monkeys and 
the more or less random searching of young children reflected a lack of understanding 
of the effect of a solid barrier on object movements that they do not perceive.
However, Hauser (2001b) proposes that monkeys are able to take into account 
the solid nature of a barrier if the gravitational aspect of the task is removed and that it 
is an inability to deal effectively with movements involving gravity that leads to a 
failure on some invisible displacement tasks. This claim that monkeys can pass an 
invisible displacement task in the absence of gravity is intriguing considering that 
most studies to date have concluded that monkeys are unable to solve invisible 
displacement tasks.
Evidence for Hauser’s claim that monkeys “can solve an invisible displacement 
problem that involves solid containers” (Hauser, 2001b p.84) comes from the fifth 
experiment in his series of investigations into monkey’s abilities to find hidden food 
rewards (Hauser, 2001b). In this particular experiment, monkeys were presented with 
two horizontally adjacent boxes open on their right sides and a screen erected in front 
of the boxes (see figure 7.1 below). A food reward is then rolled from the left, behind 
the screen and by necessity comes to rest in the first (near) box. Hauser found that
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monkeys searched significantly more in the near (correct) box than in the far 
(incorrect) box apparently demonstrating an appreciation for the solid constraint 
imposed on the object’s motion by the first box. This is in direct contrast to their 
inability to consider the role of a solid barrier in the equivalent vertical configuration 
in the shelf experiment (experiment 1 of that series).
Figure 7.1 The design employed by Hauser to test understanding o f  solidity on the 
horizontal plane. When the food reward is rolled it w ill come to rest in the near (N) box 
rather than the far (F) box.
As the claims made in chapters 5 and 6 are centrally dependent on the proposition that 
monkeys and young children do not correctly conceptualise these tasks, it is necessary 
to address claims to the contrary. Although monkeys clearly do exhibit an ability to 
find a food reward when it is rolled behind a screen in this way, correctly 
conceptualising the task, reasoning about solidity and representing the invisible 
trajectory of the moving object is not the only way to solve such a task. An 
alternative means of solving it is for monkeys to simply search in the box closest to 
where they saw the food reward disappear. This box is the near box, the box that 
monkeys would also search in if they were really taking into account the constraint of 
solidity. Experiment 1 of the current chapter was designed to address whether 
monkeys do have an understanding of solidity in a slightly different task in which it 
was possible to alternate which of two locations, a near location and a far location, a
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reward ends up in. The design was chosen because it would clearly allow an 
assessment of whether monkeys used a ‘search nearest box’ strategy irrespective of 
physical constraints. Experiment 2 presented the same task to two-year-old children. 
Most of Hauser’s task variations have to date not been run on young children, but 
considering the children’s results from the previous chapter, it was predicted that 
children would also be unable to solve this horizontal invisible displacement.
7.2 Ex p e r im e n t  1: C a n  m o n k e y s  so l v e  a  h o r iz o n t a l l y  p r e s e n t e d
INVISIBLE DISPLACEMENT TASK?
7.2.1 Subjects
A total of 10 adult monkeys participated: 4 rhesus macaques and 6 stumptail 
macaques. See table 4.1 in Chapter 4 for details of which other experiments these 
monkeys also participated in.
7.2.2 Apparatus
The same blue plastic rings containing wood-shavings were used as the search 
locations for the current experiment as were used in the tubes experiment described in 
Chapter 5. A rectangulai' piece of wood measuring 50 cm by 40 cm served as the base 
for the search containers. Metal slots for holding in place an opaque black screen (30 
cm X 25 cm) and a ramp ran along each side of the rectangular base, as well as a piece 
that connected the two longer sides together in the middle. Again, to prevent 
monkeys using the sound made by the object as it fell into the wood shavings, the 
correct location was pre-baited before each trial. The food reward that the monkey 
saw rolling down the ramp instead rolled into a concealed tray on the back of the
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opaque screen (see figure 7.2). The tray contained cotton-wool to mask any sound. A 
removable sloping shelf/ramp made out of polycarbonate and painted black, could slot 
into the base. The ramp measured 20 cm at its highest point, 15 cm at its lowest point 
and had a width of 15 cm. The ramp had a groove running its entire length so that the 
food reward would roll straight. The apparatus for monkeys had secure fastenings in 
place that screwed into the plastic search rings to prevent the monkey from removing 
them. These could also easily be moved from trial to trial so that the blue plastic rings 
could be correctly placed for each trial.
Figure 7.2 Apparatus used with monkeys in Experiment 1: ‘under’ trials (left) and ‘after’ 
trials (right), presented from the m onkey’s right and left respectively.
7.2.3 Design
There were two types of trials: ‘after’ trials in which both hiding containers were 
placed, one after the other at the end of the ramp, either from the left side or the right 
side of the ramp (figure 7.3 a & b) and ‘under’ trials in which one container was 
placed at the end of the ramp and the other was placed directly underneath the ramp, 
again with the ramp positioned from left to right or from right to left (figure 7.3 c &
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d). A maximum of 12 trials were carried out per subject in three blocks of 4 trials: 
‘under’ trial, left; ‘under’ trial, right; ‘after’ trial, left; and ‘after’ trial, right. The 
event was designed to be presented from either the left or right to avoid the potentially 
confounding effects of handedness.
Figure 7.3 A & B: ‘Under’ trials from the left and right respectively. C & D: ‘After’ trials 
from left and right.
7.2.4 Procedure
The test monkey was isolated and the experimenter was seated opposite the monkey 
as in the general testing procedure described in Chapter 4. A number of 
familiarization trials preceded testing to encourage the monkeys to search in each 
location. In full view of the monkey and without the ramp in place, the experimenter 
hid a food reward in each of the plastic rings and allowed the monkey to retrieve the 
reward. When testing commenced, the opaque screen was then slid into place in order 
to occlude the two search containers but leaving the top half of the ramp unoccluded. 
A food reward was placed at the top of the ramp and after the experimenter had drawn 
the subject’s attention to the object, it was released and rolled down the ramp.
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disappearing behind the screen. The screen was then removed and, in the case of 
‘under’ trials, the experimenter slid back the ramp to allow the monkey equal access 
to both search locations (see figure 7.3b). The subjects could then search for the 
object.
On ‘after’ trials, the correct location is always the neai*est box to the point of 
disappearance of the object, and so if  subjects aie using a ‘search nearest box’ rule, 
they should choose the first box significantly more often than the second. On ‘under’ 
trials, the correct location is always the furthest box (since the object could not be in 
the first box without passing through the solid shelf) but if subjects are using this 
‘search nearest box’ rule, they should fail ‘under’ trials.
7.2.5 Results and Discussion
Seven monkeys completed 12 trials (6 ‘after’ trials and 6 ‘under’ trials), 2 completed 
11 trials and 1 completed 9 trials. The mean proportion of correct first searches on 
both ‘after’ and ‘under’ trials was calculated. The mean proportion of correct first 
searches on ‘under’ trials was 17.6 % and on ‘after’ trials was 81.9 %. The proportion 
of correct searches on after and under trials was then subdivided into side of 
presentation. A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with condition (after trials vs. 
under trials) and side (left vs. right presentation) as within-subjects factors, and 
species (rhesus vs. stumptail macaque) as a between subjects factor, showed that there 
was a significant main effect of condition [F (1, 8) == 27.3, p <0.001]. Monkeys 
performed better on ‘after’ trials than ‘under’ trials. However, there was no 
significant effect of side of presentation [F (1, 8) = 3.10, and no significant effect 
of species [F (1, 8) = 0.74,725]. Further one-sampled t-tests indicate that monkeys are 
performing significantly below chance on ‘under’ trials [t (9) = 6.20, p <0.001] and
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significantly above chance on ‘after’ trials [t (9) = 5.98, p < 0.001] suggesting that 
search is not random.
Looking at performance on both ‘after’ and ‘under’ trials, the results strongly 
suggest that the superior performance of monkeys on ‘after’ trials is not due to any 
real understanding of the task, but rather due to a propensity for searching in the 
location closest to where a food reward disappears, irrespective of whether or not this 
location happens to be one that is physically possible. The fact that monkeys search 
predominantly in the ring that is under the solid shelf on ‘under’ trials indicates that 
they do not take into account solidity even in a horizontal invisible displacement test. 
Together, the results from under and after trials point towards the reliance on a 
proximity strategy or bias.
a  left 
■ right
"under" trials "after" trials
trial type
Figure 7.4 Graph showing mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) for monkeys, as a 
function o f  trial type and side o f  presentation.
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Figure 7.5 Left: monkey searching correctly on ‘after’ trial and right: monkey searching 
incorrectly on ‘under’ trial.
7.3 E x p e r im e n t  2: Do c h i l d r e n  s h o w  a n  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f
SOLIDITY ON A HORIZONTAL INVISIBLE DISPLACEM ENT TASK ?
There exist data on two different horizontal invisible displacement tasks that two- 
year-old children appear to fail. Firstly, in a task devised by Berthier et al. (2000), 
children are presented with an opaque panel containing four doors that is placed in 
front of a ramp. A solid barrier is placed next to one of the doors and a ball is rolled 
down the ramp. The ball, by necessity, has to stop when it hits the wall and is found 
at whichever door is to the left of the wall. Secondly, in an experiment described by 
Hood et al. (2000), children are presented with a stage in which there are two 
compartments that can be separated by inserting a solid wall in between them. When 
a screen is erected and a ball rolled from one side, if the wall is present the ball will 
stop in the first compartment but if not, it will continue and come to rest in the second 
compartment. Two-year-old children fail both of these tasks. In the Berthier et al. 
task, children search randomly between the doors, not appreciating that the ball can
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only be behind the door adjacent to the solid wall and in the Hood et al. study, 
children chose both sides of the stage equally, regardless of the presence and location 
of the barrier. However, in neither of these tasks do children appear to exhibit the 
same proximity bias displayed by monkeys on the task described in Experiment 1 of 
this chapter or in Hauser’s task (Hauser, 2001b). In other words, children in these 
studies did not tend to search more in the location closest to the disappearance of the 
ball. On the other hand, children older than two years (three years for Berthier et al. 
task and two-and-a-half years for Hood et al. task) appear able to solve both of these 
tasks (Hood et al., 2000; Berthier et al., 2000). Based on these findings, it was 
predicted that two-year-old children would also fail the task that was presented to 
monkeys in Experiment 1. Unlike the monkeys however, it was not predicted that 
they would show a proximity bias.
7.3.1 Subjects
Childi-en: 21 two-year-olds (15 boys and 6 girls, mean age = 24.9 months, s.d. = 1.5) 
and 18 three-year-olds (8 boys and 10 girls, mean age = 37.3 months, s.d. = 1.6) took 
part in Experiment 4. Testing took place at the University of Lincoln Babylab.
7.3.2 Apparatus
The apparatus for use with children was very similar to that described in experiment 1 
with monkeys. A polycarbonate base was used (67 x 41 cm) instead of wood and the 
search containers were small brightly coloured polycarbonate boxes (14x11 x11  cm) 
with doors measuring 10 cm x 9 cm. These boxes were lined with layers of felt which 
prevented any audible cues as the ball rolled into the box. The apparatus for the 
children had strips of Velcro placed in each location where the boxes were to be
129
placed so that the position of the boxes could easily be moved from trial to trial. A 
blue polycarbonate ramp measuring 23 cm at its highest point and 35 cm long and an 
opaque screen measuring 27 cm by 23 cm were also used. See figure 7.6 for 
photograph of the apparatus.
Figure 7.6 Apparatus set up for both ‘under’ trials (left) and ‘after’ trials (right), presented 
from the right.
7.3.3 Design
The design used for children was identical to that used for monkeys in experiment 1. 
A maximum of 12 trials were carried out per subject in three blocks of four trials: 
‘under’ trial, left; ‘under’ trial, right; ‘after’ trial, left; and ‘after’ trial, right.
7.3.4 Procedure
The procedure with children was the same as for monkeys. Children were seated at a 
small table opposite the experimenter with the apparatus on the table. The only 
difference between the two procedures was that in the case of children, the 
experimenter did not slide the ramp back before allowing the child to search for the
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object. This was because the search containers had doors and so they were just as 
easily accessible without removing the ramp.
7.3.5 Results and Discussion
The mean proportion of correct first searches on both ‘under’ and ‘after’ trials was 
calculated for each subject. For 24-month-olds, the mean proportion of correct first 
searches on ‘after’ trials was 70.8 % and for 36-month olds it was 80.6 %. On the 
other hand, the mean proportion of con’ect first searches on ‘under’ trials was just 
43.7 % for two-year-olds and 44.2 % for three-year-olds. A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with condition (‘under’ trials vs. ‘after’ trials) and side of 
presentation (left vs. right) as repeated measui'es factors and age (24 months vs. 36 
months) as a between subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of condition [F 
(1, 37) = 30.1, p <  0.001]. There were no other significant main effects or 
interactions, indicating that children of both two-years and three-years performed 
similarly better on ‘after’ trials than ‘under’ trials.
As there were no main effects of age or side of presentation, the data were 
collapsed over these two factors (figure 7.7). The box plot presented below (figiue 
7.8) indicates that the distribution for the two-year-old group on the ‘under’ trials is 
particularly skewed to the right, as the majority of children in this group had low 
percentage correct scores. However, the small number of children who had higher 
scores on this condition led to an inflation of the mean relative to the median. As a 
way of transforming the data into a more meaningful distribution, the raw percentage 
scores for each subject were converted into a binomial distribution, by assigning each 
of the possible number of correct responses (out of 6) with a probability of occuning. 
This has the effect of lowering the overall mean (figure 7.9), bringing it closer to the 
median.
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Figure 7.7 Graph showing mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) for both two- and 
three-year-old children on ‘under’ trials and ‘after’ trials.
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Figure 7.8 Box plot indicating the median, range and inter-quartile range o f  correct 
responses for two- and three-year-olds on ‘under’ and ‘after’ trials. The median correct 
responses on ‘under’ trials is 33 % and 45 % for two- and three-year-olds respectively and on 
‘after’ trials is 83 % for both age groups.
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Figure 7.9 Graphs showing the performance o f  both two- and three-year-old children (data 
combined) on ‘under’ trials and ‘after’ trials. The graph on the left shows the mean 
percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) calculated from the raw percentage correct scores for 
each subject. The graph on the right shows the mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) 
after the raw data was converted to a binomial distribution.
The results from experiment 1 of this chapter indicated that monkeys were making a 
proximity error and searching in the location closest to the point of disappearance of 
the food reward. As a result, they searched below chance on ‘under’ trials and above 
chance on ‘after’ trials. One-sample t-tests comparing performance with chance were 
carried out to assess whether children also made this error of searching predominantly 
in the first location. These tests were carried out on the normalized data and revealed 
that children also performed significantly below chance on ‘under’ trials [t (38) = 
6.54, p ^0.0001] and significantly above chance on ‘after’ trials [t (38) = 3.58, p ^ 
0.001]. In this way, children’s performance on this task mirrors that of monkeys.
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Side of 
presentation
‘under’ trials ‘after’ trials
24 months 36 months 24 months 36 months
left 45.0 61.9 67.5 78.8
right 45.3 32.8 68 J 87.1
Table 7.1 Mean percentage correct scores for each age group as a function o f  trial type and 
side o f  presentation.
Table 7.1 above presents the mean percentage correct score for each age group, for 
each of the two trial types and depending on the side of presentation. Although the 
ANOVA revealed no effect of side of presentation and no significant interaction 
between side of presentation and age, the means suggest that three-year-olds are 
performing better on ‘under’ trials when the apparatus is presented from the left. A 
paired-samples t-test confirms this difference [t (17) = 2.33, p <0.05] and further 
indicates that it is only when the apparatus is presented from the right that three-year- 
old children show a significant preference for the first location on ‘under’ trials [t (17) 
= 2.1,p <0.05].
_ 2
Left presentation Right presentation
Figure 7.10 Apparatus configured for ‘under’ trials presented from left (left) and right 
(right) as designated by which side the ball rolls from.
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Again, the fact that three-year-olds do better on ‘under’ trials when the apparatus is 
presented from the left is likely to be influenced by handedness. The diagram 
presented in figure 7.10 above is the child’s view of the apparatus. When the 
apparatus is presented from the right, the correct location is ipsilateral to the child’s 
left hand. Children who are right-hand dominant, as most probably are, may find it 
awkward to reach contralaterally with their right hand to the left box, leading to a 
greater degree of errors on trials in which the ball rolls from the right.
However, with such data, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions because on the 
one hand, it could be argued that three-year-olds do understand the task but because 
of an awkward reach to the contralateral side, they get lazy and just reach ipsilaterally 
instead, producing an error. On the other hand, perhaps the only reason why they do 
well when the apparatus is presented from the left is because the correct location is 
the right-hand location and this is ipsilateral to their dominant hand.
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Figure 7.11 Graph showing mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) for both age 
groups as a function o f  trial type and side o f  presentation.
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Figure 7.12 Two-year-old child searching incorrectly on ‘under’ trial (left) and correctly on 
‘after’ trial (right).
7.4 G e n e r a l  D isc u s sio n
Both two- and three-year-old children and monkeys display a proximity error when 
presented with a task in which they can either search in a location closest to where a 
ball disappears or furthest from where a ball disappears. Rather than taking into 
account the effect of a solid shelf on the ball’s movement, these results indicate that 
the search patterns of monkeys and children reflect a bias to search in the location 
closest to object disappearance. Whether this is a bias that children bring to the task 
or a strategy that they implement when the location of the object cannot be deciphered 
is unclear. However, what is clear is that the results of Hauser’s study in which it is 
claimed that monkeys demonstrate an understanding of solidity, should be treated 
with caution. The results from the experiments presented in the current chapter not 
only demonstrate that our monkeys do not take into account solidity when searching 
for a hidden object, they are also biased towards searching in a location closest to an 
object’s disappearance. Furthermore, this task demonstrates another occasion where 
two- and three-year-old children are unable to track the invisible displacement of a
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moving object and where the performance of monkeys closely mirrors that of young 
children.
In light of the findings presented in the previous chapter, one possible 
interpretation of the results presented in the current chapter is that searching in the 
first location on ‘under’ trials reflects a bias towards searching under a solid shelf. 
However, there is reason to suppose that search behaviour on this task really does 
reflect a different type of bias: a proximity bias. Firstly, two-year-old children exhibit 
the bias towards searching in the first location on ‘under’ trials on this task yet do not 
display the ‘beneath-shelf bias that monkeys display on the shelf task described in 
Chapter 6. Instead, the children’s behaviour on the shelf task of Chapter 6 is more 
likely to be an artefact of handedness as it is only apparent when the apparatus is 
presented from the left. Secondly, tliree-year-old children perform fairly well on the 
shelf task, and do not exhibit a beneath-shelf bias despite still exhibiting a preference 
for the first box on ‘under’ trials in the experiment described in this chapter. As such, 
it seems more likely that the results presented in this chapter are best interpreted as a 
proximity bias.
Considering these results, it is intriguing that two-year-old children do not 
display behaviour characteristic of a proximity bias on other tasks involving 
horizontal object movement. For example, on the Berthier et al. (2000) task, they 
report no bias towards searching at the first door, which would be the location closest 
to the disappearance of the object. One possible reason for this difference is that in 
the task reported here, the apparatus was within reach of the subject as the event 
unfolded. In both the Berthier et al. task and the Hood et al. task, the apparatus was at 
a distance from the subject as the event unfolded. It has been argued by some authors 
that success on a task may be more likely if the subject actively participates rather
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than simply passively observes (Filion, Washburn, & Gulledge, 1996). It is possible 
then that the more participatory natui*e of a ‘game’ that is within reach of the subject 
evokes a different response to one that is not within reach and therefore less 
participatory. Chapter 8 tests this proposal with monkeys using the Berthier task that 
has so far only been presented out of reach of the subject (Berthier et al., 2000).
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8
Is  INVISIBLE DISPLACEMENT WITHIN REACH?
Th e  effect  of in v o lv em en t  and  appara tu s m o v em en t  on  search
8.1 In t r o d u c t io n
Testing young children on manual search tasks requires a fine balance in order to 
obtain good data. On the one hand, the task must be interesting enough to engage the 
child’s attention. On the other hand, it is often necessary that the child pay close 
attention to small details that might be missed if  they are too actively involved in the 
‘game’. As a result, children are often seated some way from the event that the 
experimenter is presenting (Hood, Carey, & Prasada, 2000) or the apparatus is out of 
reach of the subject whilst the event unfolds and pushed towards them afterwards to 
allow them to search (Berthier, DeBlois, Poirier, Novak, & Clifton, 2000). This 
methodological problem is often magnified when testing non-human subjects because 
most often the object being hidden is a highly desired food reward and it is not 
possible to instruct the subject to wait until you tell them to search. This difficulty is 
reflected by the fact that the majority of Piagetian search tasks carried out with 
nonhuman primates have involved pushing the objects towards the animal after the 
experimenter has carried out all the necessary manipulations (e.g. Call, 2001; deBlois 
& Novak, 1994; deBlois & Novalc, 1998; Dumas & Brunet, 1994; Mendes & Huber, 
2004; Matthieu et al., 1976; Natale et al, 1986; Schino et al., 1990; Vaughter et al., 
1972).
There are a number of potential problems that stem from this distance that is 
imposed in many search tasks. Firstly, it could be argued that when the apparatus is
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within reach of the subject, the task becomes more participatory. Participatory, in this 
sense, means that the subject is free to choose when to respond instead of having to 
wait for the experimenter’s decision, and this could facilitate a better match between 
perception and action. Moreover, if  the subject perceives their involvement to be 
greater, it could increase their motivation to attend to the task. Filion et al. (1996) 
have suggested that one of the reasons that monkeys may have succeeded on their 
invisible displacement task was because of the more participatory nature of the task 
relative to most standard invisible displacement tasks. In that study, monkeys played 
a computer game in which they watched moving targets disappearing behind an 
opaque portion of the screen. With a cursor, the monkey had to intercept the target 
and to do this, had to predict where on the screen the target would reappear. Because 
the monkey was actively involved in the task, it is possible that this higher level of 
participation contributed to the monkey’s success on the task.
Secondly, one point that has been raised concerns the movement of the 
apparatus itself and the potentially distracting effect this might have on the subject’s 
representation of the object’s location (Spelke, 2002). This is of special concern when 
comparing performance on looking and seai'ch versions of the same task because the 
same movement of the apparatus does not to take place in looking tasks.
A number of different versions of the Berthier et al. (2000) task have been 
carried out, all with children between the ages of two- and three-years (see figure 8.1 
below for task). In a version by Butler and colleagues (2002), the opaque panel was 
replaced by a transparent panel containing the four opaque doors. In this case, when 
the ball was released at the top of the ramp, children could see the ball passing 
between the doors and could use re-emergence or non re-emergence as cues to the 
ball’s resting point, even if  they did not take into account the solid wall. Despite this
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additional information, very few of the two-year-olds tested performed above chance, 
instead they either searched randomly or demonstrated specific door biases. This 
finding suggests that tracking invisible displacements is not the only factor that leads 
to successful searching on this task. The authors also looked at eye gaze throughout 
the task and found that if children broke their gaze before choosing a door, they were 
unlikely to choose the correct door. So, even if they tracked the ball to the right 
location after displacement, if they looked away from this location before opening a 
door, their performance was at chance. If they held their gaze, performance was 
better (Butler et al., 2002). Similar findings were reported by Mash et al. (2003). This 
result suggests that the representation that the child has of the task is very fragile and 
easily disrupted. It is possible that the subsequent movement of the apparatus towards 
the child after the ball has been rolled could lead to a disruption of gaze or of their 
working representation of the task.
This issue is particularly important considering that this task (the standard ramp 
task) has been compared to an identical looking version in the same children (Hood,
Cole-Davis, & Dias, 2003). Hood and colleagues found that whilst two-and-a-half- 
year-old children failed to perform above chance on the standard search version of the 
Berthier task, when these same children were presented with outcomes in which the 
ball appeared at a possible location (i.e. to the left of the solid wall) or an impossible 
location (i.e. any of the other doors), they looked longer at an impossible outcome.
Hood et al. interpret these findings as suggesting that children do show a sensitivity to 
solidity, but that this knowledge is not available for use in a manual search task.
However, such conclusions should remain tentative because the two versions of the 
task are not identical. Specifically, the additional movement of the apparatus in the i
I
search task that is absent from the looking task could introduce a critical difference |
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between the tasks. It is possible that the putative distracting effect of movement may 
be part of the explanation for why the perceptual knowledge demonstrated on looking 
tasks (e.g. Hood et al, 2003) fails to be recruited in ostensibly similar action tasks 
(Berthier et al. 2000).
The results from the previous chapter indicate that both monkeys and two-year- 
old children exhibit a proximity error or bias on a similar task involving an object 
rolling down a ramp and disappearing from view. The fact that two-year-olds show 
such a marked proximity preference on that task but do not show a similar search 
pattern on the Berthier et al. task is puzzling. As was noted however, the task 
presented in Chapter 7 was within reach of the subject. It is possible then that this 
difference is crucial to evoke a response based on proximity such that the proximity 
bias or strategy is only evoked when subjects perceive a certain level of involvement 
in the task. The experiment to be described in the current chapter examines this 
possibility by presenting the Berthier et al. task to monkeys, both within their reach 
and out of reach.
8.2 M e t h o d s
8.2.1 Subjects
Eight monkeys were subjects for the current experiment and all were rhesus 
macaques. See table 4.1 in Chapter 4 for details of which monkeys participated, their 
sex and their age. The majority of these monkeys had already participated in 
Experiment 1 of Chapter 7, and so it was known that they made search responses 
based on proximity in that task.
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8.2.2 Apparatus
The apparatus was designed to closely resemble that used by Berthier et al. (2000). A 
wooden base board measuring 87 cm in length and 23 cm in width held in place a 
polycarbonate ramp measuring 71 cm in length. The ramp was 10 cm wide and 
contained a groove down its entire length to enable an object to be rolled in a straight 
line. An opaque panel measuring 50 cm in length and 20 cm in height contained four 
doors. These doors measured 9.5 cm by 7.5 cm and were 2.5 cm apart. The doors 
were painted different colours as Keen (2003) has suggested that making the doors 
distinct from each other could aid successful searching. Each door contained a small 
knob and each door opened from the right. The panel was held in front of the ramp 
by two pieces of plastic attached to the wooden baseboard. Four different 
polycarbonate panels served as the walls to be inserted next to each of the doors. 
Each wall was designed to fit one of the four positions and so differed in length, but 
each wall extended 7 cm above the top of the opaque panel. The main opaque panel 
contained slots so that the front of each of the walls was visible all the way down the 
apparatus as well as from above. See figure 8.1 below for photo of apparatus.
Figure 8.1 Apparatus used in current experiment.
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8.2.3 Design
Each monkey participated in two conditions: within-reach and out-of-reach. In the 
within-reach condition, the subject could reach the apparatus throughout the event and 
no movement of the apparatus took place after the event. In the out-of-reach 
condition, the apparatus was out of the subject’s reach during the event (at the back of 
the wooden stage -  about 30 cm away from the monkey) and was pushed towards the 
subject to allow them to search. Each monkey participated in the within-reach 
condition before participating in the out-of-reach condition. The main reason for 
doing this is that, in the initial stages of testing with a new task, monkeys tend to be 
very wary and are often alarmed by the movement of apparatus. The out-of-reach 
condition was presented second to allow the monkeys to become familiarized with the 
apparatus before introducing this slightly more aversive condition. A maximum of 
five trials at each location were given to each monkey in each condition meaning that 
each monkey received a maximum of 20 trials on each condition.
8.2.4 Procedure
With the experimenter seated opposite the monkey, the apparatus was placed on the 
small wooden stage used in the previous experiments, A familiarization phase ensued 
in which a food reward was held above one of the closed doors and lowered behind 
the door. The monkey could then open whichever door they wanted to obtain the 
reward. This initial familiarization was included to ensure that monkeys could aptly 
open the doors and could obtain the reward without problems. All monkeys learned 
quickly how the doors operated and were usually ahle to open the doors after two or 
three familiarization trials, although one monkey required five familiarization trials 
before she managed to open the door on her own. After a monkey had demonstrated
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competent door opening abilities (i.e. had retrieved a food reward from behind a 
different door on four successive familiarization trials), a second familiarization phase 
ensued in which all doors were open and the solid wall was inserted next to one of the 
four doors. A food reward was then rolled from the top of the ramp so that the 
monkey could see how the apparatus functioned and could watch the reward hitting 
the wall and stopping. There were four of these familiarization trials; one for each 
door/location and the monkey was always allowed to retrieve the food reward.
The experimental trials began immediately after the familiarization phase. The 
experimenter closed all the doors and inserted a wall next to one of the doors. A food 
reward was then rolled from the top of the ramp. In the within-reach condition, 
monkeys could search immediately whereas in the out-of-reach condition, they could 
only search once the apparatus had been pushed towards them. The position of the 
wall was randomly determined. Monkeys were allowed to search for the reward until 
they found it.
8.2.5 Results
One monkey (Bruno) did not complete the out-of-reach condition as he would not 
tolerate the movement of the apparatus and would leave the testing area. Only three 
monkeys completed 20 trials in any condition. Two monkeys completed 20 trials in 
the within-reach condition (Pete and Cowan) and one monkey completed 20 trials in 
the out-of-reach condition (Nathan). Most monkeys became distracted or 
uncooperative before the experimenter was able to administer the full 20 trials. 
However, each monkey completed at least 13 trials in the within-reach condition and 
all but two monkeys completed at least 14 trials in the out-of-reach condition. These 
two monkeys (Jenny and Cowan) completed 11 trials and 8 trials in the out-of-reach
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condition respectively. Due to the distance of the apparatus from the monkey and 
their inability to fully engage in the task, it was more difficult to sustain their attention 
in the out-of-reach condition. The mean percentage of correct responses for each 
monkey was calculated. One-sample t-tests showed that neither performance on the 
within-reach condition nor the out-of-reach condition was above chance [t (7) = 1.66, 
n.s. and t (6) = 0.45, n.s. respectively]. This indicates that monkeys did not appreciate 
the function of the wall or the constraining nature that a solid wall has on an object’s 
trajectory. In this sense they perform in the same way as two-year-old human 
children.
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Figure 8.2 Graph showing mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) by monkeys on both 
the within-reach and the out-of-reach conditions.
8.2.6 Error Analysis
The principal aim of this study was to examine whether monkeys responses would 
differ as a function of whether or not the apparatus was within-reach during the event. 
Specifically, as the motivation for this study was the finding of a proximity bias in the
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somewhat similar task described in the previous chapter, the primary interest lay in 
whether or not there would be more responses to the first door (the door closest to 
where the reward disappeared from view) when the apparatus was within-reach of the 
subject. The mean percentage of correct responses to each location was calculated 
and these are displayed in the table below (table 8.1).
Location of search
Condition 1 2 3 4
Within reach 67 19 9 6
Out of reach 11 16 50 24
Table 8.1 Mean percentage of first searches at each location for both the within-reach 
condition and the out-of-reach condition.
As there were four possible search locations, chance performance on this task was 25 
% correct responses. From the above table it can be seen that monkeys made many 
more first responses towards location 1 (the first door) on the within-reach condition 
compared with the out-of-reach condition. In the out-of-reach condition, the monkeys 
made more responses towards door 3 than any other door. The mean percentage of 
responses to door 1 on the within-reach condition was 67% compaied with only 11% 
on the out-of-reach condition. If subjects were randomly selecting a door to open, 
each door should be selected with an equal probability of 25%. Clearly, when the 
apparatus is within-reach, they are not choosing randomly as the high percentage of 
first searches at door 1 (67%) indicates. A one-sample t-test confirms that the 
percentage of searches directed at door 1 is significantly greater than would be
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expected by chance [t (7) = 5.67, p <0.01, bonferroni corrected]. This result suggests 
that when the apparatus is within the subject’s reach, monkeys do exhibit a proximity 
preference.
A one-way ANOVA with condition (within-reach or out-of-reach) as a within- 
subjects factor and choice of door as the dependent variable revealed three significant 
differences. Subjects searched significantly more at door 1 when the apparatus was 
within reach than when it was out-of-reach [F (1, 13) = 43.1, p <0.001, bonferroni 
corrected] and they searched significantly more at both door 3 when it was out-of­
reach than when it was within-reach [F (1, 13) = 51.0, p <0.001, bonferroni 
corrected]. Individual one-sample t-tests comparing the mean percentage of searches 
at each location with chance (25%) revealed that monkeys searched significantly 
more often at door 3 in the out-of-reach condition than would be expected by chance 
[t (6) = 4.66, p <0.05, bonferroni corrected].
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Figure 8.3 Mean percentage o f  searches (± SE) that were made to each door, on both the 
within-reach and the out-of-reach condition.
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Finally, the question of whether or not monkeys have an appreciation that a moving 
object will continue to move from left to right on a linear pathway following 
disappearance (in accord with the principle of continuity) can be explored by looking 
at monkeys’ second search attempts on trials where they initially make an error. On 
those trials where monkeys initially search erroneously at door 2 or 3, do they follow 
this search attempt with a further search attempt to the right rather than to the left? If 
monkeys search to the right of their first search rather than to the left, they are 
demonstrating an appreciation that the vanished object will continue moving in the 
same direction. An analysis of second search attempts was carried out on the data 
from the out-of-reach condition in which monkeys frequently directed their first 
search attempts to location 3 (although those trials where they initially search at 
location 2 were also included in analysis). Out of those trials on which monkeys 
initially search en'oneously at either door 2 or 3 and where they make a second search 
attempt, this attempt was to the right on 89 % of trials. This is significantly greater 
than would be expected by chance [t (6) = 9,23, p < 0.0001] where chance is 50 % 
(since having searched first at doors 2 or 3, monkeys have the option of then 
searching to the right or to the left).
8.3 D is c u s sio n
Firstly, the results from the current chapter constitute additional evidence that 
monkeys are not able to solve a horizontal invisible displacement task. This is true 
irrespective of whether the task is presented within-reach or out-of-reach of the 
subject. This finding is contrary to Hauser’s claim that rhesus macaques are capable 
of taking into account a solid barrier in an invisible displacement task (Hauser, 2001). 
The results from the current study better fit with those from the previous chapter
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indicating that monkeys are not able to appreciate the constraint that a solid barrier 
has on unperceived object pathways, even if they have received demonstrations of the 
effect of the barrier. If monkeys are unable to take into account the critical element of 
the task that determines the object’s location, what does guide their search?
Contrary to the findings of other authors who have carried out this task at a 
distance from the subject (Berthier et al. 2000; Hood et al., 2003), the results from the 
within-reach condition show a clear preference for searching in the location closest to 
the disappearance of the reward (door 1). When the apparatus is out of reach and then 
pushed towards the monkey to allow them to search, this preference for the first door 
disappears and monkeys appear to search predominantly at the third door.
The results from the current experiment support the findings from Chapter 7 
suggesting that monkeys exhibit a proximity bias when faced with an object that has 
disappeared from sight. Why then do they not exhibit the same proximity bias when 
faced with the same task out of their reach? One explanation is that the preference for 
searching at the first door reflects the subject’s attempt to intersect the object’s 
pathway. If this is the case, perhaps presenting the apparatus within reach of the 
monkey prevents them from really considering where the object could be and leads 
them to act impulsively rather than thoughtfully. However, presenting the appaiatus 
out of reach of the subject does not appear to facilitate successful searching either, as 
monkeys then appear to show a preference for searching at door three. Whilst their 
preference for searching at door one is explainable as a proximity bias, it is less easy 
to explain why they show a preference for door three. However, both Berthier et al. 
(2000) and Mash et al. (2003) report that children in their study searched more at the 
two centre doors (doors 2 and 3) than at doors one and four. Why should subjects 
exhibit a bias towards centre locations? Mash et al. (2003) suggest that children may
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have a “centre-response bias” leading them to search near the “geographic centre of a 
given space” (Mash, Keen & Berthier, 2003; p. 384). The authors leave open the 
question of whether or not this bias prevents children from considering another door 
or whether they simply resort to this preference when they do not understand the task.
The results from the current experiment do not suggest that moving the 
apparatus on this task adversely hinders the subject’s searching since they do not 
demonstrate an ability to find the object when the appai*atus is not moved. Nor do 
they suggest that increasing the subject’s participation in the task leads to improved 
performance. The discrepancy seen between successful performance on the looking 
version of the task and unsuccessful performance on the manual search task (Hood et 
al., 2003) cannot therefore be solely due to the movement of the apparatus.
Finally, as noted in the general introduction, whilst we know a considerable 
amount about young children’s understanding of continuity and object motion, we 
know very little about non-human species’ understanding of these physical events. 
For example, a number of studies by von Hofsten and colleagues have shown that, by 
six months, infants are capable of extrapolating future object trajectories based on 
what they have already seen (von Hofsten, Vishton, Spelke, Feng, & Rosander, 1998; 
von Hofsten, Vishton, Spelke, Rosander, & Feng, 1998) and by nine months they 
appear able to infer the point of re-emergence of an invisibly displaced object based 
on its initial linear trajectory (Berthier et al., 2001; Spelke & von Hofsten, 2001). 
One study by Filion et al. (1996) does suggest that monkeys too can correctly 
extrapolate the future location of an invisibly displaced object based on its initial 
linear trajectory, and results from the study described in this chapter also alludes to 
this. That monkeys have an appreciation for the constraint of continuity on object 
motion -  that they ‘know’ that the object will continue to move on a linear pathway -
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is evidenced by the fact that after failing to find the object on their first search 
attempt, in most cases monkeys then search to the right of their first search in the 
direction that the object was travelling when it disappeared.
The results from this chapter may help to explain the discrepancy described at 
the end of Chapter 7 between the proximity preference exhibited on the experiment 
described in that chapter and the absence of a proximity preference on similar 
horizontal invisible displacement tasks (Berthier et al. 2000; Hood et al. 2000). It 
would seem that a proximity preference is most marked when a subject is more 
actively engaged in the task and it is possible that this preference reflects an attempt 
by the subject to intercept or chase the object as it rolls down the ramp. Although it is 
not possible to ascertain from these results whether it is the increased involvement of 
the subject in the task or the post-disappearance movement of the apparatus that 
generates the difference in search behaviour between the two conditions, these results 
highlight the large difference in search behaviour that can result from a seemingly 
unimportant difference between two ways of presenting a task. One way of trying to 
differentiate between these two possibilities might be to present the task within reach 
of the subject (so that no movement of the apparatus occurs before the subject can 
make a response) but have the subject less involved in the task by imposing a 
transparent screen in front of the apparatus. If, once the screen is removed, the 
monkey still searches predominantly in the first location, it would seem unlikely that 
it is ‘involvement’ in the task that evokes this proximity bias. In which case, when 
the apparatus is out of reach, the movement of the apparatus between the 
disappearance of the object and the time when the monkey is allowed to search may 
have the effect of disrupting the representation of the task that the monkey has in 
accord with proximity.
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I n v i s i b l e  d is p l a c e m e n t s  i n v o l v i n g  g r a v i t y
9.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The results described in the previous four chapters ai^ e testament to Piaget’s claim that 
despite being able to solve his standai'd invisible displacement task by eighteen 
months, this “does not signify that this discovery is immediately generalized to 
include the whole universe.” (Piaget, 1955, p 79). Clearly, there are several instances 
where children are unable to solve an invisible displacement task, even by two or 
three years of age. Moreover, these results add to the contention discussed in the 
introductory chapters, that adult monkeys are unable to solve invisible displacement 
tasks at all.
However, the tasks described in these chapters are clearly different from the 
standard invisible displacement task upon which Piaget’s stage theory of object 
concept development was based. The ability to pass a standard invisible 
displacement, according to Piaget, signifies the emergence of symbolic mental 
representational abilities in young children. Once this ability emerges, children can 
supposedly recreate in their mind the pathway that an object took during an invisible 
displacement and hence are able to solve the task. So, if children have acquired the 
ability to mentally recreate invisible movements of objects and put it to good use in 
the standard Piagetian tasks, why are they unable to solve the invisible displacements 
described in the preceding chapters? One possibility is that these invisible 
displacement tasks involve the need to process and understand an additional type of 
information not required for solving the standard Piagetian task. The tasks presented
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in this thesis would seem to require an ability to process at least two different kinds of 
information. On the one hand, at the very least, subjects would need to have an 
ability to extrapolate future object trajectories from a portion of a visible object 
trajectory. So, for example, in order to solve the ramp task designed by Berthier and 
colleagues (2000), children and monkeys would need to know that when the rolling 
ball disappears behind the occluding panel, it continues to roll in the same linear 
downward trajectory that was visible before it was occluded. I will refer to this type 
of information as knowledge of natural object trajectories. In addition, these tasks 
require knowledge about the interaction of objects, what Leslie (1994) terms 
‘mechanical’ knowledge. In order to solve the types of invisible displacements 
described in this thesis, subjects need both to understand natural object trajectories 
and those circumstances under which natural object trajectories are interrupted or 
modified by mechanical factors such as solid walls or tubes.
There is evidence that both young children and some monkeys do have the 
ability to extrapolate future object trajectories from a visible portion of that trajectory. 
As described in the introductory chapters, Filion and colleagues showed that rhesus 
monkeys can correctly intercept a moving object that has disappeared behind an 
occluder, as if they appreciate that the object will continue to move on its linear 
pathway (Filion, Washburn, & Gulledge, 1996). As described in the previous 
chapter, when presented with the Berthier ramp task (Berthier et al., 2000), monkeys 
generally tend to search from the top door to the bottom door when searching for an 
invisibly displaced food reward and rarely show successive searching up the ramp. 
This would suggest that they appreciate the continued downward trajectory of the 
now invisible object. In the case of young children, we know that by nine months 
infants appear able to infer the point of re-emergence of an invisibly displaced object
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based on its initial linear trajectory (Berthier et al., 2001; Spelke & von Hofsten, 
2001^
It is possible that moving objects hold such interest for us that, while we can 
easily extrapolate the continued trajectory of a linearly moving object, we may focus 
so exclusively on the moving object that we fail to pay attention to other task-relevant 
features -  like the presence of solid walls or tubes. This may be paiticularly difficult 
for young children or non-human primates who may have difficulty disengaging Jfiom 
salient features (Flavell, 1977).
On the one hand then, one of the differences between standard Piagetian tasks 
and those invisible displacement tasks presented in the previous chapters is that these 
latter tasks would appear to require the additional understanding of mechanical 
interactions between objects. On the other hand, these latter tasks also initially 
involve visible moving objects that may be so salient to a subject that they fail to take 
into account other task-relevant details. Either, or both, of these factors could make 
these types of invisible displacements more difficult.
As it appears that both monkeys and young children do have the ability to 
extrapolate even an invisible portion of an object’s trajectory given the opportunity to 
witness a visible portion of this trajectory, the current experiment was designed to 
investigate whether monkeys and two-year-old children can go beyond this and infer 
the future position of an object whose initial trajectory is not visible. Although the 
results fi*om the previous chapter call into question whether the bias exhibited on 
some tasks does result from a naïve theory of gravity per se, it seems that monkeys 
and young children do extrapolate the continued downward trajectory of an object 
that has disappeared from view. The current experiment questioned whether, in the
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absence of a visible portion of a downward trajectory, monkeys and young children 
could infer a downward trajectory.
9.2 G e n e r a l  m e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  d e s ig n
The invisible displacement task designed to address the question of whether or not 
monkeys and young children are able to infer a downward trajectory is depicted in 
figures 9.1 and 9.2. In this task, the subject is presented with three identically shaped 
cups, differing only in colour, and a food reward is dropped into one of the cups in 
full view of the subject. The experimenter then overturns the baited cup on to either 
one (single-displacement) or two (double-displacement) of the other cups. As the 
baited cup is overturned onto another cup, the object inside naturally falls into the 
second cup. In order to solve this task then, the subject needs to have some 
understanding that a) overturning the cup means that the object inside is no longer 
supported and so will not remain in the baited cup and b) an unsupported object will 
fall down. Instead of witnessing the initial trajectory of the object, subjects need to 
imagine the entire trajectory that the object will take. Whereas in some other tasks the 
initial visible portion of an object’s trajectory could be argued to be enough to allow 
the subject to extrapolate the remaining portion of the pathway as a procedural 
response, the current design in which the initial trajectory needs to be infeiTed, 
requires a more explicit understanding of physical phenomena.
The study incorporated both single and double invisible displacement trials. 
Double invisible displacements also served as a control to the extent that if the 
monkey was using a strategy of searching in the last location touched, this would not 
suffice in order to solve double invisible displacement trials since, by necessity, the 
object will always be displaced into the first cup onto which the baited cup is
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overturned. Furthermore, a number of ‘catch’ trials were incorporated into the design 
in order to control for the possibility that subjects might solve the task hy simply 
using a strategy of seai'ching in the first cup touched. In catch trials, depicted in 
figure 9,3, the experimenter baits one cup and displaces the baited cup upright into 
another cup. In this case then, because there is no overturning, the object must still be 
in the baited cup and so a strategy of searching in the first cup touched by the baited 
cup will no longer work.
In addition, both adjacent and non-adjacent displacements were included in the 
design as this has also been identified as a factor that appears to influence successful 
performance, in both children and non-human primates (Call, 2001). Figure 9.4 
depicts each of the possible adjacent and non-adjacent invisible displacements that are 
possible. An adjacent displacement is one in which the baited cup is oveiturned onto 
the next sequential cup in the line, whereas a non-adjacent invisible displacement is 
one in which the baited cup is overturned onto the cup that is not sequentially 
adjacent. One reason why non-adjacent invisible displacements may result in less 
successful searches is because in order to solve them, subjects need to bypass a 
middle container. This is most pertinent when the design incorporates what Dumas 
and Brunet called a ‘comprehensive’ procedui'e whereby the subject is not shown that 
the original baited container is empty after the displacement and so there may be a 
number of possible search locations (Dumas & Brunet, 1994). If the subject begins 
by searching in the originally baited container but does not find the object, they would 
then need to recall another visited box as an alternative search location. If this other 
location is not adjacent to the location of first search, the subject will need to bypass 
another box. Bypassing an empty location may be particularly difficult for some 
subjects because they may not possess the necessary inhibitory capacities. Indeed,
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Call (2001) concluded that this was the most likely explanation for failure of non­
human primates and human children on his tests of invisible displacement. On the 
current task, non-adjacent trials were those in which the displacement was from cup 1 
to cup 3 or vice versa. If the monkey made the error of searching in the originally 
baited cup first, they may then find it difficult to bypass the middle location (cup 2).
9.3 E x p e r im e n t  1: M o n k e y s
9.3.1 Subjects
Six monkeys participated in the current study. An additional monkey was initially 
tested but showed such a strong side bias that testing was stopped. Those monkeys 
that participated in the current study are listed in table 4.1 in Chapter 4. 4 males and 
2 females ranging in age from 3 years to 8 years at the time of the experiment, took 
part. These monkeys had previously taken part in a number of other studies and 
again, these details are listed in table 4.2.
9.3.2 Apparatus
Three identical cups were employed as the hiding locations for the current study, 
differing only in colour (green, orange and blue). These cups measui'ed 15.5 cm in 
height. The same cups had already been used in the experiment described in Chapter 
6, and so the monkeys had already had experience retrieving a reward from these 
containers. However, monkeys would never retrieve a reward from the cups by 
overturning the cups themselves. The usual method of retrieval during the 
experiment described in Chapter 6 would involve the monkey knocking the cup over 
so that the reward would roll out, or tipping the cup towards them with one hand and 
taking the reward out with the other hand. To ensure complete opacity, coloured
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paper matching the colour of each cup was placed around the inside of each cup. 
Cotton-wool was placed at the bottom of each cup to mask any sound that the food 
reward might make as it fell from one cup to the other, hi addition, a plastic board 
measuring 50 cm by 30 cm was used as a base to place the cups on so that the cups 
could be moved out of reach of the monkey if need be. Again, the apparatus was 
placed on the small wooden stage used throughout the experiments described in this 
thesis.
9.3.3 Design and Procedure
The experimenter sat opposite the monkey on a small stool behind the wooden stage. 
The three cups were placed equidistant apart (roughly 17cm apart from each other) on 
the plastic board, which had been placed on top of the wooden stage. The cups were 
placed within reach of the monkey and the monkey was permitted to handle the cups 
and to look inside each cup until they were satisfied that there was no reward inside. 
Initially they would remove the cotton-wool in their search, but most monkeys 
quickly stopped doing this. Once the monkey had stopped looking in the cups, they 
were again placed upright, equidistant apart. The experimenter then took a food 
reward, showed it to the monkey, and held it above one of the thi'ee cups. When the 
monkey was looking at the reward, the experimenter dropped the reward into one of 
the cups. On a single invisible displacement, the experimenter then overturned the 
baited cup onto one of the other two cups, such that the monkey could not see the 
transfer of the food reward from the baited cup to the empty cup. The experimenter 
then replaced the overturned cup in its original upright position and the monkey was 
allowed to search. The procedure for double invisible displacements was the same 
except that after the experimenter had overturned the baited cup onto one of the other 
two cups, she then moved the cup, still in its overturned position, onto the other
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Figure 9.1 Diagram of single invisible displacement
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Figure 9.2 Diagram of double invisible displacement.
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Figure 9.3 Diagram of catch trial
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Single invisible displacement options:
Double invisible displacement options:
Ü U U U U Ü
Ü U Ü U Ü
Figure 9.4 Diagram of all possible invisible displacements.
163
empty cup and then replaced the cup in its original upright position. In as far as was 
possible, the manipulations were carried out within reach of the monkey. 
Occasionally a monkey continued to try to take the upright cups even after they had 
already looked inside them at the beginning of each trial. In these cases, the 
experimenter would slide back the base so that the cups were just out of reach of the 
monkey during manipulations. This was the case for both Alex and Jenny.
At the beginning of their first session, four of the six monkeys (Pete, Alison, 
Alex and Jenny) appeared very preoccupied by the presence of the third cup. During 
manipulations, two cups were always engaged by the experimenter; the one being 
baited and the one onto which the baited cup would be overturned. For these three 
monkeys, the presence of the third cup that was not being manipulated seemed to 
engage their attention to such an extent that they would continue trying to reach for 
this third cup rather than observing the actions of the experimenter. Rather than 
losing the subjects completely, it was decided to remove the third cup and only test 
these monkeys on single invisible displacements during that session. Having 
participated in one session where they were only presented with two cups, all four 
monkeys were then tested again with three cups on double invisible displacements in 
a second session, where they did not appear to be preoccupied by the third cup.
A maximum of 20 trials were carried out per session consisting of both single 
and double invisible displacements, randomly ordered. The number of completed 
trials and the length of the testing session varied depending on the monkey’s 
attentiveness and willingness to cooperate, as did the number of trials aborted due to 
monkeys either leaving the testing area before manipulations were complete or being 
distracted and not watching at the experimenter’s actions. Monkeys were tested over 
the course of 2 or 3 sessions, depending on how many trials they were willing to
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complete in each session. Cowan, Pete and Alex were highly motivated and were 
willing to complete 20 trials per session in two sessions, whereas Nathan, Alison and 
Jenny were less willing and required an additional session of testing.
In addition, a total of four catch trials were inserted in between normal 
experimental trials during the second (Pete, Cowan and Alex) or third (Nathan, 
Alison and Jenny) session. During catch trials, the experimenter again dropped a 
food reward into one of the upright cups, but rather than overturning the baited cup 
onto one of the other cups, the baited cup was instead inserted upright into one of the 
other cups. The experimenter attempted to ensure that the amount of time that the 
baited cup was inserted into the other cup was roughly equivalent to the amount of 
time that the baited cup was overturned for during normal experimental trials 
(roughly 2 seconds). The baited cup was then returned to its original position and 
monkeys were allowed to search for the reward.
9.3.4 Results and Discussion
All monkeys completed at least eight single and seven double invisible displacement 
trials, over the course of the two sessions. 5 monkeys also completed 4 catch trials 
and 1 monkey completed 3 catch trials. Two monkeys (Jenny and Nathan) required 
three sessions as they had completed very few trials on one of their previous sessions 
due to either distraction or refusal to approach the apparatus. Percent correct 
responses for each monkey were calculated for performance on single and double 
invisible displacements and catch trials. As a consequence of having to remove the 
third cup during one session for four of the monkeys, there were a greater number of 
completed single invisible displacements than double invisible displacements (as 
having only 2 cups necessitates only single invisible displacements). An average of
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20 single invisible displacements and an average of 13 double invisible displacements 
were completed per subject at the completion of testing.
A paired-sample t-test indicated that monkeys performed better on single 
invisible displacements than on double invisible displacements [t (5) = 3.10, p < 
0.05]. In order to assess whether performance on either the single or double invisible 
displacements was above chance, two analyses were carried out against a hypothetical 
mean of 33% (3 possible search locations). However, a consequence of removing the 
third cup for some of the subjects on some of the trials is that these trials in which 
there are only two cups cannot then be included in an analysis that compares 
performance with chance-level responding at 33%. With these data omitted, one 
sample t-tests comparing performance on single and double invisible displacement 
trials with chance (33%) revealed that performance was significantly above chance on 
both types of displacement [single: t (4) = 6.79, p <0.005, double: t (5) = 7.54, p < 
0.001].
single double
type of invisible displacement
Figure 9.5 Mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) on both single and double invisible 
displacements for monkeys.
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Monkey % correct on single invisible displacements % correct on double invisible displacements
Pete 76 71
Cowan 100 58
Nathan 68 67
Jenny 77 69
Alison 94 69
Alex 60 46
Table 9.1. Percentage o f  correct responses for each monkey for both single and double 
invisible displacements.
The above-chance performance of monkeys on both single and double invisible 
displacements suggests that they are not using a simple rule such as ‘search in the last 
location touched’ as the last location rule would only be a successful strategy for 
solving single invisible displacements. On double invisible displacements the last 
location touched is not the location where the reward will be found. Another 
relatively simple way of solving this task might be to always search in the first cup 
onto which the baited cup was overturned without appreciating the reason why the 
food reward has to be in this location.
As a way to control for this strategy, catch trials were included in which the cup 
was not overturned onto but inserted into a second cup, such that the reward would 
remain in the originally baited cup. If subjects were simply searching in the first cup 
that the baited cup makes contact with, they would be expected to search in the 
second cup even on catch trials. Performance was generally poor on catch trials and a 
one-sample t-test showed that as a group, these monkeys did not perform above
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chance [t (5) = 0.42, n.s.]. However, there was considerable interindividual variability 
with Alex getting three of his four completed catch tiials correct and Alison failing all 
three of the catch trials she completed. Out of a total of the 23 catch trials analysed, 
monkeys made mistakes on 16 of these trials. Out of these 16 trials, 14 of the errors 
were directed towards the cup that the baited cup was inserted into.
Performance on catch trials suggests that perhaps monkeys were simply 
searching in the first cup that the baited cup contacted, but did not understand the 
mechanics of the task -  that by overturning the cup, the object inside loses support 
and must fall into the second cup, but that this is not the case when the baited cup is 
inserted upright into the second cup. Generally, searching according to a rule like this 
suggests a case of associative learning or a practice effect and performance tends to be 
characterized by a cluster of errors towards the beginning of testing and improvement 
over trials (Pepperberg, 2002). Such explanations are less easy to advance if errors 
are evenly spread throughout the trials.
With this in mind, an assessment of the distribution of errors was carried out for 
each subject. Figure 9.6 presents, for each monkey, the distribution of en'ors that they 
made over the course of trials. Three out of the six monkeys responded coiTectly on 
the very first trial. Importantly however, there appears no cluster of errors at the 
initial stages of testing and the eiTors that monkeys do make appear to be distributed 
throughout trials. For each monkey, percentage correct performance was calculated 
for the first half of the experimental trials they completed and the second half of the 
experimental trials they completed. A paired-samples t-test indicated that 
performance on the second half of trials was not significantly better than performance 
on the first half, confirming that performance did not improve over trials [t (5) = 0.67, 
«5 ].
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Figure 9.6 Individual graphs o f  error distribution for each subject.
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9.3.5 Error Analysis
Monkeys were above chance on both single and double invisible displacements, and 
so the number of failm*es with wliich to analyse the types of errors monkey’s made is 
few. However, a few observations can be made from all the errors made on trials 
involving the presence of three cups\ Firstly, for two of the monkeys (Nathan and 
Alex), the majority of errors (82% and 86% for Nathan and Alex respectively) that 
they both made were directed towards the originally baited cup. For two more 
monkeys (Alison and Pete), when they make errors, these errors appeared to be 
directed more towards the centre cup (cup 2). 100% of Alison’s errors were directed 
to this location and 60% of Pete’s errors were directed towards this location, even 
though, for Pete, four of these errors (40%) were on single invisible displacements in 
which the experimenter did not engage this second cup. The errors committed by the 
other two monlceys (Cowan and Jenny) did not show any bias towards a particular 
location.
The second searches of the two monkeys who committed errors of searching in 
the baited cup were examined in order to establish whether there was any evidence 
that they could skip the middle empty location in trials in non-adjacent trials. If 
monkeys do make the error of searching in the originally baited cup, as both Nathan 
and Alex did on a number of trials, then a number of questions could be posed. 
Firstly, once the monkey has established that the reward is not in the baited cup, does 
he know that it has to be in another location that has been in contact with the baited 
cup? Secondly, if the only other location that has been touched is not adjacent to the
 ^ Those trials in which the third cup was removed were not analysed for patterns o f errors since, 
because there were only two cups present, if  the subject made an enor, by necessity they would be 
choosing the originally baited cup. Similarly, by necessity, second searches on erroneous trials would 
always be correct.
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originally baited cup, is the monkey then able to skip over the untouched cup and go 
straight to the touched cup, or are they unable to resist the lure of the middle cup?
With only two monkeys making the error of searching in the originally baited 
cup, it is difficult to draw conclusions. However, in all 5 trials in which Nathan made 
the eiTor of searching in the originally baited cup on his first search, he searched 
correctly on his second search attempt. Three of those five trials were non-adjacent 
trials and so required him to skip over a middle container having initially searched 
incorrectly. Alex, on the other hand, having initially chosen the incorrect baited cup 
did not show correct second searching on any of the 3 non-adjacent trials; instead 
choosing the next sequential cup in line.
9.4 E x p e r im e n t  2; C h il d r e n
9.4.1 Subjects
Participants were 20 two-year-old childi-en, 13 boys and 7 girls (M = 25.1 months, SD 
= 1.4 months). An additional 5 children participated but failed to complete at least 6 
trials and were eliminated from the analysis. Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 lists the children 
that participated in the current study and also the other studies in which they have also 
participated.
9.4.2 Apparatus
The apparatus for use with children were identical as those used with the monkeys, 
except that various small balls were used as the hiding object rather than food 
rewards.
171
9.4.3 Design and Procedure
Pilot testing with this task suggested that it would be difficult to engage children in 
many trials. Consequently, it was decided to divide children into two groups: a single 
invisible displacement and a double invisible displacement group. Originally, 15 
children were assigned to the double invisible displacement group and 10 to the single 
invisible displacement group. After the five children that did not complete at least 6 
trials were eliminated, 12 children remained in the double invisible displacement 
group and 8 children in the single invisible displacement group. As with the 
monkeys, the adjacent and non-adjacent displacements were randomly ordered and 
assigned for each child.
The experimenter and the child sat on opposite sides of a small table, with the 
parent or caregiver seated next to the child. The experimenter then introduced the 
three opaque cups to the child, and showed the child that each of the cups was empty, 
except for the cotton-wool at the base of each cup. A small soft ball was then dropped 
into one of the cups and either a single or a double invisible displacement was carried 
out, in the same way as for the monkeys, depending on which group the child was 
assigned to. A maximum of 12 trials were carried out per child, but few children 
completed 12 trials. In addition, up to 5 catch trials were carried out at the end of the 
experimental trials.
9.4.4 Results and Discussion
The mean percentage of correct responses per child were calculated and a Mann- 
Whitney test was carried out to compare the performance of children who participated 
in the single invisible displacement trials with those who participated in the double 
invisible displacements. Those children in the single invisible displacement group 
performed significantly better than those in the double invisible displacement group [t
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(18) = 5.12, p <0.0001]. The performance of each group was then compared with 
chance (chance is 33.3% as there are three possible search locations) which revealed 
that children in the single invisible displacement condition were performing 
significantly above chance [t (7) = 10.5, p <0.0001] whereas children in the double 
invisible displacement condition performed at chance [t (11) == 0.45, «.y].
Unfortunately the current task proved very difficult to engage the attention of 
two-year-olds. Out of the 20 two-year-olds who were willing to participate in this 
task, only a small number completed the additional catch trials. The purpose of catch 
trials was to assess whether or not children understand the effect of overturning the 
cup on the object inside and to check for the use of simple strategies like ‘always 
search in the first cup that the baited cup touches’. For this reason, it is only useful to 
analyse the catch trials of the children who succeeded on the invisible displacement 
trials, which in this case was the single invisible displacement group since the double 
invisible displacement group performed at chance. Out of the eight children who 
were willing to participate in this task from the single invisible displacement group, 
only four completed catch trials. These children did very well on the catch trials that 
they did complete with three children passing all catch trials presented to them and 
one child passing four of the five catch trials.
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Figure 9.7 Mean percentage o f  correct responses (± SE) for children in both the single and 
double displacement conditions.
9.4.5 Error Analysis
For those children who received double invisible displacement trials, an analysis of 
the types of errors committed revealed that they were not random. Out of the twelve 
children in this group, 2 children (LZ and BP) only made 2 errors and so these 
children were not included in the error analysis. However, the other ten children 
made at least 5 errors each. For eight of these ten children, the preferred location of 
search appeared to be the cup that was originally baited by the experimenter. These 
errors accounted for at least 60 % of the total number of errors. For the two children 
that did not display this pattern of errors (JH and VC), their errors also did not appear 
to be random. Instead, they preferred to choose the centre location (cup 2). Both of 
these children made 9 errors, and of these 9 errors, 6 and 7 respectively were at 
location 2.
For those 8 children who showed a tendency to search in the originally baited 
cup on their first search attempt, there is little evidence that they are able to skip over
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the middle container on their second search attempt in those trials that required it. 
For each of these ‘non-adjacent’ trials on which children made the error of searching 
first in the originally baited cup, a percentage correct for second searches was 
calculated and compared with chance using a one-sample t-test. In this case, 
performance at chance (where, having searched initially in the incorrect baited cup, 
children then show no preference for either cup 2 or 3) would be 50 %. If children 
were indeed able to skip over the middle cup and search correctly in their second 
search attempt, above chance responding would be expected. Likewise, if children 
were not able to skip over the middle container and search predominantly in the next 
sequential location on their second searches, below chance responding would be 
expected. The one-sample t-test revealed indeed that children were not able to skip 
over the middle container, and searched significantly more at this middle location on 
non-adjacent trials than would be expected by chance [t (7) = 3,89, p <0.01].
9.5 G e n e r a l  d is c u s s io n
Both two-year-old children and rhesus monkeys perform well on an invisible 
displacement task involving overturning a baited cup onto an empty cup, when the 
invisible displacement entails just one movement. However, although both species’ 
performance worsens with double invisible displacements, monkeys still perform well 
whereas two-year-old children do not perform above chance on double invisible 
displacements.
Perfoimance on catch trials, however, suggests that monkeys may not 
understand the critical role of overturning a cup and the consequent lack of support on 
the object inside the cup. Conversely, the good performance of the small number of 
children who completed catch trials suggests that their good performance on
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experimental trials reflects a true understanding of the task and a true appreciation of 
the critical action of overturning a cup, the resulting lack of support for the object and 
what happens to an object when it loses its support. It would therefore appear that 
children do well on the single invisible displacements because they are representing 
the invisible movement of the object from one location to the other, whereas monkeys 
are successful because they have learnt that they will find the reward in the first cup 
that the baited cup comes into contact with.
However, as the error analysis did not reveal the characteristic pattern that 
would be expected if monkeys were learning over the course of an experiment, 
perhaps monkeys approached the task with an existing rule. It is conceivable that 
these monkeys have already learnt something about what happens when a cup with a 
reward in it is overturned, as the same cups were used in the experiment described in 
Chapter 6, and although never overturned during experimental trials, it is inevitable 
that monkeys would have seen the experimenter overturn the cups to remove rewards 
that were not claimed or to give a reward to a monkey if the monkey had been unable 
to retrieve it on their own. In this way, monkeys may have learned an association 
without having any generalizable knowledge or expectations regarding objects that 
lose their support. However, a heuristic that would lead to the kind of behaviour seen 
in this experiment would involve something like ‘search in the first cup which the 
baited cup comes into contact with’ and this seems like an odd rule to have generated 
a priori.
Although performance on catch trials does suggest that monkeys are not solving 
the experimental trials in a representational way, this performance should not be taken 
as unequivocal evidence that monkeys do not understand the crucial causal element of 
a task. As in other tests of invisible displacement (e.g. Neiworth et al., 2003), the
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catch trials were presented towards the end of testing and it is possible that subjects 
had become so accustomed to the experimental type of invisible displacements that 
they had developed a procedural or habitual response by the point at which catch trials 
were administered and had stopped paying attention to the crucial element of the task. 
It is possible that true representational solving of a task may lead to rules that are 
simpler to execute, perhaps as a way of conserving cognitive power. Perhaps initially, 
monkeys do represent and reason about where the object has gone, but with 
experience develop automatic responses to specific situations that are more 
cognitively efficient. This in turn may make it more difficult for the monkey to 
reverse this newly developed response when the type of movement is slightly 
different (i.e. the cup is not overturned but maintained upright). It is interesting that 
despite having the ability to use a representational strategy when necessary, the gorilla 
tested in Natale et al.’s study used a simple practical rule-based strategy when this 
sufficed to solve the task (Natale et al., 1986). One possibility then is that the 
macaques in this study developed a practical rule after time and once this practical 
rule is in place it is difficult to reverse.
The ability of one monkey to skip over a middle empty container would suggest 
that rhesus macaques, in principle, are able to inhibit falling victim to sequential 
searching if the next container in line is never visited by the experimenter. In 
addition, on these particular trials, the fact that the monkey is able to skip over the 
middle location suggests that he knows the reward can only be in a location visited by 
the experimenter. One possible explanation for searching in the baited container on 
some trials is that monkeys are drawn to this location because it is the last location 
they focus attention on (as the cup is returned to its original location by the 
experimenter). In another study, Goldman-Rakic has noted the tendency of
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preffontally-lesioned rhesus macaques to respond “to the first food well that catches 
its eye” (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). It is possible that on some trials, monkeys are 
unable to inhibit choosing the last location that they attend to, even though Nathan’s 
ability to skip over the middle location on his second search attempt suggests that he 
may have some correct representation of the rewards location.
Ultimately, it is difficult to evaluate the importance of failure on catch trials, 
and with so few children completing these trials, it is difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions or compare the performance of monkeys and children. Based on the 
distribution of errors committed by the monkeys, it does however seem unlikely that 
monkeys’ good performance on experimental trials results from learning over trials, 
and this leaves open the possibility that they are truly solving the experimental trials 
by representing the invisible movement of the object from one cup to another.
The performance on this task by two-year-old children, although ostensibly less 
accomplished than the monkeys, may be easier to account for. The children in the 
single invisible displacement group performed well on both normal trials and catch 
trials suggesting that they really did understand that when the cup was overturned, this 
meant that the object inside would fall into the other cup. The fact that children in the 
double invisible displacement gi'oup generally did not perform well fits with previous 
findings that double invisible displacements are more difficult than single invisible 
displacements (Call, 2001).
Furthermore, unlike monkeys, children in the double invisible displacement 
group showed a bias towards searching in the initially baited cup and when they failed 
to find the object in this cup, tended to direct their second search attempt towards the 
next sequential cup. Since both single and double invisible displacements require the 
same understanding that, when a cup containing an object is overturned, the object
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will not remain inside the cup, it seems unlikely that the bias that the double invisible 
displacement group displayed towards searching in the originally baited cup results 
from failing to understand the task. Searching in the originally baited cup -  the most 
common error made by this group -  might indicate that children are failing to 
disengage from the last location of their attention. Children may be more prone to 
this when their representation of the object’s location is weaker. There are a number 
of possible reasons why children in the double invisible displacement group may have 
weaker representations than those in the single invisible displacement condition.
Firstly, the amount of time between overturning the baited cup and the point at 
which the child is allowed to search for the object may influence the strength of the 
representation that the child has - during a double displacement, this period of time 
will be longer. The length of delay between hiding and searching has been shown to 
be an important factor in determining success on the AB task in much younger infants 
(Diamond, 1991). For example, whereas a delay of 2 seconds induces the error in 9- 
month-old infants, 12-month-old’s require a delay of 5 seconds before they make the 
A-not-B error (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). It is conceivable therefore that 
this extra time required for the double invisible displacement is sufficient to cause 
children to forget where the object is and to resort to searching where they last saw 
the object deposited or at the location where they last attend. Although the children 
who are detrimentally affected by the time delay in the AB task were much younger, 
the AB task is a visible displacement task and it may be the case that representations 
in invisible displacement tasks are relatively weaker than in visible displacements, 
meaning that even a short increase in time delay may have a similar effect on a 
younger infant’s representation of a visible displacement that is has on an older 
child’s representation of an invisible displacement.
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Another factor that has been shown to be an important determinant of success 
on some invisible displacement tasks is whether or not the child’s gaze to the correct 
location is broken before they commence searching. Butler, Berthier & Clifton 
(2002) found that even if young children tracked a ball to the right location after 
displacement, if they looked away from this location before opening a door, their 
performance was at chance. Because in the current invisible displacement task the 
correct location is always the first cup onto which the baited cup is overturned, if the 
child is following the experimenter’s actions, their gaze from the correct location will 
be broken when the experimenter executes the second displacement.
The results from the current study are intriguing. Although monkeys appear to 
do better than children on the experimental trials to the extent that they also solve 
double invisible displacements, the successful performance of those few children who 
completed catch trials suggests that the children’s performance is actually superior.
Whilst the failure of children to pass the double invisible displacement 
condition may be explained by either of the above factors that children in the single 
invisible displacement condition do not have to cope with, it is less easy to explain 
why monkeys also do not fall prey to these factors? It should be remembered 
however that despite showing above chance performance on the double invisible 
displacement trials, this performance was at the same time significantly worse than 
perfoimance on the single invisible displacement trials, showing that monkeys did 
find these double trials more difficult, perhaps for the same reasons as children. One 
could argue that because of the within-subjects design employed with monkeys, 
monkeys were subjected to more trials than children and it is perhaps this greater 
number of trials and hence experience that leads monkeys to be more successful than 
children. However, this seems unlikely since monkeys do not make fewer errors over
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time and errors appear evenly distributed. One possibility is that monkeys are so 
highly motivated by the food reward that they pay little attention to subsequent 
actions that bear no effect on the location of the reward. So, having correctly 
reasoned that the food reward must be in the first cup onto which the baited cup is 
overturned, monkeys become fixated on this cup and do not follow the additional 
displacement. On the other hand, children may be more interested in following what 
the experimenter is doing and less fixated by the object inside the cup. The fact that 
children receive verbal instructions to pay attention to what the experimenter is doing 
may contribute to this difference between monkeys and children.
In conclusion, although the monkeys used in this study appear able to solve the 
invisible displacement test trials, their failure to solve the catch trials must lead us to 
conclude that they are not solving the test trials in a representational way. However, 
it is an open question as to whether the issues raised above could account for failure 
on catch trials. Failure on catch trials should lead to the conclusion that the successful 
performance of subjects on test trials results from a simple mle (i.e. search in first cup 
that overturned cup comes into contact with) rather than representational solving. 
However, while this explanation can explain successful solving of the single invisible 
displacement trials, it cannot explain the solving of the double invisible displacement 
trials. If the monkeys were really using this rule, it should lead them to fail the double 
invisible displacement trials. With this in mind, and considering the possible reasons 
raised above for why monkeys may fail catch trials, I suggest that the monkeys’ 
performance on this task goes beyond simple rule learning. One way to examine what 
effect the catch trials have would be to run the catch trials before the experimental 
trials, rather than at the end. In this way, if  it is the order of presentation that effects 
performance (as proposed above), and monkeys do have the representational
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capacities needed to solve invisible displacements, they should be able to demonstrate 
this by solving the catch trials that are presented first.
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T h e  LOOKING-SEARCHING DISSOCIATION
10.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
Andrew Meltzoff commented recently that as our methodology has become more 
sensitive, infants and young children appear to have become more competent 
(Meltzoff, 2000) and he probably would not disagree that this point could now be 
extended to include non-human species as well. Based on a wealth of studies carried 
out using looking time as the measure, rather than search, young infants and non­
human primates have shown remarkable sensitivity to the constraints that act on 
objects. (Bower, 1977; Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Baillargeon, 1987; 
Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Santos & Hauser, 2002; 
Cacchione & Krist, 2004). However, clearly the majority of the data presented thus 
far in this thesis has not alluded to a particularly competent young child or monkey. 
The experiments presented in chapters 5 , 6 , 7  and 8 suggest that neither young 
children nor monkeys are very good at taking into account physical constraints on 
object movement and their attempts to find a hidden object reflect the use of simple 
heuristics like proximity and alignment. So what is it about the looking-time 
paradigm that seems to yield such success when so many search tasks yield failure?
This looking-searching dissociation first became apparent with the studies of 
Bower and colleages (1971; Bower, 1974; Bower, 1977) and Baillargeon and 
colleagues (Baillargeon et al., 1985; Baillargeon, 1987). Using the habituation 
paradigm Baillargeon et al. (1985) found evidence for an understanding of object 
peimanence in 3.5-month-old infants. In this paradigm (see figure 10.1), infants are
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shown an event in which a screen rotates away from them several times until the child 
stops paying attention (until the length of time that they watch for reaches a minimum 
criterion). Then they are shown two different test events in which a box is placed in 
the pathway of the rotating screen. In one test event (the possible event), the screen 
rotates as far as it can until it hits the box (120®) and in the other event (the impossible 
event), the screen appears to rotate through the solid box (180®). To control for the 
possibility that infants might simply prefer to look at the frill 180® rotation, they also 
showed infants the 120® rotation without the presence of a box. Three-and-a-half- 
month-old infants looked reliably longer at the impossible event than at the possible 
event and showed no preference for either the 180® or 120® rotation in the control 
conditions. Note here that the impossible event was perceptually more similar to the 
habituation event since it also had a rotation of 180® and it is well known that infants 
tend to prefer to look at novel over familiar stimuli (Cornell, 1979). The fact that 
infants do look longer at the perceptually more familiar yet physically impossible 
event suggests that they are representing the box and appreciating that the screen 
should not be able to pass through it.
There are a multitude of other studies alluding to the fact that infants between 
two-and-a-half months and seven-and-a-half months do represent fully occluded 
objects (Baillargeon, 2000) and this creates somewhat of a problem for Piaget’s stage 
theory of object permanence development because he claims that infants do not have 
object permanence before about 8 months of age.
184
Experiment 1
(with tjox)
Impossible event
Habituation
even t
Test even ts
Possible event
m
Experiment 1A
(without box)
180° event
112° event
r  d
* D
Figure 10.1 The habituation events used by Baillargeon et al. (1987)
10.2 I n f a n t  STUDIES
However, object permanence is not the only realm in which young infants appear to 
show remarkable competence on looking tasks yet fail tasks that require a more 
explicit response. They appear able to appreciate how much support an object 
requires in order to remain supported (Baillargeon & Hanko-Summers, 1990; 
Baillargeon, 1992) and where this support needs to be in order for the object to remain 
stable (Dan et al., 2000, 2001). However, even children of four years seem to rely on 
a trial and error strategy in order to balance objects themselves (Karmiloff-Smith & 
Inhelder, 1975) and as Kohler has reported, “very young children...in attempting to 
pile one thing on another, try, by holding, and sometimes pressing, one against the
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other, to fix them in different and often curious positions” (Kohler, 1925; p. 130). 
Most relevant to this thesis are the findings that children do not appear to show an 
understanding of solidity when presented with a number of invisible displacement 
tasks yet they do in looking tasks. In two previously described horizontal invisible 
displacement tasks (Berthier, DeBlois, Poirier, Novak, & Clifton, 2000; Hood, Carey, 
& Prasada, 2000), two-year-old children were unable to take into account the 
constraint of solidity when searching for a liidden object. However, in a looking 
version of the Berthier task. Hood, Cole-Davies & Dias (2003) found that two-year- 
old children looked longer at an outcome in which the ball was revealed to be in a 
location that was not adjacent to the solid wall.
In the field of social cognition too, there are dissociations between what young 
infants appear to understand and what older children appear not to understand. The 
ability to pass a false belief task -  believed to demonstrate theory of mind -  is thought 
to be present in children by about four years of age (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). In the 
false-belief task, children watch as one experimenter places an object in one of two 
boxes. The experimenter (El) then leaves the room and another experimenter (E2) 
enters and moves the object to the other box and leaves. The child is then asked 
where they think El will look for the object when they return. If the child can 
attribute false-beliefs, they should be able to reason that El will look for the object in 
the location where they left it, because they were unaware that E2 moved it. Children 
under the age of four are unable to do this and usually respond that El will look for 
the object in the location where the object actually is. However, using a looking 
paradigm, Clements and Pemer (1994) found that children of 2 years and 11 months 
tended to look in the direction of the empty box when El returned despite only 45% 
of these children giving this location when asked for an explicit response. More
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recently, Onishi & Baillargeon (2004) have shown that infants as young as 15.5- 
months-old appear to demonstrate an understanding of false-belief. In this 
experiment, infants watched as an experimenter hid a toy in one of two containers that 
were placed on a rotating table-top. When the experimenter left the room, the table- 
top was rotated so that the container in which the object was hidden was now on the 
opposite side. There were three conditions: the identical container condition where 
both containers were the same, a condition in which the empty container was 
transparent and one in which the empty container was a different colour from the one 
in which the experimenter had hidden the toy. When the experimenter returned to the 
room, she looked for the toy in the container in which she had hidden the toy, despite 
the fact that she did not know the containers had been moved. Infants looked 
significantly longer in the identical condition than in either of the other two 
conditions, suggesting that the experimenter’s behavior in the identical condition was 
at odds with where they expected her to search for the toy. Other looking studies in 
the field of social cognition point to an even earlier understanding of theory-of-mind 
related capacities in infants as young as nine- and twelve-months (Gergely, Nadasdy, 
Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Gergely & Csibra, 1997; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003).
10.3 N o n -h u m a n  STUDIES
Hauser and his colleagues have been instrumental in developing the looking time 
paradigm for use with non-human subjects and have used this paradigm to explore a 
broad range of topics in physical cognition (Hauser, MacNeilage, & Ware, 1996; 
Hauser, 1998, 2001a; Munakata, Santos, Spelke, Hauser, & O'Reilly, 2001). Through 
these studies, the same dissociation that we see in the developmental literature has 
emerged in the animal literature between the understanding that monkeys seem able to
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demonstrate on looking tasks and that which they cannot demonstrate on search tasks. 
Firstly, Santos & Hauser (2002) have shown that rhesus macaques look longer when 
presented with an outcome in which a food reward appeared to have fallen through a 
solid shelf than one in which it had not, suggesting that they perceived this outcome 
as strange. However, in the search version of this task (discussed earlier in chapter 6), 
monkeys appear to disregard the presence of the shelf and search beneath it for a 
fallen food rewai*d (Hauser, 2001b). Again, in a looking task mirroring Baillargeon’s 
support paradigm, Cacchione & Krist (2004) showed that chimpanzees appear able to 
recognize when an object is inadequately supported by looking longer at this display 
relative to one in which an object does have sufficient support. However, as 
discussed earlier, Kohler has shown that chimpanzees do not seem able to take these 
factors into account in their own actions (Kohler, 1925).
10.4 W h y  is  t h e r e  a  l o o k in g -s e a r c h in g  d is s o c ia t io n ?
In attempting to address this paradox, many theories have been developed to account 
for this dissociation. The following section will examine each of these various 
accounts and look at the evidence provided to support them.
10.4.1 Perceptual accounts
A number of authors have taken issue with the cognitive interpretations from looking 
studies, particularly those of Baillargeon relating to the rotating screen paradigm 
(Rivera, Wakeley, & Langer, 1999; Bogartz, Shinskey, & Schilling, 2000; Cashon & 
Cohen, 2000). Among the most prominent adversaries to the studies proclaiming to 
show early understanding of object peimanence are Haith (Haith, 1998, 1999) and 
Bogartz and colleagues (Bogartz, Shinskey, & Speaker, 1997; Bogartz et al., 2000).
188 !
These authors argue that the results from looking time experiments can be explained 
by more perceptual accounts in which differences in looking times towards 
impossible and possible displays can be accounted for by preferences for either 
familiarity or novelty. Employing a design they call ‘event set x event set’ on the 
Baillargeon rotating screen paradigm, Bogaitz and colleagues have shown that 
depending on the event to which the infant was familiarized, one can predict observed 
looking times to both possible and impossible events (Bogartz et al., 2000). However, 
they argue that these looking times merely reflect individual infants’ preferences for 
novelty or familiarity as a function of the extent to which they initially processed the 
familiarization/habituation display. However, it is problematic for these authors that 
although their model does not predict longer looking towards the impossible display 
when infants are familiarized to the 180° rotation, and they did not find longer looking 
towards the impossible display, Baillargeon (1987) did find longer looking and so 
their conclusions are based on a non-replication. As Baillargeon (2000) points out, in 
order to convincingly argue that looking-time experiments confound familiarity and 
novelty with possibility/impossibility, these authors would have to account for a huge 
body of literature that has emerged pointing to the fact that young infants do represent 
hidden objects, and show that each and every one of these results confounded these 
parameters.
10.4.2 Means-ends accounts
One explanation for the looking-searching dissociation has been that young children 
fail tasks requiring a manual response because they are limited in their problem­
solving abilities. Specifically, they are unable to adequately plan means-end 
sequences of behaviour and coordinate actions with the information they have about
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the world (Willatts, 1989). Willatts (1989) found that when young infants were 
placed in a situation where they needed to remove obstacles in order to reach a goal 
object, they were not very good at this. In a Piagetian search task, according to 
Karmiloff-Smith, infants not only need to “make computations in the visual system”, 
but they then need to “translate that information into a motor output system for 
manual search” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; p. 77). If infants’ problem solving capacities 
are limited, they may succeed on a task requiring only a visual response but fail on a 
task requiring the additional coordination of a manual response as well.
However, the means-ends explanation is unlikely to account for the data for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, five-month-old infants appear to show an appreciation for 
object permanence a full three months before Piaget claimed, when the occluder is a 
dark room rather than a screen or cloth (Bower & Wishart, 1972; Hood & Willatts, 
1986; Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, & Perris, 1991; McCall & Clifton, 1999; Shinskey & 
Munakata, in press). Hood & Willatts (1986) presented infants with an object placed 
either to their left or right and then extinguished the lights in the room so that the 
infant could no longer see the object. Despite the object being no longer perceptible 
to the infant, they still reached out for the object with a good degree of accuracy. 
These results suggest that it is not the action of reaching that poses a problem for 
young infants in object permanence tasks. Similarly, Munakata (2002) has argued 
that deficits in means-ends behaviours cannot account for the looking-searching 
dissociation. Munakata et al. (1997) tested the means-end deficit account in 7-month- 
olds by training them to press a button to retrieve an object from behind an occluder. 
In this study, when infants pressed the button, a horizontal ledge would drop and if a 
toy were on the ledge, the toy would then slide down a ramp to within reach of the 
infant, hi the test phase, either an opaque or a transparent screen was placed in front
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of the ledge. Infants showed no sensitivity to whether or not a toy was present behind 
an opaque screen, but when the screen was transparent they were able to push the 
button to retrieve the visible toy. Since the means-end behaviours were equivalent for 
both the visible and occluded condition, it is unlikely that failure on the occluded 
condition can be solely due to means-ends deficits. However, it is possible that 
infants simply failed to recognize the presence of the transparent screen and were 
behaving as if there was no screen present. If this were the case, then the means-end 
demands for the visible and occluded conditions might not be equal. To test this 
possibility, Shinskey & Munakata (2001) ran another version of this test in which 
infants had to actually pull down the screen in order to retrieve the toy so it was 
impossible for them to ignore the presence of the transparent screen. They found that 
infants were still able to pass this task showing that they were not ignoring the screen. 
It would seem that young infants really do show genuine means-end skills before they 
are able to search for an occluded object.
10.4.3 Two distinct pathways
One explanation for the looking-searching dissociation proposes that there are two 
distinct neural pathways subserving the visual control of actions and recognition of 
objects (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Bertenthal, 1996; Newman, Atkinson, & Braddick, 
2001). According to Goodale & Milner, the dorsal stream of visual processing 
subserves the control of actions whereas the ventral stream concerns the perceptual 
recognition of objects, and these two streams are thought to be functionally 
dissociable such that someone can report being perfectly able to see objects but be 
unable to reach accurately or shape their hand in an appropriate way when they tried 
to reach for them. Not only is it proposed that these two visual processing streams are
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functionally dissociable but it is also proposed that they follow different 
developmental trajectories (Berthenthal, 1996). In order to account for the looking- 
searching dissociation then, it is argued that the ventral pathway, subserving the visual 
recognition of objects, has a more rapid developmental trajectory than the dorsal 
pathway that is involved in the control of action. Thus, infants are able to 
demonstrate an understanding when only a visual response is required (as in the 
looking-time paradigms) but not when a motor response is also required (as in the 
typical Piagetian search tasks). Newman (2001) presents evidence that when five- 
and-a-half-month-old infants are presented with two objects which differ in their size 
and hence their ‘graspability’, that they tend to reach for the object that they first 
fixate on, regardless of whether they will be able to grasp the object. Later, between 
eight and twelve months, infants ai'e able to inhibit this reflexive response and reach, 
not to the more visually salient object, but to the object that they are likely to be able 
to grasp (i.e. the smaller object). The authors argue that these results might support 
the hypothesis the system subserving action develops later than that which subserves 
visual orienting.
However, whilst there is undoubtedly support for the idea that these two 
processing streams are functionally dissociable, both at the behavioural and neural 
level (Goodale & Milner, 1992), it seems unlikely that these separate pathways of 
knowledge can fully explain infant search failures. In addition to the looking 
searching dissociation, there is the intriguing dissociation regarding object 
permanence understanding even within the manual search domain. As described 
previously, five- to seven-month-old infants appear able to appreciate object 
permanence when the occluder is a darkened room, but not when the object is
occluded by another object. If the pathway subserving control of action really was vj
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developmentally delayed, it is unclear why five-month-olds are able to competently 
reach for an object when it is in the dark but not when it is covered by a cloth or a 
screen. Any account of object permanence development and understanding needs to 
be able to account not only for the looking-searching dissociation but also for this 
dissociation within the manual search domain.
10.4.4 Graded Representations
The graded representations approach of Munakata and colleagues may go someway 
towards accounting for both of these dissociations. In this view, knowledge is not 
conceived of as an all-or-nothing domain. Rather, regarding object permanence in 
particular, this approach advocates the idea that infants may have some idea that the 
object is still present but that the knowledge they have is insufficient to support an 
action response. The ability to demonstrate knowledge about hidden objects may 
depend on the strength of the representation that the infant has and whilst a weak 
representation of the hidden object may be enough to drive a looking response, a 
strong representation may be needed for a manual response. The strength of the 
representation is defined at the neural level by the number of neurons that are firing 
and the rate at which the neurons associated with a representation fire. According to 
Mareschal et al. (1995), for the manual retrieval of both visible and hidden objects, 
infants need to coordinate the objects identity and position with motor action, but in 
order to retrieve a hidden object, its representation needs to be “strongly established” 
if the infant is to successfully coordinate the representation with motor action. 
Because manual search behaviour is so dependent on the strength of an object’s 
representation in these graded representation accounts, these models predict that 
search behaviour will differ with the child’s familiarity with the object that is hidden.
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So, since an object that is more familiar to the infant (e.g. something they play with at 
home or something they have repeatedly seen) will have a stronger representation, 
infants should find it easier to retrieve a hidden familiar object than a hidden 
unfamiliar object. Findings by Keenan & Morris (2002) and Bigelow et al. (1995) 
both support this position. In Keenan & Morris’ study, infants aged nine to twelve 
months were either tested on the standard A-not-B task with a novel toy, or with a toy 
they had played witli for seven days prior to testing. Results showed that infants were 
significantly more likely to search correctly for the familiar toy than for the novel toy. 
Recently, Shinskey & Munakata (2004) have also shown that the well-documented 
novelty preference in infancy (Fantz, 1964; Cornell, 1979) reverses when infants are 
presented with hidden objects. In this study, when seven-month-old infants were 
presented with a visible novel toy versus a visible familiar toy, the majority of infants 
show a preference for reaching for the novel toy. However, when the lights are turned 
off such that the objects are no longer visible, the majority of infants show a reverse 
preference and reach more often when the object is a familiar object. These results 
support Munakata and colleagues’ contention that only sufficiently strong 
representations will support retrieval of hidden objects. Moreover, the graded 
representations explanation can account for the dissociation searching for objects in 
the dark and searching for objects behind occluders. According to Munakata et al. 
(1997), when an object is occluded by the dark, there is no visual input to the infant at 
all, but when an object is occluded by a screen or a cloth, this visual input may 
suggest to the infant that no object is present. If the representation of the object is 
weak, as it may be in five-month-old infants, the visual input of the occluder may be 
enough to interfere with the representation that the child has of the object. Because 
there is no visual input when the object is hidden by the dark, this weak representation
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may be sustained and hence infants reach for the object (Munakata et al., 1997; 
Munakata, 2001; 2003).
10.4.5 Prediction versus Postdiction
Arguably the explanation that holds most appeal currently is the prediction- 
postdiction explanation favoured by Hood et al. (2003) This explanation proposes 
that there is a fundamental difference between what is required of a subject on a 
looking paradigm and what is required of them on a search paradigm. Specifically, 
when children or monkeys need to find an object on a search paradigm, in order to be 
successful they need to be able to predict exactly the location of that object. It is not 
enough for them to have a general inclination. By contrast, on a looking paradigm, 
subjects are shown the outcome and so do not have to make an explicit prediction. 
When an impossible outcome is revealed to a child, they are essentially asked to make 
a judgment regarding whether or not outcome is possible (Ahmed & Ruffinan, 1998; 
Meltzoff & Moore, 1998; Keen, 2003). The subject may not even be sure exactly 
why the outcome is not possible. A simple increase in attention to an outcome 
because of an uncertainty may be all that longer looking towards impossible outcomes 
reflects.
This explanation is theoretically attractive because it may also account for some 
of the adult findings of dissociation in the realm of naïve physics. As described 
earlier, there are a number of studies that have shown that adults can accurately judge 
whether or not a particular object trajectory is correct, but they may predict quite a 
different, incorrect object trajectory (Shanon, 1976; McCloskey, Caramazza, & 
Green, 1980; McCloskey, Washburn, & Felch, 1983; Kaiser, Proffitt, & McCloskey, 
1985). For example, in one of these studies, adults were shown a ball travelling
195
through a c-shaped tube and asked to predict the trajectory that the object would take 
upon exit. Many of the adults reported that the ball would continue to follow a curved 
path on exiting the tube. However, when these same adults were shown video of 
either the correct straight trajectory or a contrived curvilinear trajectory, most adults 
reported that the straight trajectory looked more natural (Kaiser, Proffitt, & Anderson, 
1985). These authors suggest that “people may possess a perceptual sensitivity to 
natural dynamics, enabling them to recognize when anomalous events violate 
dynamic laws, yet be unable to access this knowledge in an explicit manner in order 
to solve representational problems” (p.796).
This explanation is attractive, not least because it could potentially fit nicely 
with the graded representations account offered by Munakata and colleagues which, 
in itself, can account for a substantial proportion of the available data (see above). It 
is feasible that predicting outcomes of events requires stronger representations than 
simply judging outcomes. Furthermore, the proposal that young children are able to 
retrospectively, but not prospectively, judge events, even fits with findings from 
newborn infants. In one study looking at heart rate conditioning, Clifton (1974) found 
that infants were not able to anticipate delivery of glucose in response to a tone, but if 
these infants were not given glucose after the tone was played, their heart rate 
decreased.
However, whilst there has to date been no direct test of the prediction- 
postdiction hypothesis, there is reason to suspect that this again is not the whole story. 
Firstly, before this explanation was first proposed by Meltzoff & Moore (1998), there 
was evidence that young children were doing more than simply judging event 
outcomes in situations where their looking behaviour differed from more explicit 
behaviour. In the false-belief looking-paradigm devised by Clements & Pemer
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(1994), there is evidence that two-year-old children looked towards an empty location 
where they thought the actor thought the object should be -  despite the fact that 
children cannot answer at this age that the actor will look in this empty location. This 
design employed a predictive looking measure, not the postdictive looking measure 
that most looking paradigms employ, and did find evidence for correct prediction. In 
addition, a study by Hofstadter & Reznick (1996) into the A-not-B error in young 
children, analyzed both reach responses and eye-gaze-prior-to-reaching and found that 
children looked towards the correct location more often than would be expected by 
chance, despite the fact that sometimes they did not reach towards the correct 
location.
A recent study by Mash et al (2003), although not directly testing the 
prediction-postdiction explanation, found that failing to predict the location of an 
object is unlikely to account for search failures in two-year-olds on their task. This 
study employed the Berthier et al. ramp apparatus, but the task was changed from an 
invisible displacement task to a visible displacement task. The solid wall was placed 
at a particular location along the ramp and the object was released from the top of the 
ramp. Only when the object had stopped by the wall was the opaque panel containing 
the four doors lowered into place. In this way, children saw exactly where the object 
was on the ramp and so they did not have to predict where the object would stop. 
However, despite this additional information, children were still inaccurate in their 
search performance, suggesting that something other than an inability to predict was 
contributing to poor performance.
The following chapter presents a study whose aim was to explicitly test the 
prediction-postdiction hypothesis. A looking paradigm was employed in which it was 
possible to assess the yoimg child’s prediction about where an object will be, rather
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than assessing retrospective judgment. If the prediction-postdiction hypothesis holds 
true, young children who fail a search task should also fail a predictive looking task, if 
it is their inability to predict the location of an object that leads them to fail the search 
task.
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T e s t i n g  t h e  p r e d ic t i o n - p o s t d i c t io n  h y p o t h e s i s
11.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The proposal that the looking-searching dissociation discussed in the previous chapter 
is explainable by the differences between the tasks in terms of whether or not they 
require a predictive response is an attractive proposal. Not only does it have the 
potential to account for the looking-searching dissociation in young children, but it 
may also be able to account for the dissociations in adult naïve physics discussed in 
the previous chapter.
Whilst there has been much speculation about the role of prediction in 
successful performance on search tasks to the extent that Hood has recently 
commented that “this prediction-postdiction account may provide a resolution to the 
discrepancies in findings between infant looking time studies and search studies” 
(Hood, Cole-Davis, & Dias, 2003 p.69), there has not been a direct test of this 
hypothesis. In fact, as noted in the previous chapter, several prior findings would 
suggest that the prediction-postdiction account may not fully explain the looking- 
searching dissociation since there is evidence that young children do look predictively 
to the correct location despite searching incorrectly (Diamond, 1991; Hofstadter & 
Reznick, 1996) and even when they are shown the ultimate location of an object that 
is then occluded from view such that no prediction is required, children still fail 
search tasks (Mash, Keen, & Berthier, 2003). The aim of the current study was to 
provide a direct test of the prediction-postdiction hypothesis by testing two-year-old 
children on a looking version of a task that we know they are imable to pass when
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presented as a manual search task. This task is Hood’s tubes task, described 
extensively in Chapter 5, in which two-year-old children show a bias towards 
searching in the incorrect straight-down location. However, when this task is 
presented as an expectancy violation looking task, Hauser (cited in Hauser, 2003) 
reports that cotton-top tamarins do show evidence of knowing where the object really 
is. With this in mind, a new looking task was designed to test anticipatory or 
predictive looking in young children. In the current task, children are presented with 
a video of the tubes task and watch as an experimenter drops a ball into the tube. 
Children then hear an audio stimulus asking them where the ball is, and relative 
looking time to both locations is measured in response to this auditory stimulus.
11.2 B a c k g r o u n d  a n d  a im s
The results reported in the current chapter are from a broader study whose aim was 
twofold. Whilst the primary aim of the study was to investigate anticipatory or 
predictive looking (operationalised as ‘direction of looking’) in young children in 
order to directly test the prediction-postdiction account of the looking-searching 
dissociation, a secondary aim was to directly compare this kind of looking with the 
postdictive looking (operationalised as length of looking) evoked in an expectancy- 
violation paradigm. The stimuli designed to investigate anticipatory or predictive eye 
movements were presented first, followed by the stimuli designed to look at 
postdictive eye gaze. However, initial pilot testing of the latter stimuli presented in a 
standard expectancy-violation paradigm evoked ceiling effects such that children 
appeared to continue looking at the stimuli until they disappeared. It was decided to 
use a paired-comparison method to avoid such ceiling effects (see Friedman, 2002 for
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similar findings and methodology)^ Unfortunately, the use of a paired-comparison 
method appeared not to evoke differential looking towards either the possible or 
impossible outcomes. It is possible that this lack of looking preference towards the 
impossible outcome reflects a true lack of understanding that this outcome is indeed 
not possible. However, because one of the events which failed to elicit longer looking 
towards the impossible outcome was an event that children had competently passed 
during a manual search test (as described in Chapter 9), it seems more likely that this 
lack of looking preference was an artefact of the methodology employed. As a result, 
and because the expectancy-violation stimuli were always presented after the primary 
stimuli and so could not have influenced anticipatory looking obtained from these 
primary stimuli, it was decided to focus on these results and not to report the results 
from the second half of the study.
The initial aim was to include all the events presented to children in Chapters 
5, 6, 7 and 9 to be subjected to a looking time analysis (see figure 11.1). However, 
only three of these events had search locations spatially distinct enough to allow for 
accurate coding of looking direction^ and so only three events were planned for 
inclusion in a predictive looking analysis. For example, in the first event (figure 11.1 : 
Tl), the two search locations are on the left and the right so that it is clear to the 
experimenter which location the child is looking at. However, in the fourth event 
(figure 11.1 : Cl), the search options are close together and it would not be possible to 
discern where the child is looking. These non-discemable stimuli were planned for 
inclusion only in the expectancy violation analysis.
* While standard expectancy violation tasks present the subject with the possible and impossible event 
one after the other and measure relative looking at each stimulus, a paired comparison method presents 
the possible and impossible event simultaneously and measuies relative looking to each event.
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11.2.1 Subjects
20 24-month-olds and 16 36-month-olds participated in the current study. 14 boys and 
6 girls comprised the 24-month-old group (mean age: 25.0 months, s.d. 1.5 months) 
and 8 boys and 8 girls comprised the 36-month-old group (mean age: 37.5 months, 
s.d. 1.8 months). These same children simultaneously participated in a number of the 
search tasks described in previous chapters. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 in chapter 4 identify 
which children participated in this study and which other studies they also participated 
in. The original aim was to test all those children who had participated in the search 
tasks described in Chapters 5 through 9 on the looking versions of these same tests. 
However, a number of children were unwilling to sit and look at stimuli if they had 
already played with the real stimuli in the search task. Because of this, the number of 
3-year-olds tested in the current study is less than the number who participated in the 
search tasks. In addition, because there were a total of 6 different events designed for 
presentation in the looking task and the order of presentation was randomly assigned 
for each child, a number of children did not complete all 6 trials, and so, depending on 
the event, a different number of children were included in the analysis.
11.2.2 Visual stimuli
Each child was presented with a set of 6 events (pictured in figure 11.1) and each 
event comprised three pieces of video, presented one after the other. The first and 
second videos (hereafter called ‘action 1’ and ‘action 2’ trials) showed an event in 
which a ball disappeared. Actions 1 and 2 were identical except that ‘action T  events 
were shorter and were designed to serve as a reminder to the child of what they saw in 
‘action V  events. These reminder ‘Action 2’ events were included to maximise the
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chances that the child would attend to the critical event (children in looking 
paradigms often look away from the screen for short periods and as the critical 
moment is only a short part of the trial, if the child misses this part then they would 
have to be excluded. By having 2 action events, the chances of the child attending to 
the critical aspect are increased). The third piece of video was the outcome video in 
which children were simultaneously presented with 2 videos in which the ball was 
revealed in both the possible location and the impossible location. Figure 11.2 shows 
an example of a sequence of events in pictures, including the outcome trials, not 
included in the analysis for this chapter.
Video sequences were created using a canon MV500 digital video camcorder 
and then edited in adobe premiere to create a number of AVI video files. The three 
events of interest for the current chapter are standard tubes (henceforth Tl), prepotent 
removed tubes (henceforth T2) and inverted cups (henceforth C2) and the stimuli for 
these will be described separately.
In both the Tl and T2 events, children saw an ‘action 1’ trial in which two 
search locations were initially shown as empty, two hands reach around from behind 
to close the doors and then one hand appears fi'om above and di*ops a ball into the tube 
(see figure 11.3). In the ‘action 2’ trial, the same video is presented, except that the 
initial portion of the video is cut so that the video starts with the hand appearing at the 
top to drop the ball into the tube. For the C2 event, the ‘action 1’ trial initially 
showed three upright cups and then a hand appeared from behind and, one-by-one, 
turned each cup towards the child to show that it was empty and then replaced it in the 
upright position. Then another hand appeared from behind and dropped a ball into 
one cup and then overturned this cup onto the third cup in the row. The overturned 
cup was then returned to its original position (see figure 11.4). In the ‘action 2’ trial.
203
H .S
<Nu
H I
§
§
0
o<1
03CL
\o
I
O1
B1
(UÆ
g1I
O
o
ii
g
£&
cO
§ë
iÆ
îUO.o
’S
,o
Oûc
io•S>% ^
X)I-5Io<u
%01(D-S
,o
'Sto01
%
ÛOc1
T3g)
L-i - r ;
'S
cdi<u_ ICÜ ^
u1
H
3O
g
'gI
.2-o(UX)o
"O3
Action 1 trial
Action 2 trial
Outcome trial
Figure 11.2 General sequence o f  trials shown to children 1) ‘Action 1’ trial; 2) ‘Action 2 ’ 
trial and 3) ‘Outcom e’ trial (left; im possible, right: possible).
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‘‘W h e r e  is th e  b a ll? ”
Figure 11.3 Frames taken from the T l video sequence demonstrating the point at which the 
child hears the auditory stimulus “Where is the ball?” The sequence is identical for the T2 
event, except that the tube is attached from the top middle to the bottom left box.
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II I
“Where is the ball?”
&
Figure 11.4 Frames taken from the C2 video sequence demonstrating the point at which the 
child hears the auditory stimulus “Where is the ball?”
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the trial started with the hand appearing from behind and dropping the ball into the 
first cup.
Each video presented to the child measured 360 x 288 pixels and was presented 
on a flat projection screen (via an NEC Multisync MT 1030+ projector) measuring
1.45 metres in length and 65 cm in height. The length of each video/trial is detailed in 
table 11.1.
11.2.3 A uditory stim uli
A sound file was created using Avisoft-SASLab Pro to accompany each of the action 
trials. Auditory stimuli of the type “Where is the ball?” were recorded by a female 
speaker using infant-directed speech. The same auditory stimulus was used for each 
action trial. In addition, for the Tl and the T2 events, the sound that the ball made 
upon impact was included in the sound file at the appropriate point to alert the child to 
the fact that the ball had fallen down the tube. The ball impact sound was taken fr'om 
the digital video, but when played in the stimuli file, this sound was non-directional 
such that the child could not use the noise as a cue to discern the location of the ball.
The length of the auditory stimulus was 560 milliseconds and the point of onset 
of the auditory stimulus is detailed in table 11.1. In the case of the two tubes events 
(Tl and T2), the onset of the auditory stimulus occurred roughly 2000 milliseconds 
after the child had heard the sound of the ball impacting the box. The sound files that 
accompanied each action trial were created in Adobe Premiere.
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Event
Length of trial Point of onset of auditory stimulus
Action 1 Action 2 Action 1 Action 2
Tl 21020 10008 15044 04068
T2 18050 10011 14060 04076
C2 32072 16019 31068 11008
Table 11.1 Table showing length (in milliseconds) of both ‘action V and ‘action 2’ trials for 
each of the three different events (Tl, T2 and C2) and the point of onset (in milliseconds) of 
the auditory stimulus “Where is the ball” for both the ‘action 1 ’ and ‘action 2’ trials, again for 
each of the three different events.
11.2.4 D esign
In as far as was possible, each child who participated in the search studies reported in 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 9 also simultaneously participated in the looking study described 
here. The order in which children participated in the search and looking studies was 
randomised such that half the children took part in the looking study before 
participating in the search task and half participated in the search tasks before being 
run on the looking trials. The order of presentation of each of the six original events 
was pseudo-randomised and only three of the looking events were presented per 
session. The pseudo-randomisation entailed presenting children with three different 
events in a random order. The three events witnessed were also randomly chosen 
except that similar events were separated by session. There were a total of six 
different events (see figure 11.1) but some events were more similar than others. For 
example, two events contained tubes, two events contained cups and two events 
contained the ramp and the rolling ball. Because of this similarity, these pairs of
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events were always separated by session such that if a child viewed the standard tube 
event (Tl) on the first session, they would see the prepotent removed tube event (T2) 
on the second session. As described in Chapter 4, because of the limited attention 
span of young children, most were tested over the course of two sessions. As with the 
search tasks, the looking events were also divided over these two sessions because 
each event was quite lengthy. As a result some children received the trials of interest 
to this chapter on their first visit to the lab and others received these trials on their 
second visit.
11.2.5 Procedure
The children were sitting centred on their parent’s lap at a distance of about 90 cm 
from the projection screen. For a diagram of the looking booth, see figure 11.5. A 
loudspeaker was situated centrally above the projection screen so that the sound of the 
ball impacting the box in the two tubes events was non-directional and could not be 
used as a cue to the location of the ball. As the children entered the testing booth and 
were seated on their parent’s lap, they were presented with some distracter stimuli 
aimed at making them comfortable in the testing booth. These distracter stimuli took 
the form of a screensaver whereby an animated small yellow face or an angel was 
seen passing across the screen. Once the child was seated on the parent’s lap, the 
parent was instructed to put on headphones and to close their eyes so that they could 
not influence the looking direction of their child. The headphones worn by the 
parents played instructions reminding them to keep their eyes closed and their child 
centred. The children’s eye movements were recorded using two light-sensitive video 
cameras mounted above the projection screen. One camera pointed from the left of 
the projection screen and one camera pointed from the right.
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During the experiment, the testing booth was in near darkness. The first trial 
was launched when the child was centred and appeared comfortable. The stimuli 
were encoded into a trial file that specified the location that the image should appear 
on the screen, the length of the file and the order of presentation of each stimulus. 
This trial file was then run from a PC in an adjacent room. If at any point the child 
appeared restless or turned away Jfrom the screen, the experimenter played a chime 
over the speaker or flashed a red blob up on the projection screen to get the child’s 
attention, but this was only done in between trials.
11.2.6 D ata analysis
All looking during all trials was recorded to standard VHS tapes. In order to analyse 
lefi/right looking in response to the auditory stimulus “where is the ball?”, the 
relevant trials (i.e. T l, T2 and C2 ‘action 1’ and ‘action 2’ trials) were digitized in 
Adobe Premiere to create AVI files for each child for each of these different trials.
Stimuli Action 1 Action 2 Outcome
Tubes 1 y y -
Tubes 2 y y -
Cups 1 - - -
Cups 2 y y -
Rolling Ball 1 - - -
Rolling Ball 2 - - -
Table 11.2 Table showing data that was used in the current analysis. ‘V' denotes data used 
and denotes data discarded.
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A visual basic program was written to analyse the AVI files. The program allowed 
analysis of every two frames and gave an output in Excel of which direction the coder 
deemed the child to be looking on each of these fi âmes and the corresponding point in 
the trial in milliseconds. Each trial was coded twice by the experimenter and a quarter 
of these trials were also coded by a second coder (interrater reliability: r = 0.89). 
Although the entirety of each trial was coded, only a small section (2 seconds) of each 
trial following the auditory stimulus “where is the ball” was used for subsequent 
analysis. However, it was felt important to code the entire trial and then to isolate the 
portion that would be subjected to analysis so that the experimenter/coder was blind 
to the important section of the tiial and could not know at which point the child 
should be looking to the left or right.
After the entire trial had been coded, a two-second period following the end of 
the auditory stimulus was isolated for analysis. In addition, because “responses to the 
spoken word require the mobilization of an eye movement” (Swingley & Aslin, 2000 
p. 155), and are not instantaneous, the beginning of the isolated two-second period 
commenced 400 milliseconds after the end of the auditory stimulus. There is 
considerable variation in estimates of the minimum time required to make a saccade 
following an auditory stimulus, and this probably varies depending on age and 
species. However, based on theirs and others research, Swingley & Aslin propose 
that 400 milliseconds is probably a good estimate. The two-second period for 
analysis was also chosen based on the findings of Swingley & Aslin. They report that 
the “few eye movements occurring after this time are usually spontaneous re-fixations 
unrelated to the spoken stimulus” (p. 155).
To be included in the analysis, it was required that 90% of the frames be coded 
the same on the two scorings carried out by the main coder. Considering that there
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were 25 frames coded for a two-second period (1 frame is equal to 40 milliseconds 
but since every two frames were coded, two seconds is 25 coded frames), this 
amounts to 23 out of the 25 frames needing to be identically coded. If there was not 
90% agreement in the two codings, two more codings were taken until there was 90% 
agreement.
11.2.7 R esults
The final number of subjects who completed each of the three trials of interest (Tl, T2 
and C2) varied because of a number of factors. Firstly, a number of children simply 
did not complete all the trials of interest and because of the random order in which the 
different events were presented for each child, the trials that were not completed 
differed depending on the individual child. Secondly, although the light sensitive 
camera employed during this study was usually sufficient to allow the experimenter to 
accurately score where the child was looking, there were some trials where this was 
deemed impossible. For example, some children sat with their heads in such a 
position that it was impossible to view the eye movements. These trials were 
discarded from analysis. Thirdly, a number of trials had to be discarded because of 
experimental error. Trials ended when a light on the computer screen indicated that 
the previous trial had finished, but on a few occasions the experimenter started the 
new trial before the previous trial had ended, and so these trials were also excluded 
from analysis. At the conclusion of the study, only 6 out of 20 two-year-olds and only 
4 out of 16 three-year-olds had complete data sets with results for each of the two 
action trials (‘action V and ‘action 2’) on each of the three different events of interest 
to this chapter (Tl, T2 and C2). Because of this large variation in the number and 
type of trials that each child completed, it was not possible to carry out a repeated
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measures omnibus tests as such analyses do not allow for missing data^. I opted to 
run a number of independent t-tests analysing performance on the separate events in 
order to investigate whether looking at the correct location in any of these events is 
greater than would be expected by chance, while simultaneously looking at 
differences between age groups. It is unlikely that perfoimance on any of the ‘action 
2’ trials could have been affected by the experience of viewing an ‘action 1’ trial 
beforehand because neither of the action trials showed any outcome so viewing the 
trial is unlikely to have affected children's expectations. Furthermore, although there 
were two events that involved tubes, and children did see an outcome after the second 
action trial for a tube event before they would have viewed the second tube event, 
these two different tube events (XI and T2) were always presented to children on 
different sessions. Because of this, it would seem justified to analyse behaviour on 
these two events as independent data. Finally, because there were no apparent 
learning effects over trials on the manual search tasks, it seems unlikely that 
performance on one trial in the looking study would influence performance on 
subsequent trials, except that some children may have become less attentive as trials 
went on. As a result, it seems reasonable to treat the different events as independent 
and subject them to independent analyses. As events were presented in a random 
order, even if children did become inattentive and therefore not complete all events in 
each session, the random order of presentation should ensure that no particular event 
is privileged in terms of receiving more attention from the child than another.
 ^There are a nmnber o f solutions to this problem, none of which are definitive or necessarily correct. 
Firstly, one could discard any subjects who have missing data for any of the trials. However, clearly 
this is undesirable, especially since such a small number o f subjects in each of the age groups have a 
complete set o f data. At least two alternatives remain. One possibility is to estimate the missing data 
points by substituting the missing point with the grand mean -  that is, the mean o f all subjects over all 
trials over all tliree events. However, this method entails the problem of artificially inflating the mean 
especially since it was assumed a priori that children would do well on the C2 event since the results 
from the manual search study revealed that children were able to pass this task when presented as a 
manual search task. The third possibility is to carry out a number of independent tests and this was the 
approach was chosen.
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Therefore, it was decided to carry out separate analyses for each of the three different 
event types: T l, T2 and C2.
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Figure 11.6 Graph displaying the mean proportion (± SE) o f  the two-second time period 
children spent looking towards the correct location for each ‘action 1’ event type. An * 
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11.2.7.1 Analysis for T l
For the Tl event (standard tubes), 19 24-month-olds were tested and 14 of these 
subjects successfully completed the two action trials. For the 36-month-olds, 14 were 
originally run on the Tl event and 13 of these subjects completed the ‘action 1’ trial 
and 12 completed the ‘action 2’ trial.
‘Action r  trial: An independent samples t-test revealed no significant 
differences in the proportion of time spent looking towards the correct location 
according to age [t (25) = 0.43, «.sj. Due to the lack of difference between age groups, 
the data was pooled for the remaining analysis. A one-sample t-test was then carried 
out to investigate whether the mean proportion of looking time towards the correct 
location is greater than would be expected by chance. As the period chosen for 
assessment of looking time was two seconds, looking for one second at the correct 
location would be expected by chance. However, the one-sample t-test indicated that 
children were looking significantly more at the correct location (the left box) than 
would be expected by chance [t (26) = 2.02, p <0.05].
‘Action V  trial: An independent samples t-test revealed an effect of age that 
approached significance [t (24) = 1.90, p = 0.07] indicating that 24-month-olds were 
looking longer at the correct location than were 36-month-olds on the ‘action T  trial. 
Considering this trend, it seemed sensible to analyse the looking behaviour of these 
two age groups individually rather than pooling the data and assuming no difference. 
When independent sample t-tests were carried out, they revealed that 24-month-olds 
were looking significantly longer at the correct location on ‘action 2’ trials than would 
be expected by chance [t (13) = 2.90, p <0.05], but that 36-month-olds were not [t 
(11) = 0.24, ns]. It is notable that in the case of the 24-month-olds, the two children 
who displayed the opposite looking preference on the ‘action 1’ trial (i.e. they looked
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longer at the incorrect location following the auditory stimulus) also showed this 
reverse looking pattern on the ‘action 2’ trial. 11 out of the 14 two-year-olds who 
completed both ‘action 1’ and ‘action 2’ trials displayed the same pattern of looking 
on both trials. The results for the three-year-olds are more puzzling. On the one 
hand, these children performed above chance on ‘action 1’ trials, preferring to look at 
the correct location when asked where the ball was. However, their performance on 
‘action 2’ trials -  exactly the same stimulus -  indicates chance performance. It seems 
unlikely that the results from the second action trial for three-year-olds reflect a 
genuine misunderstanding of the task since three-year-olds generally perform well on 
the manual search version of the tubes task and displayed above chance predictive 
abilities on the ‘action V trial. One alternative explanation is simply that three-year- 
olds lost interest in the second action trial and stopped paying attention to the 
important pai*ts of the event. Although it is not possible to tell whether they were 
truly engaged in this second action trial, it is notable that at least three of the three- 
year-olds showed some looking away from the screen during (turning around to look 
at their parent) during the second action trial which they did not do on the first action 
trial. This distraction on the part of the three-year-olds may have resulted in their 
either no longer being motivated to respond correctly, or not paying attention to the 
vital elements of the task which would subsequently allow them to respond correctly 
to the auditory stimulus.
11.2.7.2 Analysis for T2 event
For the T2 event (tubes task with prepotent response removed), 17 24-month-olds 
were tested. 12 of these subjects completed the action 1 event with codeable data. For 
the ‘action 2’ trial, 11 subjects completed the trial with codeable data. For the 36-
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month-olds, 14 subjects were tested on the T2 event. Only 9 of these subjects 
completed the ‘action V  event with scoreable data. For the ‘action 2’ event, 8 
subjects completed the trial with scoreable data.
‘Action V  trial: An independent samples t-test revealed an effect of age on 
looking time that approached significance for the ‘action 1’ trial. That is, three-year- 
olds looked longer towards the correct location than two-year-olds although this effect 
did not reach significance [t (19) = 1.87, p = 0.8]. Because of this near-significant 
effect of age, it was decided to carry out two separate one-sample t-tests to assess 
whether the looking of either the two- or three-year-olds towards the correct location 
differed from chance. A one-sample t-test showed that the looking behaviour of two- 
year-olds did not differ from chance [t (11) = 0.00, p = 1.00]. However, a one-sample 
t-test on the three-year-old data revealed that these subjects did look significantly 
longer at the correct location than would be expected by chance [t (8) = 4.03, p < 
0.05].
‘Action 2’ trial: An independent samples t-test revealed no significant
differences in looking times between 24-month-olds and 36-month-olds [t (17) = 1.21, 
M6"]. As a result, the data from both groups was pooled for a one-sample t-test to 
assess whether looking times towards the correct location were greater than would be 
expected by chance. This analysis revealed that children did not look towards the 
correct location more than would be expected by chance [t (18) = 0.71, ns].
11.2.7.3 Analysis for C2 event
For the C2 event (inverted cups), 16 24-month-olds were tested and 12 of these 
subjects completed the ‘action 1’ trial with codeable data. On the ‘action 2’ trial, 14 
subjects completed the trial with scoreable data. For the 36-month-olds, 13 subjects
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were run on the C2 event. For the ‘action 1 ’ trial, 9 subjects completed the trial with 
useable data and for the ‘action T  trial, 8 subjects completed with useable data.
‘Action 1’ trial: An independent samples t-test comparing the performance of 
two-year-olds and three-year-olds on the ‘action 1’ trial of the C2 event revealed no 
difference in looking times towards the correct location between the two age gioups [t 
(19) == 0.59, p = «5]. Due to the fact that there were no differences between two- and 
three-year-olds, the data was pooled for the rest of the analysis. A one-sample t-test 
was then carried out to investigate whether looking time towards the correct location 
was greater than would be expected by chance. The one-sample t-test revealed that 
looking time towards the correct (right hand side) location was greater than would be 
expected by chance [t (20) = 6.37, p <0.001].
‘Action 2’ trial: The independent samples t-test comparing the looking of two- 
year-olds and three-year-olds revealed that three-year-olds were looking significantly 
longer towards the correct cup than two-year-olds [t (20) = 2.10, p <0.05. Despite 
this difference in looking times between the age groups, one-sample t-tests revealed 
that both groups looked significantly longer at the correct cup than would be expected 
by chance [two-year-olds: t (13) = 3.25, p <0.01 and three-year-olds: t (7) = 7.23, p <  
0.0001].
Results Summary
Overall then, the results from the basic looking analysis suggest that, with the 
exception of the three-year-olds on the Tl ‘action 2’ event, both two-year-olds and 
three-year-olds look towards the correct location when asked where the ball is on the 
Tl and C2 event. However, with regard to the T2 event, only three-year-olds 
exhibited longer looking towards the correct location with two-year-olds performing
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at chance. Again, as with the Tl event, the three-year-old children only exhibited 
above chance looking on the first action trial, with their looking behaviour dropping 
to chance level on the second action trial.
11.2.8 O rd er  ANALYSIS
Since most children who participated in the looking experiment described in the 
current chapter simultaneously participated in the manual search tasks described in 
Chapters 5 through 9, an analysis of the order in which they participated in the 
looking and search tasks was carried out to assess whether or not those children who 
participated in the search tasks first were more successful on the looking task than 
those who participated in the opposite order. Separate ANOVAs were carried out for 
each event and for each action trial, but these analyses revealed no effect of order of 
presentation, and no interaction between order and age, for any of the events or action 
trials.
11.3 D is c u s sio n
The results presented in the current chapter provide suggestive evidence for an ability 
in two-year-old human children to be able to visually predict the correct location of an 
object when it has disappeared from view. To reiterate the main findings of this 
chapter:
• Both two- and three-year-olds look longer at the correct location when a ball is 
dropped down an s-shaped tube in the Tl event and they hear the auditory stimulus 
“where is the ball?”
• Only three-year-olds look longer at the correct location when a ball is dropped 
down an s-shaped tube in the T2 event.
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• Both two- and three-year-olds look longer at the correct location in the C2 event 
when an object is dropped into a cup and that cup is overturned on top of another cup 
and the object invisibly displaced into the second cup.
• The order in which the children participated in the search and looking versions of 
the tasks does not affect performance on the looking tasks.
Why did two-year-old children look longer at the correct location on the Tl event but 
not on the T2 event? Certainly the lack of positive looking on the T2 event weakens 
the conclusion that two-year-old children are able to predict the correct location of an 
invisibly displaced object. Moreover, there is no immediately obvious explanation for 
this discrepancy as the two events are practically identical in their demands.
However, consider the following possibility. If we accept the interpretations of 
looking behaviour on expectancy-violation studies, infants as young as three months 
interpret events in accord with the principle of solidity (Spelke, Breinlinger, 
Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Baillargeon, 2004) and they appear to know that one 
object cannot pass through another object. If we suppose that children evoke this 
principle when interpreting physical events, it is possible to imagine that when 
viewing the tube event, children initially extrapolate a straight-down linear trajectory 
from the portion of object movement that they witness, but when asked, “where is the 
ball?”, they reason that the tube would prevent this straight-down movement. Having 
reasoned that a straight-down trajectory would not have been possible, children are 
left with only one other possibility on the Tl looking event: the correct location. 
Hence, children look towards the correct location as the only other feasible location 
but they need not understand the exact function of the tube in order to deduce that this 
is the correct location. They only need to reason about where the ball cannot be.
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However, in the T2 event (where the straight-down box is removed), having reasoned 
again that the ball could not have travelled straight-down, children are then left with 
two options of places to search. If they do not understand the function of the tube, 
they may believe that either location is a feasible location for the ball to be in and 
hence children look randomly at both boxes. A separate question is why children may 
be able to use their knowledge of solidity to interpret the looking event but not the 
manual search task? This question will be discussed further in the general discussion 
(Chapter 12),
The current experiment does not support the ‘prediction-postdiction’ hypothesis, 
according to which children are unable to predict the location of an object. On the 
contrary, when presented with a video of the standard tubes task, two-year-old 
children appear able to correctly predict where the ball must be. However, this 
reasoning need not be based on an understanding of the function of the tube but may 
be based on a perhaps simpler interpretation of the event in accord with the principle 
of solidity that will dictate where the ball cannot be and by chance lead the child to 
the coiTect location. The apparent dissociation between the inability of two-year-olds 
to find the ball on the manual version of the tubes task (Chapter 5) and their apparent 
ability to correctly predict the location of the ball on the looking paradigm may not 
reflect a true difference in knowledge exhibited on each task. Rather, it is possible 
that the looking paradigm may yield correct responses without reflecting real 
knowledge.
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G e n e r a l  d is c u s s i o n
The aim of the experiments presented in tliis thesis was to explore claims that failures 
on some invisible displacement tasks may reflect limitations in a subject’s executive 
functioning (i.e. memory and inliibition capacities) rather than an inability to 
represent the displacements of absent objects. A further aim was to identify factors 
that may influence search behaviour and contribute to successes and failures on such 
tasks. The results show that a variety of biases exist and emerge in behaviour, 
depending upon a particular situation. These biases are sometimes shared by humans 
and monkeys but are sometimes not. However, contrary to the contentions of some 
authors, such biases do not necessarily mask existing and correct knowledge 
representations, but, on the contrary, the elicitation of biases may prevent the 
formation of correct representations.
12.1 Su m m a r y  o f  f in d in g s
The proposal that subjects may have ‘hidden’ the relevant knowledge that a particular 
task encompasses, motivated the studies presented in Chapters five, six and seven. In 
Chapter 5, Hood’s prediction that “participants should be capable of performing the 
correct response (on the tubes task) when the prepotent response is removed” (Hood, 
1995 p. 595) was tested by presenting a version of the tubes task in which there was 
no option of making the prepotent response. The task was presented to both two- 
year-old human children and monkeys; two groups of subjects that have demonstrated 
a peiwasive gravity bias on the standai'd version of the tubes task (Hood, 1995; Hood, 
Hauser, Anderson, & Santos, 1999). If subjects really do have knowledge about tubes
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and an understanding of the invisible displacement that they are presented with, then 
removing the option of prepotent responding should facilitate the demonstration of 
this knowledge. This was not Üie case. Both monkeys and children exhibited random 
responding.
Moreover, the results of the experiments reported in Chapter 5 demonstrate that, 
contrary to Hood’s claims, the ‘gravity’ error is not restricted to cases of falling 
objects and is also seen in a task in which an object travels up a tube. The contention 
of both Hood and Hauser that children and monkeys would be able to pass this task 
were they able to inhibit a prepotent gravity response (Hood, 1995; Hauser, 2003), 
does not hold up under the weight of evidence presented in this Chapter. The 
existence of a bias is likely to reflect a more general alignment bias rather than 
anything specifically related to gravity.
The results from the experiments presented in Chapter 6 add strength to the 
conclusions from Chapter 5. Hauser (2001b) proposed that an additional example of 
the ‘gravity’ bias is also evident on the shelf task. In this task, rhesus macaques 
search beneath a solid shelf for an object that is dropped from above. According to 
Hauser, this en'or reflects another dimension of the gravity bias: subjects who are 
ordinarily able to take into account the constraint of solidity on object motion behave 
as if they cannot, because of a pervasive gravity bias. The results of Chapters 6 and 7 
call this conclusion into question by providing evidence that a) searching in the 
beneath-shelf location occurs irrespective of whether or not any objects are seen 
falling, or whether there is any difference between the two search locations in temis 
of their gravitational plausibility, and b) that the results obtained by Hauser, which 
ostensibly demonstrate an understanding of solidity, are more likely to reflect a bias 
towards searching in a location closest to where the reward was last seen. The
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behaviour witnessed on Hauser’s task then is unlikely to be the consequence of failing 
to inhibit a prepotent response resulting from a naïve theory of gravity.
In discounting this bias as being specifically related to gravity, the results from 
these Chapters have also highlighted a number of other biases that influence search 
behaviour. In Chapter 5, an alignment bias rather than a gravity bias was proposed to 
account for the behaviour witnessed in both children and monkeys. In Chapter 6, a 
rather different bias emerged for monkeys -  a bias towards searching for food in a 
sheltered location. This bias does not appear to emerge in human children; instead, 
children present a bias that is better explained by handedness. In Chapters 7 and 8, a 
proximity bias is identified which leads both monlceys and young children to search 
for a hidden object in the location closest to where this object disappeared. The 
results from Chapter 8 highlight how situation-specific biases can be, and how 
seemingly mundane changes in tasks (such as whether or not the apparatus is within 
or out-of-reach of the subject) can elicit entirely different patterns of search.
In addition to identifying a number of biases that influence search behaviour, 
the experiments presented in these Chapters also point to a glaring inability on the 
part of these two gi'oups of subjects to take into account how the physical constraint 
of solidity impacts on object trajectories. Despite the fact that there is evidence that in 
other situations, both children and monkeys do appear to reason in accord with the 
physical constraint of solidity (Santos & Hauser, 2002; Baillargeon, 2004), this ability 
is not demonstrated in the current tasks. In all of the tasks presented in Chapters 5, 6, 
7 and 8, both monkeys and young children appear ignorant to the constraint of solidity 
and systematically ignore the constraints on object pathways imposed by the presence 
of tubes and solid shelves.
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Although the results from these earlier Chapters point towards subjects that do 
not understand how physical features influence the trajectories of objects, the results 
from Chapters 9 and 11 suggest that in some situations, our infant and monkey 
subjects may not be as ignorant as these results suggest. In Chapter 9 we see some 
possible evidence that rhesus monkeys may be able to solve an invisible displacement 
task involving gravity, suggesting that, in principle, they may be capable of 
representing the movement of an invisible object. Likewise, the failure of two-year- 
old children to pass a double invisible displacement, but their ability to pass the single 
invisible displacement task described in Chapter 9, strongly suggests that it is not a 
general ability to represent hidden object movement that determines success and 
failure on invisible displacement tasks, but rather features more specific to individual 
tasks. If both monkeys and children are able to solve some invisible displacement 
tasks, then it is necessary to accept that the ability exists. The task then becomes one 
of identifying the factors that contribute to instances of success and failure.
Much research over the past few decades has highlighted the dissociation that 
exists between the understanding that subjects (both human and nonhuman) can 
demonstrate on looking tasks and that which they can demonstrate on manual search 
tasks. The results fr om Chapter 11, indicating that two-year-old children can predict 
the location of a ball when only a looking response is required, contrast with the 
inability of these same children to find a ball when a manual response is required 
(Chapter 5). These results contribute another example of a looking-searching 
dissociation in development, but go beyond this by addressing one specific hypothesis 
that has been proposed to account for the dissociation; the prediction-postdiction 
hypothesis. It appears that, contrary to the contentions of some authors (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1998; Hood, Cole-Davis, & Dias, 2003; Keen, 2003), children do not fail
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manual search tasks because they are unable to predict the location of an object. In 
the task presented in Chapter 11, children were able to visually predict the location of 
a ball that had disappeared by exhibiting longer looking to the correct location in 
response to the question, “where is the ball?” Most looking studies that have found 
positive results (i.e. subjects react with increased attention to physically impossible 
outcomes), rather than measuring looking in advance, have measured looking 
retrospectively to outcomes. In this way, the task presented in Chapter 11 emulates its 
searching counterpart (of Chapter 5) more closely, as both require the ability to 
predict an object’s location in order to be successful. The results of Chapter 11 
strongly suggest that an inability to predict an object’s location does not account for 
the looking-searching dissociation. However, the suggestion was also made that 
correct prediction on this task need not reflect complete understanding of the task 
either, and could be achieved by a process of elimination.
12.2 In t e r p r e t in g  t h e  r e s u l t s
The overall results presented in this thesis cannot be explained in any simple way. 
That neither monkeys nor children show evidence of correct understanding of the 
tubes task even once the prepotent response is removed, contradicts the contentions of 
both Hood and Hauser that a dominant prepotent response masks correct existing 
knowledge (Hood, 1995; Hauser, 2003). The observed response -  searching at the 
straight-down location -  is not concealing an accurate representation of the task when 
it is presented in the search domain. Likewise, the proposed ‘other dimension’ of the 
‘gravity’ bias -  leading monkeys to search for a fallen object beneath a solid shelf -  
does not mask an existing correct representation of the task. Monkeys also do not 
take into account the constraint of solidity when this and similar tasks are presented
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horizontally. Gravity is not the culprit. But, if subjects do not have the requisite 
physical knowledge that would enable them to pass the task were it not for an 
interfering prepotent response, why do children appear to show an understanding of 
the tubes task when it is presented in the looking domain?
The results from Chapters 8 (within reach vs. out of reach task) and 9 (inverted 
cups task) highlight the importance of considering ostensibly mundane aspects of 
tasks in the quest to understand why children and nonhuman species fail invisible 
displacement tasks; Chapter 8 because it shows how a seemingly small variation in 
the presentation of a task can have a large effect on search behaviour and Chapter 9 
because it shows that, in principle, children and monkeys can fail one invisible 
displacement task yet pass another. If both tasks require mental representational 
abilities, mental representation of invisible trajectories is unlikely to be the principal 
factor that determines success on these tasks.
In an attempt to address these issues, I adopt the framework proposed by 
Munakata and colleagues who have stressed the need to consider that knowledge can 
be present to varying degrees, or in Munakata’s terms, knowledge representations can 
be ‘graded in nature’ (Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997). The degree 
or strength of a subject’s representation may determine what the subject can do with 
that representation. Munakata proposes that, while a weak representation may be 
sufficient on some tasks, a stronger representation may be needed to pass another type 
of task (Munakata, 2000). At the neural level, according to Munakata, 
“representations can be graded in terms of the number of relevant neurons firing, their 
firing rates and the coherence of the firing patterns” (Munakata, 2001 p. 309). In 
addition to this distinction between varying strengths of knowledge representations, I 
propose that there are also occasions where no degree of correct representation of a
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task is formed. The different behavioural biases that have been identified in this 
thesis may be thought of as belonging to two different groups. Firstly there are biases 
that may create misrepresentations of tasks such that no correct representation of the 
task exists. Secondly there are biases in behaviour that emerge in situations where the 
subject has not formed the correct representation or has only a weak (correct) 
representation of the task.
12.3 U n d e r s t a n d in g  in v is ib l e  d is p l a c e m e n t  p e r f o r m a n c e
Although it is not possible to dr aw conclusions on the origins of such biases from the 
cuiTent work, in thinking about why they emerge in some situations and not others, 
we can identify directions for future research. Four different biases have been 
identified from the studies presented in this thesis: an alignment bias and a proximity 
bias were identified in Chapters 5 and 7 and found to be present both in monkeys and 
young children, whilst a bias to search beneath a solid shelf and a handedness bias 
were identified in Chapter 6 but found to each be present only in monkeys (beneath- 
shelf bias) or young children (handedness bias). I propose that two of these biases 
(the alignment and proximity biases) are biases that prevent the subject from forming 
even a weak representation of the task, whilst the other two biases (the beneath-shelf 
bias and the handedness bias) emerge in situations where the subject either has no 
representation (because of an inability to consider the relevant physical constraints) or 
a weak representation of the task.
The position advocated in this thesis, to be described in greater depth in the 
next section, makes the following points:
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• Young children and monkeys do not take into account task-relevant 
details in advance of an object’s disappearance
• Their attention focuses on the most salient feature of a task (e.g. the 
falling object) and weak inhibitory skills mean that attention is not easily 
disengaged from the most salient feature
• Focusing on the most salient feature leads to an initial expectation that is 
in accord with this most salient feature
• Weak inhibitory skills prevent subjects from suppressing a reach 
response to the location where their attention is initially focused 
(because of their initial interpretation of the task in accord with the most 
salient feature).
• The inability to suppress a reach response prevents the subjects from 
further reasoning about the location of the object.
• In cases where a representation is weak, numerous external factors may, 
in effect, destroy the representation, and lead to the emergence of pre­
existing biases.
12.3.1 Biases that lead to incorrect representations 
Although I have concluded that inhibition at the response level cannot account for the 
bias displayed on the tubes task, and is unlikely to account for other biases, the 
position advocated here is that inhibition at the representational level may play a role 
in these failures. By ‘inhibition at the representational level’, I adopt Hamishfeger’s 
definition that it is inhibition that “involves the control of cognitive contents or 
processes” (Hamishfeger, 1995 p. 184) and Zelazo et al.’s definition that this type of 
inhibition means that subjects have “difficulty inhibiting an incorrect representation
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and establishing a correct one” (Zelazo, Reznick, & Spinazzola, 1998 p.203). 
Although inhibition at the response level is thought to mask existing knowledge 
(Diamond, 1991; Hood, 1995; Zelazo, Reznick, & Pinon, 1995) an inhibitory failure 
at the representational level does not mask existing knowledge since the correct 
representation is never formed. As the prefrontal cortex matures, the resulting 
enhancement in inhibitory capacity may increasingly allow subjects to inhibit 
incorrect representations and establish coirect ones. Inhibition may enable subjects to 
establish correct representations by allowing them to simultaneously consider all the 
task relevant features that determine the location of an object. A lack of inhibitory 
control at this level may lead subjects to focus exclusively on the most salient feature 
of a task and neglect other relevant variables. (One point that should be made here 
however, is that if the subject does not have the understanding or appreciation of the 
physical principles that a paiticular task entails, even in the absence of the stimuli that 
elicits the bias, a correct representation will not be formed).
12.3.1.1 F a il in g  to  a t t e n d  to  t a sk -r e l e v a n t  d eta ils  a n d  f o c u sin g  o n  the  m o st
SALIENT VARIABLE
One reason why a correct representation of an object’s location may never emerge in 
the first place may be because young cliildren and monkeys find it difficult to take in 
and process multiple sources of information simultaneously. One of the prerequisites 
for solving invisible displacement tasks like those that have been designed by Hood 
(1995) and Berthier et al. (2000) is that subjects need to be able to integrate 
knowledge they may have about natural object trajectories with what knowledge they 
have about object interactions. It is possible that monkeys and young children are 
able to demonstrate a sensitivity to such factors independently, but are not able to take
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them both into account simultaneously. When a child sees a falling object, they need 
to not only know that falling objects will keep moving down in the absence of 
support, but that when this falling object encounters another solid object (like a tube), 
this will affect the pathway that the falling object will take. Likewise, in the case of 
the Berthier et al. task (2000), it is necessary to know that when the rolling object 
disappears from view, it will continue to roll straight down, but that the presence of a 
solid wall will determine how far this object will roll. If subjects focus exclusively on 
only one of these factors, their response to the disappearance of the object will be 
incorrect.
However, such integration may be difficult for a two-year-old child or other 
subjects who have limited inhibitory capacities. Flavell (1977) has argued that young 
children are prone to ‘centration’ - the tendency to focus attention exclusively on one 
variable at the expense of attending to other, equally relevant variables. The point of 
attention may be the most salient or interesting element of the visual display and this 
may lead the child to neglect other task-relevant features (Flavell, 1977, p.81). As 
children get older, they become better able to ‘decentrate’ and pay attention to, and 
consider, other variables that may be relevant to the task in hand. Flavell does not 
speculate on how this comes about, but it is feasible that as inhibitory capacities 
mature, subjects become better able to disengage from the most salient feature, or the 
feature that most interests them, to enable them to attend to other factors. In a recent 
study in which children’s eye movements were recorded while they participated in a 
version of the Berthier et al. rolling ball task, it was found that two-year-olds rarely 
looked at the solid wall at all, focussing predominantly on the disappearance and 
emergence of the ball, whereas three-year-olds did look at the solid wall (Haddad, 
Kloos, & Keen, 2004). Two-year-olds subsequently fail to find the ball whereas
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three-year-olds perform well. The looking behaviour of children on this task 
conforms to the contention that children who fail a search task may be focussing 
exclusively on one relevant aspect of a task, at the expense of other relevant aspects.
12.3.1.2 F o c u sin g  o n  th e  m o st  sa l ie n t  f e a t u r e  l e a d s  to  a n  in itia l  e x pe c t a t io n  
IN ACCORD w ith  THIS FEATURE
By neglecting other task-relevant features, and concentrating solely on the most 
salient feature, it follows that children and monkeys may initially interpret an object’s 
motion in accord with this most salient feature. For example, if a subject is focusing 
solely on the linear trajectory of an object, they may initially interpret the remaining 
invisible trajectory of the object as continuing this linear pathway. Having done this, 
and initially focused on the location that accords with this initial interpretation, young 
children and monkeys may find it difficult to disengage from this initial ‘choice’ and 
to suppress a reach response to this location. Goldman-Rakic notes a similar response 
in monkeys when she writes that monkeys with prefrontal deficits have a tendency to 
“respond to the first food well that catches (their) eye” (Goldman-Rakic, 1987 p.604). 
Although suppressing a reach response in both two-year-olds and monkeys is possible 
on other tasks, these may be tasks in which subjects already have some degree of 
representation of the object’s true location. For example, both two-year-olds and 
monkeys can suppress a prepotent response to location ‘A’ on the A-not-B task, but 
their representation of the location at ‘B’ may be strong enough to allow them to 
suppress the urge to reach to ‘A’. In an invisible displacement task where the 
subject’s representation of the object’s location may be absent or very weak, it may be 
less easy for them to suppress reaching to the location that they initially focus on.
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In order to account for the divergent reaching-looking findings from Chapter 5 
and 11, it is proposed that initially, children and monkeys do interpret the movement 
of the ball in accord with a pre-existing alignment bias. The reason why they have 
this initial interpretation is because it is the dynamic feature of the task (the moving 
object) that captures their attention. However, in a looking task, like the one 
described in Chapter 11, children may have the opportunity to reason that the solid 
nature of the tube prevents the object fiom travelling in, or continuing on, its linear 
pathway. As a result, they are able to discount this location as a possible search 
option. In the standard tubes looking condition, this leaves them with just one other 
option -  the correct option, whereas in the prepotent removed condition, having 
discounted the aligned location, they then have two alternative locations. The kind of 
cognitive back-peddling that would be required for them to then work out, with 
knowledge of how tubes fimction, which of these two locations is the right one, may 
be too difficult for young children (especially if they have little experience with tubes 
and how they function) and so they look randomly between the two locations. On the 
standard tubes trial, as there is only one option after discounting the aligned location, 
correct looking is seen.
On the search version of the tubes task however, children of this age may never 
get the opportunity to reason about where the ball must be. Having initially 
interpreted the event in terms of a linear pathway and having set eyes on the aligned 
location, they may find it difficult to inhibit a subsequent reach to this location. The 
difference between looking and reaching is that in the reaching task, children find it 
difficult to inhibit reaching to the location that first catches their eye, so not allowing 
them the option of further reasoning about where the object could be. In the looking 
task, the removal of the option of any reach response might allow the child the option
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of reasoning about whether this aligned location is likely or not. So, despite having 
the ability to recognize the way in which solidity constrains object motion, it is only 
in the looking task that they have the opportunity to indulge this capacity.
The same phenomenon may also account for the search errors seen on the 
different ramp tasks described in Chapters 7 and 8. Subjects initially focus solely on 
the dynamic event (the object movement), and do not take into account other elements 
of the task that will affect the final location of the object. In the task described in 
Chapter 7, in which subjects watch as a ball rolls down a ramp, and have the option of 
searching either underneath the ramp (the nearer, yet incorrect location) or at the end 
of the ramp (the further, but correct location), both monkeys and children search 
predominantly underneath the ramp. If subjects focus exclusively on the rolling 
object, at the expense of other task relevant features like the solid ramp, their initial 
representation of the task may be in accord with a pre-existing proximity bias. Such a 
bias may have a long evolutionary histoiy. For example, if a predator disappears 
behind a large rock, it would be beneficial to the prey to pay attention to this part of 
the environment rather than any other part. Again, when the subject’s initial 
representation is in accord with a pre-existing bias, a reach response to this attended 
location quickly follows.
Neither of these biases masks a correct representation of the task. Such biases 
stem from the subject’s over-attending to the most salient variable (the dynamic one) 
and initially forming a representation of the task in accord with this variable. As 
inhibitory capacities mature, children become better able to focus on other relevant 
features and consider the interaction between the different variables. Monkeys, on the 
other hand, may never develop sophisticated enough inhibitoiy skills and remain 
unable to overcome ‘centration’ even as adults.
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12.3.2 A b s e n t  r e p r e s e n t a t io n s
In the section above, I proposed that where there are dynamic events like falling or 
rolling objects, the salience of such events leads those with weak inhibitory control to 
focus exclusively on this variable and form a representation of the task accordingly. 
However, on some tasks, this may not lead to a representation of the task that 
specifies one search location as more likely to contain the vanished object than 
another. In such situations, I propose that behavioural biases like the handedness bias 
seen in children, and the beneath-shelf preference seen in monkeys, will emerge.
Even if children and monkeys evoked an alignment or proximity bias upon 
witnessing the falling object in Chapter 6, the spatial closeness of the two search 
locations in these tasks does not dictate one search location to be more likely to 
contain the reward than another. As a result, the child may have no representation 
(correct or incorrect) of the object’s location and in such cases pre-existing 
behavioural biases like handedness (children) and sheltered-foraging (monkeys) may 
surface. However, in the task described in Chapter 6, when spatial cues are provided 
which give one search location special status, the beneath-shelf bias does not surface, 
as the monkey has been able to form an alternative representation.
12.3.3 W eak  REPRESENTATIONS
The discussion so far has focused on situations where, because of representational 
biases, subjects may have no accurate representation of a task. Furthermore, I have 
proposed that initial interpretations of tasks in accord with the most salient feature, 
and the subsequent reaching behaviour that follows, may not allow subjects the option 
of reasoning about where the object really could be.
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However, there are some tasks where a young child or a monkey may be able to 
form some degree of representation about an object’s location, but this representation 
may still be relatively weak. When representations are weak, biases like handedness 
may surface again to influence search behaviour. The experiment described in 
Chapter 6 suggests a difference in search behaviour between two-year-olds and three- 
year-olds such that three-year-olds perform better on the ramp task than two-yeai*- 
olds. However, while two-year-olds appear to show no understanding of the task, the 
behaviour of three-year-olds suggests that they may know something more about the 
task. However, handedness still appears to exert an effect on search behaviour even at 
this age. It is possible that, by three years, children are able to attend more to task­
relevant features (other than the most salient dynamic event) and may form a correct, 
albeit weak, representation of the object’s location. However, the weakness of the 
representation may mean that biases like handedness still exert an influence on 
behaviour. Perhaps it is only when the child is able to form a sufficiently strong 
representation of the object’s location that biases like handedness no longer exert an 
influence on search.
So far, I have argued that the salience of moving objects captures attention to 
such an extent that subjects with weak inhibitory control may not be able to disengage 
attention from this single variable. If excessive attention is given to the dynamic 
aspect of a task and this leads subjects to a representation of the task in accord with 
the one feature they are focussing on, one prediction would be that if the dynamic 
event was somehow made less salient, subjects may be able to focus on other relevant 
features that may help them to solve the task. Perhaps this is what we see in the study 
described in Chapter 9. In this task, because there is no salient object trajectory, 
subjects may be more easily able to attend to other relevant features, such as the
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overturning of the cup, and the effect that this has on an object inside. This may also 
help to explain why two-year-old children can do well on a standard Piagetian 
invisible displacement but fail the kind of invisible displacements involving object 
trajectories that are described in this thesis.
However, although rhesus monkeys show some ability to solve the invisible 
displacement in Chapter 9, this result is inconsistent with many results that have 
shown monkeys to be incapable of solving invisible displacements when the 
appropriate controls have been employed. In attempting to explain this discrepancy, it 
may be helpful to consider the results from Chapter 8, which suggested that seemingly 
mundane task differences might, in reality, have profound effects on a subject’s 
ability to solve a task. One possible explanation for the differences seen in the two 
conditions described in Chapter 8 is that the post-disappearance movement of the 
apparatus leads to a disruption in the monkey’s (incorrect) representation of the task. 
So, even if monkeys have evoked an initial (incorrect) representation of the task in 
accord with a proximity bias, the movement of the apparatus may disrupt or desti*oy 
this representation. It seems possible that the post-disappearance movement of 
apparatus in most invisible displacement tasks carried out with animals (Vaughter, 
Smotherman, & Ordy, 1972; Mathieu, Bouchard, Granger, & Herscovitch, 1976; 
Natale, Antinucci, Spinozzi, & Poti, 1986; Schino, Spinozzi, & Berlinguer, 1990; De 
Blois & Novak, 1994; Dumas & Brunet, 1994; De Blois, Novak, & Bond, 1998; 
Mendes & Huber, 2004) may have the effect of disrupting the monkey’s 
representation and the weaker the representation is, the more likely that mundane 
features of a task (like apparatus or subject movement) will disrupt this 
representation. Either the movement of the apparatus or the delay imposed by this 
kind of design may affect a fragile or weak representation of the location of the object
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and result in failure. One of the few tests of invisible displacement understanding in 
which the animals have shown competence in invisible displacements did not involve 
any movement of the apparatus because the apparatus was kept within reach of the 
subject (Neiworth et ah, 2003).
In cases where a representation is weak, factors such as the movement of the 
apparatus may have a devastating effect on an already fragile representation. As 
Berthier and colleagues have previously noted, even on a visible displacement version 
of their task, if a two-year-old child’s gaze is disrupted from the location of 
disappearance prior to search, they tend to search randomly (Mash, Keen, & Berthier, 
2003). This indicates the fragility of the child’s representation of the object’s 
location.
12.3.4 F u t u r e  d ir e c t io n s
In an attempt to reconcile some of the apparently discrepant findings, I have proposed 
some possible explanations based on representational inhibition and weak 
representations. From these speculations, a number of predictions can be made.
Firstly, in relation to the possibility that it is the saliency of dynamic events that 
prevents subjects with weak inhibitory control from considering other relevant task 
features, by removing or reducing the dynamism of the event, the performance of 
these subjects should change. For example, on the tubes task, if  the experimenter 
placed an object into the tube rather than dropping it, would this reduce the salience of 
this aspect of the event and allow subjects to attend to other features as well?
Secondly, with respect to the claim made at the end of Chapter 11, that the 
apparent ability of two-year-olds to visually predict the location of the ball at the end 
of the tube need not necessarily reflect true understanding of how tubes function,
239
providing three search locations instead of two could test this claim. If the findings 
reflect elimination of the straight-down location, rather than real understanding about 
how tubes function, perhaps children would not look towards the correct location if 
there were two other boxes.
Thirdly, the direction that I find most exciting is the possibility to explore to 
what extent invisible displacement failures in monkeys could be attributable to 
mundane task features that have not, to date, been considered. If monkeys might be 
able to solve invisible displacements, but the representations that they form are weak 
enough to be disrupted by apparatus movement, it is possible to design tasks that do 
not involve post-disappearance movement of apparatus. Perhaps the only reason great 
apes have displayed such competence on invisible displacement tasks is because of 
their hypothesised superior executive functioning abilities. Call’s finding that apes in 
his task fell victim to sequential searching (choosing the next container in line even 
though this container was not visited by the experimenter) has been interpreted as an 
inhibitory failure (Call, 2001) and it is possible that the urge to search at the next 
sequential location could be better overcome if the ape had a stronger representation 
of the food’s location. One way to examine the idea that strength of representation 
may affect the likelihood of these types of biases emerging is to compare visible and 
invisible displacement tasks that entail similar memory demands. For example, even 
on a double visible displacement, the subject only need remember the final location of 
the object in order to solve the task and so the memory demands are less for a visible 
displacement than an invisible displacement. If two rewards were hidden visibly in 
different locations, such that there was still a middle container that was empty, the 
memory demands on the subject might approach those of an invisible displacement, 
as now the subject has to also remember two locations, not just the final location
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visited. If, having retrieved one food reward, the subject was able to bypass the 
middle container, perhaps this would indicate that inliibitory problems surface mainly 
in situations where representations might be relatively weaker.
12.4 C o n c l u d in g  REMARKS
The experiments in this thesis have revealed a number of biases that emerge in the 
search behaviour of both young human children and adult macaque monkeys. These 
biases do not mask existing correct representations of the tasks, but rather emerge 
instead of correct representations. Pre-existing biases may be most likely to emerge 
in behaviour when an individual’s representation of a task is non-existent or relatively 
weak. The position advocated in this thesis is that although subjects may have 
difficulty inhibiting an incorrect representation of a task in both looking and reaching 
modalities, the task of establishing a correct representation may be especially difficult 
on a search task. This is because, having initially evoked an incorrect representation, 
young children may find it difficult to suppress a reach response to that location. 
When no reach response is possible, the task of establishing a correct representation 
may be easier.
It seems likely that the role of executive function in invisible displacement 
failures has been underestimated and while some authors have raised contentions that 
some search behaviours seen on these tasks do reflect executive limitations (Gagnon 
& Dore, 1992; Call, 2001), the fiill extent to which executive limitations may impinge 
on successful solving of an invisible displacement task may, in reality, be much 
greater. The fact that most invisible displacement tasks that monkeys have failed to 
solve representationally have been presented out of reach and involved post­
disappearance movement of apparatus is concerning in light of findings in this thesis
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that such seemingly insignificant task differences can evoke such different search 
patterns.
These findings raise serious questions about the usefulness of tasks that we use 
to assess a species capacity for object permanence abilities. The kind of tasks that 
Piaget conceived for measuring the developing cognitive skills of young children 
were readily adopted for use with non-human species precisely because they appeared 
so readily transferable to the study of non-human cognition (Pepperberg, 2002). As 
Macphail (1987) once said “comparative analyses are doomed to failure in the 
absence of comparative methods that could be used across species”. However, with 
increasing interest in the role of executive functions in task failures, the time has 
come to consider whether object permanence tasks really do measure what we think 
they do. Seemingly mundane factors like whether or not there is movement of 
apparatus after an invisible displacement task or the time difference between hiding 
and searching that is necessarily imposed depending on whether an invisible 
displacement is single or double, may make all the difference between success and 
failure. Given the differences in prefrontal structure between species and the 
consequent differences in inhibitory capacities, any element of a task that requires 
more attention than another, or greater memory skills than another, is likely to yield 
species differences in task performance because some species simply have better 
executive skills than others.
One of the most difficult challenges facing comparative psychologists is to convince 
the scientific community that animals can solve the challenges that face them in ways
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that approximate human problem solving. The many reports of monkeys’ failure to 
solve invisible displacements in ways tliat would suggest representational thought, 
solving them instead by more simple strategies, appears an ideal example of the how 
the same end may be achieved via different means. Although this body of research 
has led to a consensus that monkeys are not capable of solving such problems in the 
same way that young human children eventually become able to, more recent research 
has suggested that executive functioning limitations, rather than representational 
limitations, may be responsible for this difference. The results presented in this 
thesis, whilst acknowledging that certain elements of some invisible displacement 
tasks may make them more difficult for subjects with inferior executive functioning 
skills to solve, do not support the contention that monkeys and young children have 
representations that they are unable to demonstiate. If the biases identified do 
determine the subject’s representation of a task, then it follows that, if young children 
and non-human species are less able to prevent these biases from influencing their 
representations, then the representations that emerge will be very different.
243
R e f e r e n c e s
Ahmed, A., & Ruffinan, T. (1998). Why do infants make A not B errors in a search 
task, yet show memory for the location of hidden objects in a nonsearch task? 
Developmental Psychology, 34(3), 441-453.
Annett, M. (1985). Left, right, hand and brain: The right shift theory. Hillsdale, NJ; 
Erlbaum.
Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3.5- and 4,5-month-old infants. 
Developmental Psychology, 23, 655-664.
Baillargeon, R. (2000). Reply to Bogartz, Shinskey, and Schilling; Schilling; and 
Cashon and Cohen. Infancy, 7(4), 447-462.
Baillargeon, R. (2004). Infants' reasoning about hidden objects: evidence for event- 
general and event-specific expectations. Developmental Science, 7(4), 391-424.
Baillargeon, R., & Hanko-Summers, S. (1990). Is the top object adequately supported 
by the bottom object? Young infant's understanding of support relations. 
Cognitive Development, 5, 29-53.
Baillargeon, R., Kotovsky, L., & Needham, A. (1995). The acquisition of physical 
knowledge in infancy. In D. Sperber, Premack, D., & Premack, A. (Eds) (Ed.), 
Causal Cognition: A multidisciplinary Debate. Oxford; GUP.
Baillargeon, R., Needham, A., & DeVos, J. (1992). The development of young 
infants' intuitions about support. Early Development and Parenting, 1, 69-78.
244
Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five- 
month-old infants. Cognition, 20, 191-208.
Bates, E. (1976). Language, Thought and Culture: Advances in the Study o f 
Cognition. New York: Academic Press.
Benson, J. B., DeBlois, S., Bottani, M. A., & Hansen, S. T. (2000). Spatial location 
estimation from 18 to 36 months. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Infant Studies, Brighton, England.
Berger, S. (in press). Demands on Finite Cognitive Capacity Cause Infants' 
Perseverative EiTors. Infancy.
Bertenthal, B. I. (1996). Origins and early development of perception, action, and 
representation. Annual Review o f Psychology, 47, 431-459.
Berthier, N., Bertenthal, B., Seaks, J., Sylvia, M., Johnson, R., & Clifton, R. (2001). 
Using object knowledge in visual tracking and reaching. Infancy, 2(2), 257-284.
Berthier, N., DeBlois, S., Poirier, C. R., Novak, M. A., & Clifton, R. K. (2000). 
Where's the ball? Two- and three-year-olds reason about unseen events. 
Developmental Psychology, 36, 394-401.
Bever, T. G., Mehler, J., & Epstein, J. (1968). What children do in spite of what they 
know. Science, 762(3856), 921-924.
Bigelow, A. E., MacDonald, D., & MacDonald, L. (1995). The Development of 
hifants' search for their mothers, unfamiliar people and objects. Merrill Palmer 
Quarterly Journal o f Developmental Psychology, 41(2), 191-208.
245
Bogartz, R. S., Shinskey, J. L., & Schilling, T. H. (2000). Eight-Month-Old Infants' 
Perception of Possible and Impossible Events. Infancy, 7(4), 403-428.
Bogartz, R. S., Shinskey, J. L., & Speaker, C. J. (1997). Interpreting infant looking: 
the event set x event set design. Developmental Psychology, 33(3), 408-422.
Bower, T. G. (1974a). Development in Infancy. New York: Freeman.
Bower, T. G. (1974b). Development of infant behaviour. Br Med Bull, 30(2), 175- 
178.
Bower, T. G. R. (1977). The Perceptual World o f the Child. London: Fontana.
Bower, T. G. R., Broughton, J. M., & Moore, M. K. (1971). Development of the 
object concept as manifested in the tracking behavior of infants between 7 and 
20 weeks of age. Journal o f Experimental Child Psychology, 11, 182-193.
Bower, T. G. R., & Wishart, J. G. (1972). The effects of motor skill on object 
permanence. Cognition, 7(2), 28-35.
Boysen, S. T. (1996). 'More is less': the distribution of rule-governed resource 
distribution in chimpanzees. In A. E. Russon, Bard, K.A., & Parker, S.T. (Ed.), 
Reaching into Thought: the Minds o f the Great Apes. (pp. 177-189). Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Bremner, J. G. (1978). Spatial errors made by infants: Inadequate spatial cues or 
evidence of egocentrism? British Journal o f Psychology, 69, 77-84.
246
Butler, S. C., Berthier, N., & Clifton, R. K. (2002). Two-Year-Olds' Search Strategies 
and Visual Tracking in a Hidden Displacement Task. Developmental 
Psychology, 3<9(4), 581-590.
Butterworth, G., & Hopkins, B. N. (1993). Origins of handedness in human infancy. 
Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 35, 177-184.
Byrne, G. D., & Suomi, S. J. (1991). Effects of woodchips and buried food on 
behavior patterns and psychological well-being of captive rhesus monkeys. 
American Journal o f Primatology, 23, 141-151.
Cacchione, T., & Krist, H. (2004). Recognizing Impossible Object Relations: 
Intuitions About Support in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal o f  
Comparative Psychology, 118(2), 140-148.
Call, J. (2001). Object Permanence in Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Chimpanzees 
(Pan trogodytes) and Children (Homo sapiens). Journal o f Comparative 
Psychology, 115, 159-171.
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (in press). Reasoning and thinking in nonhuman primates, 
hi K. H. R. Morrison (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook o f Thinking and 
Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carlson, D. F., & Harris, L. J. (1985). Development of infant's hand preference for 
visually directed reaching: Preliminary report of a longitudinal study. Infant 
Mental Health Journal, 6, 158-172.
247
Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., & Hix, H. R. (1998). The role of inhibitory processes in 
young children's difficulties with deception and false belief. Child Development, 
69, 672-692.
Cashon, C. H., & Cohen, L. B. (2000). Eight-month-old infants' perception of 
possible and impossible events. Infancy, 7(4), 429-446.
Clements, W. A., & Pemer, J. (1994). Implicit understanding of belief. Cognitive 
Development, 9, 377-397.
Clifton, R. K. (1974). Heart rate conditioning in the newborn infant. Journal o f 
Experimental Child Psychology, 18, 9-21.
Clifton, R. K., Rochat, P., Litovsky, R., & Perris, E. (1991). Object Representation 
Guides Infants' Reaching in the Dark. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 17(2), 323-329.
Cornell, E. H. (1979). Infants' recognition memory, forgetting and savings. Journal o f 
Experimental Child Psychology, 28, 359-374.
Cummings, E. M., & Bjork, E. L. (1981). The search behavior of 12-14 month old 
infants on a five-choice invisible displacement hiding task. Infant Behaviour 
and Development, 4, 47-60.
Dan, Naoko, Omori, Takahide, Tomiyasu, & Yoshikazu. (2000). Development of 
infants' intuitions about support relations: sensitivity to stability. Developmental 
Science, 5(2), 171-180.
Dan, Naoko, Omori, Takahide, Tomiyasu, & Yoshikazu. (2001). Determinants of 
infants' understanding of supporting relations: Amount of contact versus
248
position of the center of gi'avity. Psychological Reports Special Issue, Vol 
175-181.
Dan, N., & Omori, T. (2002). Self-sitters know that objects should fa ll straight down. 
Paper presented at the International Conference on Infant Studies, Toronto, 
Ontario, April 18-21.
Dan, N., Omori, T., & Tomiyasu, Y. (2000). Dominance o f gravity rules in falling 
events during infancy. Paper presented at the hitemational Conference on Infant 
Studies, Brighton, UK, July 2000.
De Blois, S.T., Novak, M.A., & Bond, M. (1999). Can memoiy requirements account 
for species' differences in invisible displacement tasks? Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 25(2), 168-176.
De Blois, S. T., & Novak, M. A. (1994). Object Permanence in Rhesus Monkeys 
(Macaca mulatta). Journal o f Comparative Psychology, 108(A), 318-327.
De Blois, S. T., Novak, M. A., & Bond, M. (1998). Object Permanence in Orangutans 
(Pongo pygmaeus) and Squirrel Monkeys (Saimiri sciureus). Journal o f 
Comparative Psychology, 112(2), 137-152.
DeLoache, J. S. (1987). Rapid change in the symbolic functioning of very young 
children. Science, 238, 1556-1557.
Diamond, A. (1981). Retrieval of an object from an open box: The development of 
visual-tactile control of reaching in the first year of life. Society for Research in 
Child Development Abstracts, 5,78.
249
Diamond, A. (1990). Developmental time course in human infants and infant 
monkeys, and the neural bases of, inhibitory control in reaching. Annals o f the 
New York Academy o f Sciences, 608, 637-676.
Diamond, A. (1991). Neuropsychological insights into the meaning of object concept 
development. In S. G. Carey, R. (Ed.), The epigenesis o f mind (pp. 67-110). 
Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Diamond, A., & Gilbert, J. (1989). Development as progressive inhibitory control of 
action: retrieval of a contiguous object. Cognitive Development, 4(3), 223-249.
Diamond, A., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1989). Comparison of human infants and 
rhesus monkeys on Piaget's AB task: evidence for dependence on dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 74(1), 24-40.
Dore, F. Y., & Dumas, C. (1987). Psychology of Animal Cognition - Piagetian 
Studies. Psychological Bulletin, 102(2), 219-233.
Dore, F. Y., & Goulet, S. (1998). The Comparative Analysis of Object Knowledge. In 
J. Langer, & Killen, M. (Ed.), Piaget, Evolution and Development. Mahwah, 
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Dumas, C. (1992). Object permanence in cats (Felis catus): An ecological approach to 
the study of invisible displacement. Journal o f Comparative Psychology, 106, 
404-410.
Dumas, C., & Brunet, C. (1994). Permanence de I'object chez le singe capuchin 
(Cebus capella): etude des deplacement invisibles. Canadian Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology, 48(f>), 341-357.
250
Fa, J. E., & Lindburg, D. G. (1996). Evolution and Ecology o f Macaque Societies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fantz, R. L. (1964). Visual experience in infants: decreased attention to familiar 
patterns relative to novel ones. Science, 146, 668-670.
Farroni, T., Johnson, M. H., Brockbank, M., & Simion, F. (2000). Infants' use of gaze 
direction to cue attention: The importance of perceived motion. Visual 
Cognition, 7(6), 705-718.
Farroni, T., Massaccesi, S., Pividori, D., & Johnson, M. H. (2004). Gaze Following in 
Newborns. Infancy, 5(1), 39-60.
Filion, C. M., Washburn, D. A., & Gulledge, J. P. (1996). Can monkeys (Macaca 
mulatta) represent invisible displacement? Journal o f Comparative Psychology, 
770(4), 386-395.
Flavell, J. H. (1977). Cognitive development: Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Flombaum, J. I., & Santos, L. R. (2004). What Rhesus Monkeys Understand About the 
Knowledge o f Others. Paper presented at the International Conference on Infant 
Studies, Chicago, Illinois, May 5-8^\
Friedman, W. (2002). Arrows of Time in Infancy: The Representation of Temporal- 
Causal Invariances. Cognitive Psychology, 44(3), 252-296.
Fuster, J. M. (1980). The Prefrontal Cortex: Anatomy, physiology, and 
neuropsychology o f the frontal lobe. New York: Raven Press.
251
Gagnon, S., & Dore, F. Y. (1992). Search behaviour of various breeds of adult dogs 
(Canis familiaris): object permanence and olfactory cues. Journal o f 
Comparative Psychology, 106, 58-68.
Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (1997). Teleological reasoning in infancy; The infant’s 
naive theoiy of rational action. A reply to Premack & Premack. Cognition, 63, 
227-233.
Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance 
at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193.
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1987). Development of cortical cicuitry and cognitive 
function. Child Development, 58, 601-622.
Gomez, J. C. (2004). Apes, monkeys, children and the developing mind. Harvard 
University Press.
Goodale, M. A., & Milner, A. D. (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and 
action. Trends in Neuroscience, 15, 20-25.
Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Kuhl, P. K. (2001). The scientist in the crib: What 
early learning tells us about the mind. New York: Perennial: HarperCollins.
Goulet, S., Dore, F. Y., & Rousseau, R. (1994). Object pennanence and working 
memory in cats (Felis Catus). Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Behavior Processes, 20, 347-365.
Graybiel, A. M. (1998). The Basal Ganglia and Chunking of Action Repertoires. 
Neurobiology o f learning and memory, 70, 119-136.
252
Griffith, E. M., Pennington, B., Wehner, E., & Rogers, S. (1999). Executive functions 
in young children with autism. Child Development, 70(4), 817-832.
Haddad, J. M., Kloos, H., & Keen, R. (2004). Cognitive Strategies in a Dynamic 
Search Task: The Effects o f Congruent and Conflicting Cues. Paper presented at 
the International Conference on Infant Studies, Chicago, Illinois, May 5-8^ .^
Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Infant Behaviour and 
Development, 27(2), 167-179.
Haith, M. M. (1999). Some thoughts about claims for innate knowledge and infant 
physical reasoning. Cognitive Science, 153-156.
Harnishfeger, K. K. (1995). The development of cognitive inhibition: Theories, 
definitions, and research evidence. In F.F. Dempster & C.J. Brainerd (Ed.), New 
Perspectives on interference and inhibition in cognition (pp. 175-204). San 
Diego, C.A.: Academic Press.
Harris, P. L. (1985). The development of search. In P. Salapatek & L.B. Cohen (Ed.), 
Handbook o f Infant Perception. New York: Academic Press.
Hauser, M. D. (1998). A nonhuman primate's expectations about object motion and 
destination: The importance of self-propelled movement and animacy.
Developmental Science, 7(1), 31-37.
Hauser, M. D. (1999). Perseveration, inhibition, and the prefirontal cortex: A new 
look. Current opinions in neurobiology, 9, 214-222.
Hauser, M. D. (2000). Wild Minds. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press.
253
Hauser, M. D. (2001a). Can rhesus monkeys spontaneously subtract? Cognition, 79, 
239-262.
Hauser, M. D. (2001b). Searching for food in the wild: A nonhuman primate's 
expectations about invisible displacement. Developmental Science, 4(1), 84-93.
Hauser, M. D. (2002). Evolutionary constraints on object Imowledge. Paper presented 
at the International Conference on Infant Studies, Toronto, Ontario, April 18 -  
21*.
Hauser, M. D. (2003). Knowing about knowing: Dissociations between Perception 
and Action Systems over Evolution and during Development. Annals o f the New 
York Academy o f Sciences, 1001, 79-103.
Hauser, M. D., Kralik, J. D., & Botto-Mahan, C. (1999). Problem solving and 
functional design features: Experiments with cotton-top tamarins. Animal 
Behaviour, 57, 565-582.
Hauser, M. D., Kralik, J. D., Williams, T., & Moskovitz, D. (2001). What Guides a 
Search for Food That Has Disappeared? Experiments on Cotton-Top Tamarins 
(Saguinus oedipus). Journal o f Comparative Psychology, 115, 140-151.
Hauser, M. D., MacNeilage, P., & Ware, M. (1996). Numerical representations in 
primates. Proceedings o f the National Academy o f Sciences o f the United States 
o f Amercia, 93(4), 1514-1517.
Hofstadter, M., & Reznick, J. S. (1996). Response modality affects human infant 
delayed-response performance. Child Development, 67, 646-658.
254
Hood, B.M., Carey, S., & Prasada, S. (2000). Predicting the outcomes of physical 
events: two-year-olds fail to reveal knowledge of solidity and support. Child 
Development, 77(6), 1540-1554.
Hood, B.M., Cole-Davis, V., & Dias, M. (2003). Looking and Search Measures of 
Object Knowledge in Preschool Children. Developmental Psychology, 59(1), 
61-70.
Hood, B.M., Hauser, M., Anderson, L., & Santos, L. (1999). Gravity biases in a 
nonhuman primate? Developmental Science, 2, 35-41.
Hood, B.M., & Willatts, P. (1986). Reaching in the dark to an object’s remembered 
position: evidence for object permanence in 5-month-old infants. British 
Journal o f Developmental Psychology, 4, 57-65.
Hood, B. M. (1995). Gravity rules for 2-4 year-olds? Cognitive Development, 10, 577- 
598.
Hood, B. M. (1998). Gravity does rule for falling events. Developmental Science, 
7(1), 59-63.
Hood, B. M., Santos, L., & Fieselman, S. (2000). Two-year olds' naive predictions for 
horizontal trajectories. Developmental Science, 5(3), 328-332.
Jacques, S., Zelazo, P. D., Kirkham, N. Z., & Semcesen, T. K. (1999). Rule Selection 
Versus Rule Execution in Preschoolers: An Error-Delection Approach.
Developmental Psychology, 55(3), 770-780.
James, W. (1890). Principles o f Psychology. New York: Henry Holt.
255
Kaiser, M. K , Proffitt, D. R., & Anderson, K. (1985). Judgments of natui'al and 
anomalous trajectories in the presence and absence of motion. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 11, 795-803.
Kaiser, M. K , Proffitt, D. R., & McCloskey, M. (1985). The development of beliefs 
about falling objects. Perception and Psychophysics, 55, 533-539.
Karin-D'Arcy, M. R., & Povinelli, D. J. (2002). Do Chimpanzees Know What Each 
Other See? International Journal o f Comparative Psychology, 15, 21-54,
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1991). Beyond Modularity: Innate Constraints and
Developmental Change. In S. Carey, & Gelman, R. (Ed.), The Epigenesis o f 
Mind. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Karmiloff-Smith, A., & Inhelder, B. (1975). If you want to get ahead, get a theory. 
Cognition, 3, 195-211.
Keen, R. (2003). Representation of Objects and Events: Why Do Infants Look So 
Smart and Toddlers Look So Dumb? Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 79-83.
Keenan, T., & Morris, T. L. (2002). The Effect o f Object Familiarity on Infants' 
Search Performance in A-not-B Task. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Infant Studies, Toronto, Ontario, April 5-8 '^\
Kim, I. K , & Spelke, E. S. (1992). Infants' Sensitivity to Effects of Gravity on Visible 
Object Motion. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 75(2), 385-393.
256
Kim, L K , & Spelke, E. S. (1999). Perception and understanding of effects of gravity 
and inertia on object motion. Developmental Science, Vol 2(3), 339-362.
King, J. E. (1995), Laterality in Hand Preferences and Reaching Accuracy of Cotton- 
Top Tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). Journal o f Comparative Psychology, 109(1), 
34-41.
Kohler, W. (1925). The mentality o f apes. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin 
Books.
Kuhlmeier, V., Wynn, K , & Bloom, P. (2003). Attribution of dispositional states by 
12-month-olds. Psychological Science, in press.
Kummer, H. (1995). Causal knowledge in animals. In D. Sperber, Premack, D., & 
Premack, A. (Ed.), Causal cognition: a multidisciplinary approach (pp. 26-39). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Leslie, A. M. (1994). ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain 
specificity. In L. A. Hirschfeld, & Gelman, S.A. (Ed.), Mapping the mind: 
Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 119-148). New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Leslie, A. M., & Keeble, S. (1987). Do six-month-old infants perceive causality? 
Cognition, 25(3), 265-288.
Limongelli, L., Boysen, S. T., & Visalberghi, E. (1995). Comprehension of cause- 
effect relations in a tool-using task by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal 
o f Comparative Psychology, 109(1), 18-26.
257
Macphail, E. (1987). The comparative psychology of intelligence. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 70(645-695).
Marcovitch, S., Zelazo, P. D., & Schmuckler, M. A. (2002). The effect of the number 
of A trials on performance on the A-not-B task. Infancy, 5(4), 519-529.
Mareschal, D., Plunkett, K., & Harris, P. (1995). Developing object permanence: A 
connectionist model. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Seventeenth 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
Mash, C,, Keen, R., & Berthier, N. E. (2003). Visual Access and Attention in Two- 
Year-Old's Event Reasoning and Object Search. Infancy, 4(3), 371-388.
Mathieu, M., & Bergero, G. (1981). Piagetian assessment of cognitive development in 
chimpanzee {Pan troglodytes). In A.B. Chiarelli & R.S. Corruccini (Ed.), 
Primate behaviour and sociobiology (pp. 142-147). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Mathieu, M., Bouchard, M., Granger, L., & Herscovitch, J. (1976). Piagetian Object- 
Permanence in cebus capucinus, lagothrica flavicauda and pan troglodytes. 
Animal Behaviour, 24, 585-588.
Matsuzawa, T. (2001). Primate Origins o f Human Cognition and Behavior. Springer.
McCall, D. D., & Clifton, R. K. (1999). Infants' means-end search for hidden objects 
in the absence of visual feedback. Infant Behaviour and Development, 22, 179- 
195.
McCloskey, M., Caramazza, A., & Green, B. (1980). Curvilinear motion in the 
absence of external forces: naive beliefs about the motion of objects. Science, 
210, 1139-1141.
258
McCloskey, M., Washburn, A., & Felch, L. (1983). Intuitive physics: The straight- 
down belief and its origin. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory and Cognition, 9, 636-649.
Mehler, J., & Bever, T. (1967). Cognitive capacity of very young children. Science, 
755(3797), 141-142.
Meltzoff, A. (2000). Keynote address: Infants' Understanding o f People and Things. 
Paper presented at the International Conference on Infant Studies, Brighton, 
UK, July 2000.
Meltzoff, A., & Moore, M. K. (1998). Object Representation, Identity, and the 
Paradox of Early Permanence: Steps Toward a New Framework. Infant 
Behaviour and Development, 27(2), 201-235.
Mendes, N., & Huber, L. (2004). Object Permanence in Common Marmosets 
(Callithrix jacchus). Journal o f Comparative Psychology, 775(1), 103-112.
Milner, B. (1963). Effects of different brain lesions on caid sorting. Archives o f 
Neurology, 9, 90-100.
Munakata, Y. (2000). Challenges to the Violation-of-Expectation Paradigm: 
Throwing the Conceptual Baby Out With the Perceptual Processing Bathwater. 
Infancy, 7(4), 471-477.
Munakata, Y. (2001). Graded representations in behavioral dissociations. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 5(7), 309-315.
259
Munakata, Y. (2002). Two approaches to understanding knowledge dissociations: 
Ancillary deficits and graded representations. Paper presented at the 
International Conference on Infant Studies, Toronto, Ontario.
Munakata, Y., McClelland, J. L., Johnson, M. H., & Siegler, R. S. (1997). Rethinking 
infant knowledge: toward an adaptive process account of successes and failures 
in object permanence tasks. Psychological Review, 104{4), 686-713.
Munakata, Y., Santos, L. R., Spelke, E. S., Hauser, M. D., & O'Reilly, R. C. (2001). 
Visual representation in the wild: how rhesus monkeys parse objects. Journal o f 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 75(1), 44-58.
Natale, F., Antinucci, F., Spinozzi, G., & Poti, P. (1986). Stage 6 object concept in 
nonhuman primate cognition: A comparison between gorilla (Gorilla gorilla 
gorilla) and Japanese macaque (Macaca fuscata). Journal o f Comparative 
Psychology, 706, 335-339.
Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (1998). Effects of prior experience on 4.5-month-old 
infants' object segregation. Infant Behaviour and Development, 21, 1-24.
Neiworth, J. J., Steinmark, E., Basile, B. M., Wonders, R., Steely, F., & DeHart, C. 
(2003). A test of object permanence in a new-world monkey species, cotton top 
tamarins {Saguinus oedipus). Animal Cognition, published online: February 21, 
2005.
Newman, C., Atkinson, J., & Braddick, O. (2001). The development of reaching and 
looking preferences in infants to objects of different sizes. Developmental 
Psychology, 57(4), 561-572.
260
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2004). False-Belief Understanding with Invisible 
Displacement in 15.5-Month-old Infants. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Infant Studies, Chicago, Illinois.
Osthaus, B., Slater, A. M., & Lea, S. E. G. (2003). Can dogs defy gravity? A 
comparison with the human infant and a non-human primate. Developmental 
Science, 6(5), 489-497.
O'Sullivan, L. P., Mitchell, L. L., & Daehler, M. W. (2001). Representation and 
perseveration: Influences on young children's representational insight. Journal 
o f Cognition and Development, 2(4), 339-365.
Parker, S. T., & Gibson, K. R. (1979). A developmental model for the evolution of 
language and intelligence in early hominids. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2, 
367-408.
Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). The value of the Piagetian framework for comparative 
cognitive studies, Cognition, 5, 177-182.
Pepperberg, I. M., & Funk, M. S. (1990). Object permanence in four species of 
psittacine birds: An African Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus), and Illiger mini 
macaw (Ara maracana), a parakeet (Melopsittacus undulatus), and a cockatiel 
{Nymphicus hollandicus). Animal Learning and Behavior, 75(1), 97-108.
Pepperberg, I. M., & Kozak, F. A. (1986). Object permanence in the African Grey 
parrot {Psittacus erithacus). Animal Learning and Behavior, 74(322-330).
Peskin, J. (1992). Ruse and representation: On children's ability to conceal 
infonnation. Developmental Psychology, 25, 84-89.
261
Piaget, J. (1952). The origins o f intelligence in children, NY: Norton.
Piaget, J. (1955). The Child's Construction o f Reality (M. Cook, Trans.). London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
Piaget, J. (1960). The Psychology o f Intelligence. NJ: Littlefield, Adams, Peterson.
Povinelli, D. J. (2000). Folk Physics for Apes: OUP.
Povinelli, D. J. (2002). Theory o f Mind is not an inevitable byproduct o f social 
evolution. Paper presented at the Rational Animals Workshop, Oxford, UK, 
October, 2002.
Povinelli, D. J., Reaux, J. E., Theall, L. A., & Giambrone, S. (2000). The Support 
Problem: Physical Connection Revisited. In D. J. Povinelli (Ed.), Folk Physics 
fo r Apes (pp. 254-270). Oxford: OUP.
Ramsay, D. S. (1980). Onset of unimanual handedness in infants. Infant Behaviour 
and Development, 2, 69-76.
Redshaw, M. (1978). Cognitive development in human and gorilla infants. Journal o f 
Human Evolution, 7, 133-143.
Rivera, S., Wakeley, A., & Langer, J. (1999). The Drawbridge Phenomenon: 
Representational Reasoning or Perceptual Preference? Developmental 
Psychology, 55(2), 427-435.
Rochat, P. (1992). Self-sitting and reaching in 5- to 8-month-old infants: the impact of 
posture and its development on early eye-hand coordination. Journal o f Motor 
Behaviour, 24, 210-220.
262
J
Rumbaugh, D. (1997). Competence, cortex, and primate models: A comparative 
primate perspective. In G. R. L. N. Krasnegor, & P.S. Goldman-Rakic (Ed.), 
Development o f the prefrontal cortex (pp. 117-140). Baltimore: P.H. Brookes.
Russell, J., Mauthner, N., Sharpe, S., & Tidswell, T. (1991). The "windows task" as a 
measure of strategic deception in preschoolers and autistic subjects. British 
Journal o f Developmental Psychology, 9, 331-349.
Santos, L. R. (2004). 'Core Knowledges': a dissociation between spatiotemporal 
knowledge and contact-mechanics in a non-human primate? Developmental 
Science, 7(2), 167-174.
Santos, L. R., Ericson, B., & Hauser, M. D. (1999). Constraints on problem solving 
and inhibition: Object retrieval in cotton-top tamarins. Journal o f Comparative 
Psychology, 112, 186-193.
Santos, L. R., Flombaum, J. I., & Hauser, M. D. (2002). What Does A Non-Human 
Primate Understand About Self-Propelled Motion. Paper presented at the ICIS, 
Toronto, Ontario, April 18-21*.
Santos, L. R., & Hauser, M. D. (2002). Monkey see versus monkey do: Dissociations 
between looking and acting in a non-human primate. Paper presented at the 
hitemational Conference on Infant Studies, Toronto, Ontario, April 18-21*.
Santos, L. R., & Hauser, M. D. (2002). A Non-Human Primate's Understanding of 
Solidity: Dissociations Between Seeing and Acting. Developmental Science, 
5(2), F1-F7.
263
Schino, G., Spinozzi, G., & Berlinguer, L. (1990). Object concept and mental 
representation in Cebus apella (capuchin) and Macaca fascicularis (longtail 
macque). Primates, 31, 537-544.
Schott, J. M., & Rossor, M. N. (2003). The grasp and other primitive reflexes. Journal 
o f Neurology and Psychiatry, 74, 558-560.
Semendeferi, K., Lu, A., Schenker, N., & Damasio, H. (2002). Humans and great apes 
share a large frontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 272-276.
Shanon, B. (1976). Aristotelianism, Newtonianism and the physics of the layman. 
Perception, 5, 241-243.
Shepard, R. N. (1984). Ecological constraints on internal representations: Resonant 
kinematic of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming. Psychological 
Review, 91, 417-447.
Shettleworth, S. (1998). Cognition, evolution and behavior. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Shinskey, J. L., & Munakata, Y. (2001). Detecting transparent barriers: Clear 
evidence against the means-end deficit account of search failures. Infancy, 2, 
395-404.
Shinskey, J. L., & Munakata, Y. (2004). 7-month-olds' Novelty Preference Reverses 
with Hidden Objects. Paper presented at the International Conference on Infant 
Studies, Chicago, Illinois, May 5-8^\
Shinskey, J. L., & Munakata, Y. (in press). Aie Infants in the Dark About Hidden 
Objects? Developmental Science.
264
Smith, B., & Casati, R. (1994). Naive Physics: An Essay in Ontology. Philosophical 
Psychology, 7(2), 225-244.
Spelke, E. (1994). Initial knowledge: six suggestions. Cognition, 50(1-3), 431-445.
Spelke, E. (2002). Symposium: Interpreting dissociations between infant looking and 
reaching: A comparative approach. Discussant at the International Conference 
on Infant Studies, Toronto, Ontario, April 18-21.
Spelke, E., Breinlinger, K., Macomber, J., & Jacobson, K. (1992). Origins of 
knowledge. Psychological Review, 99, 605-632.
Spelke, E., & von Hofsten, C. (2001). Predictive Reaching for Occluded Objects by 6- 
Month-Old Infants. Journal o f Cognition and Development, 2, 261-281.
Spelke, E. S., Katz, G., Purcell, S. E., Ehrlich, S. M., & Breinlinger, K. (1994). Early 
knowledge of object motion: continuity and inertia. Cognition, 51, 131-176.
Spence, K. W. (1937). Experimental studies of learning and the mental processes in 
infra-human primates. Psychological Bulletin, 34, 806-850.
Suddendorf, T. (2003). Early Representational Insight: Twenty-Four-Month-Olds Can 
Use a Photo to Find an Object in the World. Child Development, 74(3), 896- 
904.
Swingley, D., & Aslin, R. N. (2000). Spoken word recognition and lexical 
representation in very young children. Cognition, 76(2), 147-166.
Tebbich, S., & Bshary, R. (2004). Cognitive abilities related to tool use in the 
woodpecker finch, Cactospiza pallida, ^«zma/.SeAavmwr, 67, 689-697.
265
Thelen, E., Schoner, G., Scheier, G., & Smith, L. B. (2001). The dynamics of 
embodiment: A field theory of infant perseverative reaching. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 24(1), 1-86.
Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997). Primate Cognition'. OUP.
Uzgiris, I. C., & Hunt, J. (1975). Assessment in infancy: ordinal scales o f 
psychological development. Champaign-Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois 
Press.
Vaughter, R. M., Smotherman, W., & Ordy, J. M. (1972). Development of object 
permanence in the infant squirrel monkey. Developmental Psychology, 7, 34-38.
Visalberghi, E., Fragaszy, D. M., & Savage-Rumbaugh, S. (1995). Performance in 
tool-using task by common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan 
paniscus), an orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), and capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella). Journal o f Comparative Psychology, 109, 52-60.
Visalberghi, E., & Limongelli, L. (1994). Lack of comprehension of cause-effect 
relations in tool-using capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal o f 
Comparative Psychology, 108(\), 15-22.
Visalberghi, E., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Primate causal understanding in the 
physical and psychological domains. Behavioral Processes, 42, 189-203.
von Hofsten, C., Vishton, P., Spelke, E. S., Feng, Q., & Rosander, K. (1998). 
Predictive action in infancy: tracking and reaching for moving objects. 
Cognition, 67(3), 255-285.
266
von Hofsten, C., Vishton, P., Spelke, E. S., Rosander, K., & Feng, Q. (1998). 
Principles of predictive action in infancy. Cognition, 76, 255-285.
Warren, J. M. (1953). Handedness in the Rhesus Monkey. Science, 118, 622-623.
Watson, J. S., Gergely, G., Csanyi, V., Topal, J., Gacsi, M., & Sarkozi, Z. (2001). 
Distinguishing logic from association in the solution of an invisible 
displacement task by children and dogs: using negation of disjunction. Journal 
o f Comparative Psychology, 115(f)), 219-226.
Welsh, M., & Pennington, B. F. (1988). Assessing frontal lobe functioning in 
children: Views from developmental psychology. Developmental
Neuropsychology, 4(3), 199-230.
Willats, P. (1999). Development of means-end behavior in young infants: Pulling a 
support to retrieve a distant object. Developmental Psychology, 3(3), 651-667.
Willatts, P. (1984). The stage-IV infant's solution of problems requiring the use of 
Infant Behaviour and Development, 7, 125-134.
Willatts, P. (1989). Development of problem-solving. In A. Slater, & Bremner, J.G. 
(Ed.), Infant Development: Erlbaum.
Wimmer, H., & Pemer, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and 
constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of 
deception. Cognition, 13, 103-128.
Wise, K. L., Wise, L. A., & Zimmerman, R. R. (1974). Piagetian object permanence 
in the infant rhesus monkey. Developmental Psychology, 10, 429-437.
267
Woodward, A. L. (2003). Infants' developing understanding of the link between 
looker and object. Developmental Science, 6(3), 297-311.
Zelazo, P. D., Fiye, D., & Rapus, T. (1996). An age-related dissociation between 
knowing rules and using them. Cognitive Development, 11, 37-63.
Zelazo, P. D., Reznick, J. S., & Pinon, D. E. (1995). Response Control and the 
Execution of Verbal Rules. Developmental Psychology, 31(3), 508-517.
Zelazo, P. D., Reznick, J. S., & Spinazzola, J. (1998). Represenational Flexibility and 
Response Control in a Multistep Multilocation Search Task. Developmental 
Psychology, 34(2), 203-214.
268
